The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/55117 |
Resumo: | We study the value of the political connections of directors on Chinese boards. We build a new dataset that measures connections of directors to members of the Politburo via past school ties, and find that private firms with politically connected directors in the boardroom get on average about 16% higher subsidies over sales per firm (7 million yuan). Connected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) access debt at 11% cheaper cost, which translates into average savings of close to 32 million yuan per firm in lower interest payments. We find that the value of the political connections persisted after the anti-corruption campaign (ACC) of 2012. It became weaker for the cost of debt in SOEs, but stronger for subsidies to private firms. We argue that the value of connections in the private sector increased after the ACC because they became a less risky alternative to corruption. We also show that connected firms do not perform better. |
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The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaignBoard of directorsChinaCorruptionMisallocation;Political connectionsWe study the value of the political connections of directors on Chinese boards. We build a new dataset that measures connections of directors to members of the Politburo via past school ties, and find that private firms with politically connected directors in the boardroom get on average about 16% higher subsidies over sales per firm (7 million yuan). Connected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) access debt at 11% cheaper cost, which translates into average savings of close to 32 million yuan per firm in lower interest payments. We find that the value of the political connections persisted after the anti-corruption campaign (ACC) of 2012. It became weaker for the cost of debt in SOEs, but stronger for subsidies to private firms. We argue that the value of connections in the private sector increased after the ACC because they became a less risky alternative to corruption. We also show that connected firms do not perform better.Repositório da Universidade de LisboaAlonso, MartaPalma, NunoSimon-Yarza, Beatriz2022-11-14T15:26:37Z20222022-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/55117engAlonso, M.,Palma, N., Simon-Yarza, B. (2022). The value of political connections: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign. Journal of Institutional Economics, 18 (05), pp. 785–805. (Published online17 February 2022). DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/S17441374220000171744-137410.1017/S1744137422000017info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T17:01:53Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/55117Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:05:48.622376Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
title |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
spellingShingle |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign Alonso, Marta Board of directors China Corruption Misallocation; Political connections |
title_short |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
title_full |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
title_fullStr |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
title_full_unstemmed |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
title_sort |
The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign |
author |
Alonso, Marta |
author_facet |
Alonso, Marta Palma, Nuno Simon-Yarza, Beatriz |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Palma, Nuno Simon-Yarza, Beatriz |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Alonso, Marta Palma, Nuno Simon-Yarza, Beatriz |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Board of directors China Corruption Misallocation; Political connections |
topic |
Board of directors China Corruption Misallocation; Political connections |
description |
We study the value of the political connections of directors on Chinese boards. We build a new dataset that measures connections of directors to members of the Politburo via past school ties, and find that private firms with politically connected directors in the boardroom get on average about 16% higher subsidies over sales per firm (7 million yuan). Connected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) access debt at 11% cheaper cost, which translates into average savings of close to 32 million yuan per firm in lower interest payments. We find that the value of the political connections persisted after the anti-corruption campaign (ACC) of 2012. It became weaker for the cost of debt in SOEs, but stronger for subsidies to private firms. We argue that the value of connections in the private sector increased after the ACC because they became a less risky alternative to corruption. We also show that connected firms do not perform better. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-11-14T15:26:37Z 2022 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/55117 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/55117 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Alonso, M.,Palma, N., Simon-Yarza, B. (2022). The value of political connections: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign. Journal of Institutional Economics, 18 (05), pp. 785–805. (Published online17 February 2022). DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137422000017 1744-1374 10.1017/S1744137422000017 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799134610148294656 |