Debt in firms with a high propension to expropriation: the case of controlled firms

• Autor(a) principal: Soares, Rodrigo Oliveira
• Data de Publicação: 2008
• Outros Autores: Kloeckner, Gilberto de Oliveira
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista de Administração de Empresas
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rae/article/view/36753
• topic: Capital structure; ownership structure; agency problems; expropriation; Brazilian market; Estrutura de capital; estrutura de propriedade; problema de agência; expropriação; mercado brasileiro

The Brazilian capital market is characterized by concentrated ownership structures, in a legal environment which is propitious to the expropriation of minority shareholders, what may influence the incentives to decision makers, and mainly, affect the decision on debt as a financing source. We aimed to study the leverage of firms controlled by a single shareholder, which we classify as high propension to minority expropriation firms. The sample consisted of 322 company traded at Bovespa between 1996 and 2002. Tests results showed that the firms controlled by a single shareholder used a smaller amount of debt, what is consistent with the high monitoring capacity of debtholders. Conversely, the level of debt increases as the cash flow rights of the controller shareholder decreases, what may be a signal of the use of debt as a governance device.