Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: CHEN, You-hua
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: NIE, Pu-yan, Huang, Ji-bo
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
Texto Completo: https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462
Resumo: Purpose – This paper highlights the interaction between innovationand financial structure under duopoly with a monopoly debater.Design/methodology/approach – By game-theory approaches, wecharacterize effects of debt levels on innovative investment with limitedliability effect.Findings – This paper argues that higher debt levels increase bothinnovative investment and output. Both higher debt rate and higherdebt levels act as commitment to reduce opponent firms’ net profits.Net profit for unit debt is reduced with higher debt level and higherdebt rate.Originality/value – This study extends Brander and Lewis’s (1986) toinnovative situation and no interior point solution is restricted.
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spelling Duopoly innovation with monopoly debaterInnovación duopolio con orador de monopolioInovação de duopólio com debatedor de monopólioFinancial structureinnovationmonopoly debatercorporate financecommitmentEstrutura financeirainovaçãodebatedor de monopóliofinanças corporativascompromisso.Purpose – This paper highlights the interaction between innovationand financial structure under duopoly with a monopoly debater.Design/methodology/approach – By game-theory approaches, wecharacterize effects of debt levels on innovative investment with limitedliability effect.Findings – This paper argues that higher debt levels increase bothinnovative investment and output. Both higher debt rate and higherdebt levels act as commitment to reduce opponent firms’ net profits.Net profit for unit debt is reduced with higher debt level and higherdebt rate.Originality/value – This study extends Brander and Lewis’s (1986) toinnovative situation and no interior point solution is restricted.Objetivo – O presente artigo destaca a interação entre a inovação e aestrutura financeira segundo o conceito de duopólio com um debatedorde monopólio.Metodologia – Por meio de abordagens de teorias de jogos,caracterizamos os efeitos dos níveis de dívida em investimentosinovadores com efeito da responsabilidade limitada.Resultados – O presente artigo argumenta que níveis mais altos dedívida aumentam tanto os investimentos quanto os resultados. Tantoa taxa de dívida mais alta quanto os níveis de dívida mais altos atuamcomo um compromisso com a redução dos lucros líquidos das empresasconcorrentes. O lucro líquido por dívida unitária é reduzido com maiornível de dívida e maior taxa de dívida.Contribuições – O presente artigo expande o trabalho de Brandere Lewis (1986) para uma situação inovadora, sem a restrição de umasolução de ponto interior.FECAP2017-02-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/246210.7819/rbgn.v19i63.2462Review of Business Management; Vol. 19 No. 63 (2017); 104-117RBGN Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; Vol. 19 Núm. 63 (2017); 104-117RBGN - Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; v. 19 n. 63 (2017); 104-1171983-08071806-4892reponame:Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)instname:Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)instacron:FECAPengporhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462/pdfhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462/pdf_1Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business Managementinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCHEN, You-huaNIE, Pu-yanHuang, Ji-bo2021-07-21T16:24:20Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/2462Revistahttp://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/indexhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/oai||jmauricio@fecap.br1983-08071806-4892opendoar:2021-07-21T16:24:20Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online) - Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
Innovación duopolio con orador de monopolio
Inovação de duopólio com debatedor de monopólio
title Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
spellingShingle Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
CHEN, You-hua
Financial structure
innovation
monopoly debater
corporate finance
commitment
Estrutura financeira
inovação
debatedor de monopólio
finanças corporativas
compromisso.
title_short Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
title_full Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
title_fullStr Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
title_full_unstemmed Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
title_sort Duopoly innovation with monopoly debater
author CHEN, You-hua
author_facet CHEN, You-hua
NIE, Pu-yan
Huang, Ji-bo
author_role author
author2 NIE, Pu-yan
Huang, Ji-bo
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv CHEN, You-hua
NIE, Pu-yan
Huang, Ji-bo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Financial structure
innovation
monopoly debater
corporate finance
commitment
Estrutura financeira
inovação
debatedor de monopólio
finanças corporativas
compromisso.
topic Financial structure
innovation
monopoly debater
corporate finance
commitment
Estrutura financeira
inovação
debatedor de monopólio
finanças corporativas
compromisso.
description Purpose – This paper highlights the interaction between innovationand financial structure under duopoly with a monopoly debater.Design/methodology/approach – By game-theory approaches, wecharacterize effects of debt levels on innovative investment with limitedliability effect.Findings – This paper argues that higher debt levels increase bothinnovative investment and output. Both higher debt rate and higherdebt levels act as commitment to reduce opponent firms’ net profits.Net profit for unit debt is reduced with higher debt level and higherdebt rate.Originality/value – This study extends Brander and Lewis’s (1986) toinnovative situation and no interior point solution is restricted.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-02-06
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462
10.7819/rbgn.v19i63.2462
url https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462
identifier_str_mv 10.7819/rbgn.v19i63.2462
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462/pdf
https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/2462/pdf_1
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business Management
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business Management
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv FECAP
publisher.none.fl_str_mv FECAP
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Review of Business Management; Vol. 19 No. 63 (2017); 104-117
RBGN Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; Vol. 19 Núm. 63 (2017); 104-117
RBGN - Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; v. 19 n. 63 (2017); 104-117
1983-0807
1806-4892
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
instname:Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
instacron:FECAP
instname_str Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
instacron_str FECAP
institution FECAP
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online) - Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||jmauricio@fecap.br
_version_ 1798942368955629568

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