The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista de Administração Pública |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171 |
Resumo: | This paper examines the effects of a president’s coalition management decisions on the costs of governing. An innovative Governing Costs Index (GCI) was developed, taking into consideration political and financial transfers made by the president to coalition parties. GCI is calculated employing a principal component analysis. The relationship between the variations on the management strategies and the costs were estimated using a first-differences panel. GCI was considered as the dependent variable and the coalition size, ideological heterogeneity, and cabinet proportionality among partners as the explanatory variables. Results indicate that large, ideologically heterogeneous coalitions and disproportional cabinets tend to be more expensive over time. The results also suggest that presidential decisions about how to manage coalitions influence governing costs in important ways, even when controlling exogenous constraints like party fragmentation at the Congress and presidential popularity. In addition, spending more political and financial resources with coalition allies does not necessarily lead to greater political support for the president in the Congress. |
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The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential systemPagando el precio de gobernar: costos del manejo de coalición en el presidencialismo brasileñoPagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileirogoverning costscoalition managementmultiparty presidential systempresidentExecutive-Legislative relationscostos de gobernarmanejo de coalicionespresidencialismo de coaliciónpresidenterelaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativocustos de governogerência de coalizãopresidencialismo multipartidáriopresidenterelações Executivo-LegislativoThis paper examines the effects of a president’s coalition management decisions on the costs of governing. An innovative Governing Costs Index (GCI) was developed, taking into consideration political and financial transfers made by the president to coalition parties. GCI is calculated employing a principal component analysis. The relationship between the variations on the management strategies and the costs were estimated using a first-differences panel. GCI was considered as the dependent variable and the coalition size, ideological heterogeneity, and cabinet proportionality among partners as the explanatory variables. Results indicate that large, ideologically heterogeneous coalitions and disproportional cabinets tend to be more expensive over time. The results also suggest that presidential decisions about how to manage coalitions influence governing costs in important ways, even when controlling exogenous constraints like party fragmentation at the Congress and presidential popularity. In addition, spending more political and financial resources with coalition allies does not necessarily lead to greater political support for the president in the Congress.Este artículo analiza los efectos de las decisiones presidenciales del manejo de la coalición en los costos para gobernar. Se utiliza el análisis de componentes principales para crear el Índice de Costo de Gobierno (ICG) y se utiliza un panel de primeras diferencias para estimar la relación entre el índice y las variables de gestión de la coalición: el tamaño de la coalición, la heterogeneidad ideológica y proporcionalidad de poder con aliados. Los resultados indican que coaliciones demasiado grandes, desproporcionadas y ideológicamente heterogéneas tienden a ser más costosas a lo largo del tiempo. Los resultados también sugieren que las decisiones presidenciales sobre cómo manejar las coaliciones influyen en los costos, aún controlando por las limitaciones exógenas como fragmentación partidaria y popularidad presidencial. Además, gastar más recursos políticos y financieros con los aliados de la coalición no implica necesariamente un mayor apoyo político para el Presidente en el Congreso.Este artigo analisa os efeitos das estratégias do presidente de como gerir sua coalizão sobre os custos de governar ao longo do seu mandato. Foi desenvolvido um Índice inédito de Custo de Governo (ICG) considerando as transferências políticas e monetárias feitas pelo presidente aos partidos da sua coalizão. O ICG foi calculado a partir de análise de componentes principais. As relações entre as variações de estratégias de gerência e seus custos foram estimadas por meio de um painel não balanceado em primeiras diferenças, tendo como variável dependente o ICG e como variáveis explicativas o tamanho da coalizão, a heterogeneidade ideológica e a alocação proporcional de poder entre parceiros. Os resultados indicam que coalizões grandes, ideologicamente heterogêneas e desproporcionais tendem a ser mais caras ao longo do tempo. As decisões presidenciais de como gerenciar suas coalizões influenciam os custos de governo, mesmo controlando por aspectos exógenos, como fragmentação partidária na Câmara dos Deputados e popularidade presidencial. Além disso, gastar mais recursos políticos e financeiros com os aliados da coalizão não significa necessariamente maior apoio político no Legislativo.Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)2017-08-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 51 No. 4 (2017); 528-550Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 51 Núm. 4 (2017); 528-550Revista de Administração Pública; v. 51 n. 4 (2017); 528-5501982-31340034-7612reponame:Revista de Administração Públicainstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171/68617https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171/pdf_122Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBertholini, FredericoPereira, Carlos2017-08-31T13:48:16Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/71171Revistahttps://ebape.fgv.br/publicacoes/rapONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rap@fgv.br1982-31340034-7612opendoar:2017-08-31T13:48:16Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system Pagando el precio de gobernar: costos del manejo de coalición en el presidencialismo brasileño Pagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileiro |
title |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
spellingShingle |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system Bertholini, Frederico governing costs coalition management multiparty presidential system president Executive-Legislative relations costos de gobernar manejo de coaliciones presidencialismo de coalición presidente relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo custos de governo gerência de coalizão presidencialismo multipartidário presidente relações Executivo-Legislativo |
title_short |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
title_full |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
title_fullStr |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
title_full_unstemmed |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
title_sort |
The price of governing: coalition management costs in Brazil’s presidential system |
author |
Bertholini, Frederico |
author_facet |
Bertholini, Frederico Pereira, Carlos |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pereira, Carlos |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bertholini, Frederico Pereira, Carlos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
governing costs coalition management multiparty presidential system president Executive-Legislative relations costos de gobernar manejo de coaliciones presidencialismo de coalición presidente relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo custos de governo gerência de coalizão presidencialismo multipartidário presidente relações Executivo-Legislativo |
topic |
governing costs coalition management multiparty presidential system president Executive-Legislative relations costos de gobernar manejo de coaliciones presidencialismo de coalición presidente relaciones Ejecutivo-Legislativo custos de governo gerência de coalizão presidencialismo multipartidário presidente relações Executivo-Legislativo |
description |
This paper examines the effects of a president’s coalition management decisions on the costs of governing. An innovative Governing Costs Index (GCI) was developed, taking into consideration political and financial transfers made by the president to coalition parties. GCI is calculated employing a principal component analysis. The relationship between the variations on the management strategies and the costs were estimated using a first-differences panel. GCI was considered as the dependent variable and the coalition size, ideological heterogeneity, and cabinet proportionality among partners as the explanatory variables. Results indicate that large, ideologically heterogeneous coalitions and disproportional cabinets tend to be more expensive over time. The results also suggest that presidential decisions about how to manage coalitions influence governing costs in important ways, even when controlling exogenous constraints like party fragmentation at the Congress and presidential popularity. In addition, spending more political and financial resources with coalition allies does not necessarily lead to greater political support for the president in the Congress. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-08-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171 |
url |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por eng |
language |
por eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171/68617 https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/71171/pdf_122 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Pública info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Pública |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 51 No. 4 (2017); 528-550 Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 51 Núm. 4 (2017); 528-550 Revista de Administração Pública; v. 51 n. 4 (2017); 528-550 1982-3134 0034-7612 reponame:Revista de Administração Pública instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Revista de Administração Pública |
collection |
Revista de Administração Pública |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||rap@fgv.br |
_version_ |
1798943772548005888 |