Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Aparecida Silva Jacques, Kelly
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Lemes, Sirlei, Lopes Fávero, Luiz Paulo, Portela de Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia Maria
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
Texto Completo: https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4240
Resumo: Purpose – To identify the relationship between characteristics of the Board of Directors and the dissemination probability of socially responsible reports.Theoretical framework – Considering the central role of the Board of Directors in mitigating conflicts of interest, the study is based on the Stakeholders-Agency Theory.Design/methodology/approach – The sample included 250 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3). The data used were collected in the “Relate or Explain” Report, Economática® and CVM Reference Form, and then operationalized using a binary logistic regression model.Findings – The results suggest that the dissemination chance of socially responsible reports is 1.52% higher in companies with more concentrated shares, 101.10% higher in larger companies and 59.2% lower in companies with dual positions.Research Practical & Social implications – The findings can be useful to (i) direct organizational strategies for the composition of the Board of Directors that improve the dissemination of socially responsible reporting, (ii) to foster discussions about changes in the classification of levels about corporate governance at B3 and (iii) decision-making by several stakeholders.Originality/value – To the Accounting Academy, the study promotes an additional debate on the role of the Board of Directors in dealing with the Agency Theory. The study innovates by showing how the characteristics of the Board of Directors can change the potential for dissemination of socially responsible reports.Keywords – Stakeholder‐agency theory.; Corporate social responsibility; Corporate governance.  
id FECAP-3_87d65452d493d050dd00925609e6e1b4
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/4240
network_acronym_str FECAP-3
network_name_str Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility ReportsComposição do Conselho de Administração e a Probabilidade de Divulgação de Relatórios de Responsabilidade SocialStakeholder‐agency theoryCorporate social responsibilityCorporate GovernanceTeoria Stakeholders-Agenciaresponsabilidade social corporativaGovernança Corporativa Purpose – To identify the relationship between characteristics of the Board of Directors and the dissemination probability of socially responsible reports.Theoretical framework – Considering the central role of the Board of Directors in mitigating conflicts of interest, the study is based on the Stakeholders-Agency Theory.Design/methodology/approach – The sample included 250 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3). The data used were collected in the “Relate or Explain” Report, Economática® and CVM Reference Form, and then operationalized using a binary logistic regression model.Findings – The results suggest that the dissemination chance of socially responsible reports is 1.52% higher in companies with more concentrated shares, 101.10% higher in larger companies and 59.2% lower in companies with dual positions.Research Practical & Social implications – The findings can be useful to (i) direct organizational strategies for the composition of the Board of Directors that improve the dissemination of socially responsible reporting, (ii) to foster discussions about changes in the classification of levels about corporate governance at B3 and (iii) decision-making by several stakeholders.Originality/value – To the Accounting Academy, the study promotes an additional debate on the role of the Board of Directors in dealing with the Agency Theory. The study innovates by showing how the characteristics of the Board of Directors can change the potential for dissemination of socially responsible reports.Keywords – Stakeholder‐agency theory.; Corporate social responsibility; Corporate governance.   Objetivo – Identificar a relação entre as características do Conselho de Administração e a probabilidade de divulgação de relatórios socialmente responsáveis.Referencial teórico – Considerando o papel central do Conselho de Administração na mitigação de conflitos de interesses, o estudo baseia-se na Teoria Stakeholders-Agência.Desenho/metodologia/abordagem – A amostra incluiu 250 empresas listadas na bolsa de valores brasileira (B3). Os dados utilizados foram coletados no Relatório “Relacione ou Explique”, Economática® e Formulário de Referência da CVM, e posteriormente operacionalizados por meio de modelo de regressão logística binária.Resultados – Os resultados sugerem que a chance de divulgação de relatórios socialmente responsáveis ​​é 1,52% maior nas empresas com ações mais concentradas, 101,10% maior nas empresas maiores e 59,2% menor nas empresas com dupla posição.Implicações Práticas e Sociais da Pesquisa – Os resultados podem ser úteis para (i) direcionar estratégias organizacionais para a composição do Conselho de Administração que melhorem a disseminação de relatórios socialmente responsáveis, (ii) fomentar discussões sobre mudanças na classificação dos níveis corporativos governança na B3 e (iii) tomada de decisões por diversos stakeholders.Originalidade/valor – Para a Academia de Contabilidade, o estudo promove um debate adicional sobre o papel do Conselho de Administração no tratamento da Teoria da Agência. O estudo inova ao mostrar como as características do Conselho de Administração podem alterar o potencial de divulgação de relatórios socialmente responsáveis.Palavras-chave – Teoria da agência dos stakeholders.; Responsabilidade social corporativa; Governança