Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/480 |
Resumo: | We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game. |
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Page Junior, Frank H.Monteiro, P. K.Escolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:24:56Z2010-09-23T18:57:36Z2008-05-13T15:24:56Z2010-09-23T18:57:36Z2002-03-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/480We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.engFundação Getulio VargasEnsaios Econômicos;442Competitive nonlinear pricingDelegation principleImplementation principleCompetitive taxation principleNash equilibria for discontinuous gamesEconomiaEconomiaPreços - Determinação - BrasilThree principles of competitive nonlinear pricinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTHUMBNAIL1288.pdf.jpg1288.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4182https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6f026cee-8a2d-4994-9afb-fddfa9ee6aa3/download13578ca4226a31a9aa2b59fb2f8e15a5MD59TEXT1288.pdf.txt1288.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain1034https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/be6da4db-ba6a-4c95-bfb9-b1041cb7a210/download7615d1f96c484976f21e68492618d023MD58ORIGINAL1288.pdf1288.pdfapplication/pdf2183886https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/53bbe3e3-a252-4e5e-b9b7-3023eebbde55/downloadbaa789fd8fd3267077b552f924a7d619MD5510438/4802023-11-08 15:28:37.175open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/480https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-08T15:28:37Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
title |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
spellingShingle |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing Page Junior, Frank H. Competitive nonlinear pricing Delegation principle Implementation principle Competitive taxation principle Nash equilibria for discontinuous games Economia Economia Preços - Determinação - Brasil |
title_short |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
title_full |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
title_fullStr |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
title_full_unstemmed |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
title_sort |
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing |
author |
Page Junior, Frank H. |
author_facet |
Page Junior, Frank H. Monteiro, P. K. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Monteiro, P. K. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Page Junior, Frank H. Monteiro, P. K. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Competitive nonlinear pricing Delegation principle Implementation principle Competitive taxation principle Nash equilibria for discontinuous games |
topic |
Competitive nonlinear pricing Delegation principle Implementation principle Competitive taxation principle Nash equilibria for discontinuous games Economia Economia Preços - Determinação - Brasil |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia Preços - Determinação - Brasil |
description |
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2002-03-01 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:24:56Z 2010-09-23T18:57:36Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:24:56Z 2010-09-23T18:57:36Z |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/480 |
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0104-8910 |
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0104-8910 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/480 |
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eng |
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Ensaios Econômicos;442 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas |
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Fundação Getulio Vargas |
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