The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Opinião Pública (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563 |
Resumo: | In Brazil, the president's party commands job positions and legislative proposals in the executive branch, demonstrating the effort to implement its agenda. However, a bill only becomes law after being passed by the legislature, where it is frequently changed in committees. Thus, the presidential party also seeks to gain command of these bodies. This article analyzes if and how this occurs. We use a descriptive analysis, with logistic regressions, and data from the Cebrap Legislative Database on the presidents and rapporteurs of legislative commissions (1995-2014). We demonstrate that the presidential party has more rapporteurs than their weight in the House, mainly for bills proposed by government. Its deputies preside over the committees that distribute the most rapporteurships and benefit their co-members in the assignments. The article contributes to analysis of executive-legislative branch relationships, and the administration of coalitions and confirms the importance of committees in the decision-making process. |
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The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissionsEl partido del presidente de Brasil en la legislatura: centralización de trabajo en las comisiones permanentesO partido do presidente do Brasil no Legislativo: centralização de trabalho nas comissões permanentesCentralización de trabajoPresidencialismo de coaliciónPartido del presidentePoder LegislativoComisiones permanentesCentralização de trabalhoPresidencialismo de coalizãoPartido do presidentePoder LegislativoComissões permanentesCentralization of laborPresidentialism through coalitionThe president’s partyLegislative branchPermanent commissionsIn Brazil, the president's party commands job positions and legislative proposals in the executive branch, demonstrating the effort to implement its agenda. However, a bill only becomes law after being passed by the legislature, where it is frequently changed in committees. Thus, the presidential party also seeks to gain command of these bodies. This article analyzes if and how this occurs. We use a descriptive analysis, with logistic regressions, and data from the Cebrap Legislative Database on the presidents and rapporteurs of legislative commissions (1995-2014). We demonstrate that the presidential party has more rapporteurs than their weight in the House, mainly for bills proposed by government. Its deputies preside over the committees that distribute the most rapporteurships and benefit their co-members in the assignments. The article contributes to analysis of executive-legislative branch relationships, and the administration of coalitions and confirms the importance of committees in the decision-making process.En Brasil, el partido del presidente, en comparación con sus pares de coalición, concentra ministerios, burocracias e iniciativas legislativas en el poder ejecutivo, demostrando un compromiso con la implementación de su agenda. Sin embargo, un proyecto de ley sólo se convierte en ley después de que se procesa en la legislatura, donde a menudo se modifica en las comisiones, por lo tanto, el partido presidencial busca cierta centralización en estos órganos. El objetivo del artículo es investigar si y como el partido presidencial centraliza trabajo en la Cámara de Diputados. Analizamos con estadísticas descriptivas y regresiones logísticas informaciones de la Base de Datos Legislativos del Cebrap sobre presidencia de comisión y relatoría (1995-2014). Demostramos que los miembros del partido presidencial son nombrados relator en proporciones superiores a su peso en la Cámara, principalmente en proyectos gubernamentales: sus diputados presiden las comisiones que distribuyen la mayoría de las relatorías y priorizan a sus correligionarios en las indicaciones. El artículo es original al examinar la acción del partido presidencial en la Cámara, trae contribuciones sobre la interacción Ejecutiva-Legislativa y la gestión de la coalición y ratifica la relevancia de las comisiones en el proceso decisorio.No Brasil, o partido presidencial centraliza cargos e propostas legislativas no Executivo, demonstrando empenho em implementar sua agenda. Porém, um projeto só se torna lei após passar pelo Legislativo, o que frequentemente é alterado nas comissões. Assim o partido presidencial busca centralização também nesses órgãos. Este artigo analisa se e como isso ocorre. Analisamos descritivamente, e com regressão logística, dados da Câmara da presidência de comissão e relatoria (1995-2014). Apontamos que o partido presidencial recebe relatorias em proporção superior ao peso de sua bancada, sobretudo em projetos do governo: seus deputados presidem as comissões que mais designam relatores e priorizam seus correligionários nas indicações. O artigo traz contribuições sobre relação Executivo-Legislativo, gerenciamento de coalizão e ratifica a relevância das comissões no processo decisório.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2023-08-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563Opinião Pública; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2023): May/Aug.; p. 505-527Opinião Pública; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2023): mayo/ago.; p. 505-527Opinião Pública; v. 29 n. 2 (2023): maio/ago.; p. 505-5271807-0191reponame:Opinião Pública (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563/32505Brazil; ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrasil; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2023 Opinião Públicahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVasquez, VitorMagalhães, Benjamin de Oliveira2023-09-15T17:02:53Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8674563Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/opPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/oaicesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br1807-01910104-6276opendoar:2023-09-15T17:02:53Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions El partido del presidente de Brasil en la legislatura: centralización de trabajo en las comisiones permanentes O partido do presidente do Brasil no Legislativo: centralização de trabalho nas comissões permanentes |
title |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
spellingShingle |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions Vasquez, Vitor Centralización de trabajo Presidencialismo de coalición Partido del presidente Poder Legislativo Comisiones permanentes Centralização de trabalho Presidencialismo de coalizão Partido do presidente Poder Legislativo Comissões permanentes Centralization of labor Presidentialism through coalition The president’s party Legislative branch Permanent commissions |
title_short |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
title_full |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
title_fullStr |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
title_sort |
The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions |
author |
Vasquez, Vitor |
author_facet |
Vasquez, Vitor Magalhães, Benjamin de Oliveira |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Magalhães, Benjamin de Oliveira |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vasquez, Vitor Magalhães, Benjamin de Oliveira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Centralización de trabajo Presidencialismo de coalición Partido del presidente Poder Legislativo Comisiones permanentes Centralização de trabalho Presidencialismo de coalizão Partido do presidente Poder Legislativo Comissões permanentes Centralization of labor Presidentialism through coalition The president’s party Legislative branch Permanent commissions |
topic |
Centralización de trabajo Presidencialismo de coalición Partido del presidente Poder Legislativo Comisiones permanentes Centralização de trabalho Presidencialismo de coalizão Partido do presidente Poder Legislativo Comissões permanentes Centralization of labor Presidentialism through coalition The president’s party Legislative branch Permanent commissions |
description |
In Brazil, the president's party commands job positions and legislative proposals in the executive branch, demonstrating the effort to implement its agenda. However, a bill only becomes law after being passed by the legislature, where it is frequently changed in committees. Thus, the presidential party also seeks to gain command of these bodies. This article analyzes if and how this occurs. We use a descriptive analysis, with logistic regressions, and data from the Cebrap Legislative Database on the presidents and rapporteurs of legislative commissions (1995-2014). We demonstrate that the presidential party has more rapporteurs than their weight in the House, mainly for bills proposed by government. Its deputies preside over the committees that distribute the most rapporteurships and benefit their co-members in the assignments. The article contributes to analysis of executive-legislative branch relationships, and the administration of coalitions and confirms the importance of committees in the decision-making process. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-08-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8674563/32505 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Opinião Pública https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Opinião Pública https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brasil; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Opinião Pública; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2023): May/Aug.; p. 505-527 Opinião Pública; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2023): mayo/ago.; p. 505-527 Opinião Pública; v. 29 n. 2 (2023): maio/ago.; p. 505-527 1807-0191 reponame:Opinião Pública (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Opinião Pública (Online) |
collection |
Opinião Pública (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Opinião Pública (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
cesop@unicamp.br||racael@unicamp.br || rop@unicamp.br |
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1800217018548355072 |