Paradoxes on the disclosure of civil servants’ salary information by local governments

• Autor(a) principal: Precinotto, André
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Aquino, André Carlos Busanelli de, Dias, Lidiane Nazaré da Silva
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/85334
• topic: paradox; transparency; open government; payroll disclosure/salary disclosure; paradoja; transparencia; gobierno abierto; nómina de servidores; paradoxo; transparência; governo aberto; folha de pagamento

Although local governments’ payrolls are a significant expense, they are one of the most difficult to monitor. The disclosure of civil servants’ salaries to improve control is a measure of public interest, but the mere information on the government’s personnel expenses as provided by law may not be sufficient to detect irregularities. This study analyzes the paradoxes of disclosing salary information and the tensions among the parties related to this issue. We interviewed local government employees, unions, software companies, courts of accounts, nonprofit organizations, and journalists, gathering different interests and perspectives, addressing the issue as an example of the challenges to improve public transparency. Based on an inductive approach, the research offers a non-exhaustive list of irregularities in Brazil that are not detected by simply disclosing information in transparency portals. Our findings point out that detecting and addressing such irregularities require the cooperation of several control agents to combine multiple data sources and evidence.