corporativa.FECAP2023-12-12info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por paresapplication/pdfhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/424010.7819/rbgn.v25i4.4240Review of Business Management; Vol. 25 No. 4 (2023): RBGN Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; Vol. 25 Núm. 4 (2023): RBGN - Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; v. 25 n. 4 (2023): 1983-08071806-4892reponame:Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)instname:Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)instacron:FECAPenghttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4240/1936Copyright (c) 2023 Review of Business Managementinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAparecida Silva Jacques, KellyLemes, SirleiLopes Fávero, Luiz PauloPortela de Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia Maria2023-12-12T19:39:43Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/4240Revistahttp://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/indexhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/oai||jmauricio@fecap.br1983-08071806-4892opendoar:2023-12-12T19:39:43Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online) - Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
Composição do Conselho de Administração e a Probabilidade de Divulgação de Relatórios de Responsabilidade Social
title Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
spellingShingle Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
Aparecida Silva Jacques, Kelly
Stakeholder‐agency theory
Corporate social responsibility
Corporate Governance
Teoria Stakeholders-Agencia
responsabilidade social corporativa
Governança Corporativa
title_short Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
title_full Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
title_fullStr Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
title_full_unstemmed Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
title_sort Composition of the Board of Directors and the Likelihood of Disclosure of Social Responsibility Reports
author Aparecida Silva Jacques, Kelly
author_facet Aparecida Silva Jacques, Kelly
Lemes, Sirlei
Lopes Fávero, Luiz Paulo
Portela de Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia Maria
author_role author
author2 Lemes, Sirlei
Lopes Fávero, Luiz Paulo
Portela de Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia Maria
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Aparecida Silva Jacques, Kelly
Lemes, Sirlei
Lopes Fávero, Luiz Paulo
Portela de Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia Maria
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Stakeholder‐agency theory
Corporate social responsibility
Corporate Governance
Teoria Stakeholders-Agencia
responsabilidade social corporativa
Governança Corporativa
topic Stakeholder‐agency theory
Corporate social responsibility
Corporate Governance
Teoria Stakeholders-Agencia
responsabilidade social corporativa
Governança Corporativa
description Purpose – To identify the relationship between characteristics of the Board of Directors and the dissemination probability of socially responsible reports.Theoretical framework – Considering the central role of the Board of Directors in mitigating conflicts of interest, the study is based on the Stakeholders-Agency Theory.Design/methodology/approach – The sample included 250 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3). The data used were collected in the “Relate or Explain” Report, Economática® and CVM Reference Form, and then operationalized using a binary logistic regression model.Findings – The results suggest that the dissemination chance of socially responsible reports is 1.52% higher in companies with more concentrated shares, 101.10% higher in larger companies and 59.2% lower in companies with dual positions.Research Practical & Social implications – The findings can be useful to (i) direct organizational strategies for the composition of the Board of Directors that improve the dissemination of socially responsible reporting, (ii) to foster discussions about changes in the classification of levels about corporate governance at B3 and (iii) decision-making by several stakeholders.Originality/value – To the Accounting Academy, the study promotes an additional debate on the role of the Board of Directors in dealing with the Agency Theory. The study innovates by showing how the characteristics of the Board of Directors can change the potential for dissemination of socially responsible reports.Keywords – Stakeholder‐agency theory.; Corporate social responsibility; Corporate governance.  
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-12-12
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4240
10.7819/rbgn.v25i4.4240
url https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4240
identifier_str_mv 10.7819/rbgn.v25i4.4240
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4240/1936
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Review of Business Management
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Review of Business Management
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv FECAP
publisher.none.fl_str_mv FECAP
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Review of Business Management; Vol. 25 No. 4 (2023):
RBGN Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; Vol. 25 Núm. 4 (2023):
RBGN - Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; v. 25 n. 4 (2023):
1983-0807
1806-4892
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
instname:Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
instacron:FECAP
instname_str Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
instacron_str FECAP
institution FECAP
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online) - Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||jmauricio@fecap.br
_version_ 1798942371061170176