Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por eng |
Título da fonte: | Internext |
Texto Completo: | https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745 |
Resumo: | Objective: To investigate the effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance in firms convicted of corruption by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Method: The sample consisted of 131 firms, with 138 convictions received between the passage of the FCPA in 1978 and 2019. The collected data were submitted to descriptive statistics, comparison of means and multiple linear regression. Main Results: Corporate economic performance was positively explained by a combination of political connections and corruption. Performance was observed to rise over time in firms engaged in such practices, with the highest performance in the year of the conviction. Relevance / Originality: Our study fills a gap in the literature by correlating, in integrated manner, political connections and corruption with corporate economic performance, and by providing a longitudinal analysis of economic performance in demonstrably corrupt firms. Theoretical / Methodological Contributions: The study contributes to the literature by harmonizing the constructs of political connections and corruption with Resource Dependence Theory. Our results are relevant to organizations, the State and stakeholders in general and may subsidize decisions and policies for the control of corruption and maintenance of covenants. Nevertheless, they also point to socioeconomic dysfunction as these practices are detrimental to the economy at organizational level and, hence, cannot be legitimized, regardless of the desired ends. |
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Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices ActEfeito das conexões políticas e da corrupção no desempenho econômico empresarial no âmbito da Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Conexões políticasCorrupçãoDependência de recursosDesempenho econômicoPolitical ConnectionsCorruptionResource DependenceEconomic PerformanceObjective: To investigate the effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance in firms convicted of corruption by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Method: The sample consisted of 131 firms, with 138 convictions received between the passage of the FCPA in 1978 and 2019. The collected data were submitted to descriptive statistics, comparison of means and multiple linear regression. Main Results: Corporate economic performance was positively explained by a combination of political connections and corruption. Performance was observed to rise over time in firms engaged in such practices, with the highest performance in the year of the conviction. Relevance / Originality: Our study fills a gap in the literature by correlating, in integrated manner, political connections and corruption with corporate economic performance, and by providing a longitudinal analysis of economic performance in demonstrably corrupt firms. Theoretical / Methodological Contributions: The study contributes to the literature by harmonizing the constructs of political connections and corruption with Resource Dependence Theory. Our results are relevant to organizations, the State and stakeholders in general and may subsidize decisions and policies for the control of corruption and maintenance of covenants. Nevertheless, they also point to socioeconomic dysfunction as these practices are detrimental to the economy at organizational level and, hence, cannot be legitimized, regardless of the desired ends.Objetivo: Investigar os reflexos das práticas de conexões políticas e de corrupção no desempenho econômico de empresas condenadas por corrupção pela Securities and Exchange Commission por violarem a Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Método: A amostra reúne 131 companhias, responsáveis por 138 casos, desde o início da vigência da FCPA, em 1978, até 2019. Aplicaram-se técnicas de estatística descritiva, comparação de médias e regressão linear múltipla. Principais Resultados: O desempenho econômico das empresas foi explicado positivamente por práticas integradas de conexões políticas e corrupção. Verificou-se um movimento crescente no desempenho dessas empresas na extensão temporal das práticas, registrando-se o maior desempenho no ano da condenação. Relevância / Originalidade: O estudo supre lacunas na literatura, ao envolver, de forma integrada, as práticas de corrupção corporativa e conexões políticas no desempenho econômico empresarial, assim como a análise desse desempenho na extensão do tempo, em torno da prática de corrupção. Contribuições Teóricas / Metodológicas: Contribui-se para a literatura ao relacionar os construtos à teoria da dependência de recursos. Os resultados alcançam as organizações, o Estado e os stakeholders em geral, que servirão para subsidiar decisões e políticas que digam respeito ao controle da corrupção e à manutenção de alianças. No entanto, o resultado pode representar uma disfunção socioeconômica, já que tais práticas não são benéficas para a economia no contexto organizacional, não podendo ser legitimadas independentemente dos fins desejados.Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM2023-09-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/74510.18568/internext.v18i3.745Internext - International Business and Management Review ; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2023): September - DecemberInternext; v. 18 n. 3 (2023): Setembro - Dezembro1980-4865reponame:Internextinstname:Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM)instacron:ESPMporenghttps://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745/498https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745/500Copyright (c) 2023 Danival Sousa Cavalcante, Marcia Martins Mendes De Lucahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCavalcante, Danival SousaDe Luca, Marcia Martins Mendes2023-12-07T21:23:38Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/745Revistahttps://internext.espm.br/internextPRIhttps://internext.espm.br/internext/oaiinternext@espm.br1980-48651980-4865opendoar:2023-12-07T21:23:38Internext - Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Efeito das conexões políticas e da corrupção no desempenho econômico empresarial no âmbito da Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
title |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
spellingShingle |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Cavalcante, Danival Sousa Conexões políticas Corrupção Dependência de recursos Desempenho econômico Political Connections Corruption Resource Dependence Economic Performance |
title_short |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
title_full |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
title_fullStr |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
title_full_unstemmed |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
title_sort |
Effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act |
author |
Cavalcante, Danival Sousa |
author_facet |
Cavalcante, Danival Sousa De Luca, Marcia Martins Mendes |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
De Luca, Marcia Martins Mendes |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cavalcante, Danival Sousa De Luca, Marcia Martins Mendes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Conexões políticas Corrupção Dependência de recursos Desempenho econômico Political Connections Corruption Resource Dependence Economic Performance |
topic |
Conexões políticas Corrupção Dependência de recursos Desempenho econômico Political Connections Corruption Resource Dependence Economic Performance |
description |
Objective: To investigate the effect of political connections and corruption on corporate economic performance in firms convicted of corruption by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Method: The sample consisted of 131 firms, with 138 convictions received between the passage of the FCPA in 1978 and 2019. The collected data were submitted to descriptive statistics, comparison of means and multiple linear regression. Main Results: Corporate economic performance was positively explained by a combination of political connections and corruption. Performance was observed to rise over time in firms engaged in such practices, with the highest performance in the year of the conviction. Relevance / Originality: Our study fills a gap in the literature by correlating, in integrated manner, political connections and corruption with corporate economic performance, and by providing a longitudinal analysis of economic performance in demonstrably corrupt firms. Theoretical / Methodological Contributions: The study contributes to the literature by harmonizing the constructs of political connections and corruption with Resource Dependence Theory. Our results are relevant to organizations, the State and stakeholders in general and may subsidize decisions and policies for the control of corruption and maintenance of covenants. Nevertheless, they also point to socioeconomic dysfunction as these practices are detrimental to the economy at organizational level and, hence, cannot be legitimized, regardless of the desired ends. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-09-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745 10.18568/internext.v18i3.745 |
url |
https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.18568/internext.v18i3.745 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por eng |
language |
por eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745/498 https://internext.espm.br/internext/article/view/745/500 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Danival Sousa Cavalcante, Marcia Martins Mendes De Luca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Danival Sousa Cavalcante, Marcia Martins Mendes De Luca http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing - ESPM |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Internext - International Business and Management Review ; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2023): September - December Internext; v. 18 n. 3 (2023): Setembro - Dezembro 1980-4865 reponame:Internext instname:Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM) instacron:ESPM |
instname_str |
Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM) |
instacron_str |
ESPM |
institution |
ESPM |
reponame_str |
Internext |
collection |
Internext |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Internext - Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
internext@espm.br |
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1793890310439305216 |