Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Garcia, Fernando
Data de Publicação: 1998
Outros Autores: Silva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
Tipo de documento: Relatório
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2984
Resumo: In the present paper, we prove that any social choice function satisfies Arrow s principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if individual behavior is menu-dependent. Therefore, Arrow s General Possibility Theorem is not valid when individual preferences are determined by irreducible values. In this context, any aggregation device which satisfies Non-dictatorship and Paretian Unanimity principles (simple majority, for example) also does IIA. This could be an important result for social choice theory, inasmuch as individual behavior determined by irreducible values (self-interest, ideology, ethics, and social norms, for example) can validate representative democracy. The relative importance of such values and the possibility of preference reversals determine the dynamics of social choice according to democratic principles.
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spelling Garcia, FernandoSilva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves daEscolas::EAESP2009-10-27T17:28:38Z2009-10-27T17:28:38Z1998-01-01T00:00:00Z19981998;7http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2984In the present paper, we prove that any social choice function satisfies Arrow s principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if individual behavior is menu-dependent. Therefore, Arrow s General Possibility Theorem is not valid when individual preferences are determined by irreducible values. In this context, any aggregation device which satisfies Non-dictatorship and Paretian Unanimity principles (simple majority, for example) also does IIA. This could be an important result for social choice theory, inasmuch as individual behavior determined by irreducible values (self-interest, ideology, ethics, and social norms, for example) can validate representative democracy. The relative importance of such values and the possibility of preference reversals determine the dynamics of social choice according to democratic principles.No presente paper, nós provamos que qualquer função da escolha social satisfaz o princípio da independência das alternativas irrelevantes (IIA) de Arrow se o comportamento individual é menu-dependente. Portanto, o 'Teorema da Possibilidade Geral' de Arrow não é válido quando as preferências individuais são determinadas por valores irredutíveis. Nesse contexto, qualquer instrumento de agregação que satisfaça os princípios não-ditatoriais e paretianos de unanimidade (maioria simples, por exemplo) também faz IIA. Esse poderia ser um resultado importante para a teoria da escolha social, enquanto um comportamento individual determinado por valores irredutíveis (interesse próprio, ideologia, Ética e normas sociais, por exemplo) podendo validar democracia representativa. A importância relativa de tais valores e da possibilidade de reversão da preferência determina a dinâmica da escolha social, de acordo com os princípios democráticos.engRelatório de pesquisa FGV/EAESP/NPP;n.7Constitutional economicsNova economia políticaTeorema da possibilidade geralAdministração de empresasDemocraciaSocial choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideologyEscolha social e valores irredutíveis: uma aproximação da economia política e a ideologiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINALP00130_1.pdfapplication/pdf126902https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/73347f23-a01a-4840-bde5-3338153da3da/downloaddb0607c31f4eaddc8bc88efe3592f628MD51TEXTP00130_1.pdf.txtP00130_1.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain41159https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/a8977da6-9bc6-46b7-aa5a-4454b30983a3/download1d606488f578fd51ca454d48e14a8229MD56THUMBNAILP00130_1.pdf.jpgP00130_1.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3791https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/8930dafc-3248-4e16-9d3d-d5873d1dcccf/downloadc8da087139af76332f426e34a0f59d49MD5710438/29842023-11-09 20:09:55.414open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/2984https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T20:09:55Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
dc.title.alternative.por.fl_str_mv Escolha social e valores irredutíveis: uma aproximação da economia política e a ideologia
title Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
spellingShingle Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
Garcia, Fernando
Constitutional economics
Nova economia política
Teorema da possibilidade geral
Administração de empresas
Democracia
title_short Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
title_full Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
title_fullStr Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
title_full_unstemmed Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
title_sort Social choice and irreducible values: a political economy approach of ideology
author Garcia, Fernando
author_facet Garcia, Fernando
Silva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
author_role author
author2 Silva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
author2_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EAESP
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Garcia, Fernando
Silva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Constitutional economics
topic Constitutional economics
Nova economia política
Teorema da possibilidade geral
Administração de empresas
Democracia
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Nova economia política
Teorema da possibilidade geral
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Administração de empresas
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Democracia
description In the present paper, we prove that any social choice function satisfies Arrow s principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if individual behavior is menu-dependent. Therefore, Arrow s General Possibility Theorem is not valid when individual preferences are determined by irreducible values. In this context, any aggregation device which satisfies Non-dictatorship and Paretian Unanimity principles (simple majority, for example) also does IIA. This could be an important result for social choice theory, inasmuch as individual behavior determined by irreducible values (self-interest, ideology, ethics, and social norms, for example) can validate representative democracy. The relative importance of such values and the possibility of preference reversals determine the dynamics of social choice according to democratic principles.
publishDate 1998
dc.date.created.fl_str_mv 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 1998
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2009-10-27T17:28:38Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2009-10-27T17:28:38Z
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dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv Relatório de pesquisa FGV/EAESP/NPP;n.7
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