Crime and Punishment in Classroom: a Game-Theoretic Approach for Student Cheating

• Autor(a) principal: Griebeler,Marcelo de C.
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
• Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402017000100043
• topic: Student Cheating; Game Theory; Academic Dishonesty

We provide the microeconomic foundations of cheating in classroom through a static game with complete information. Our setting is composed by two students, who must choose whether or not to cheat, and a professor, who must choose how much effort to exert in trying to catch dishonest students. Our findings support the determinants of cheating found by the empirical literature, mainly those related to the penalty's level. It is also emphasized the importance of professors being well-motivated (with low disutility of effort) and worried about fairness in classroom. The several extensions of the baseline model reinforce the importance of the cost-benefit analysis to understand dishonest behavior in classroom. Finally, by relaxing the complete information assumption, we discuss the role of students' uncertainty about the professor's type and how low effort professors can send signals to create incentives for honest behavior.