Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2752 |
Resumo: | This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization. |
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Pereira, CarlosTeles, Vladimir KuhlEscolas::EESP2009-09-03T18:18:12Z2009-09-03T18:18:12Z2009-09-03http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2752This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. 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dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
title |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
spellingShingle |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth Pereira, Carlos Political institutions Economic growth Democracy Economia Economia |
title_short |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
title_full |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
title_fullStr |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
title_full_unstemmed |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
title_sort |
Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth |
author |
Pereira, Carlos |
author_facet |
Pereira, Carlos Teles, Vladimir Kuhl |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Teles, Vladimir Kuhl |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EESP |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, Carlos Teles, Vladimir Kuhl |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Political institutions Economic growth Democracy |
topic |
Political institutions Economic growth Democracy Economia Economia |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
description |
This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2009-09-03T18:18:12Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2009-09-03T18:18:12Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2009-09-03 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
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article |
status_str |
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2752 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2752 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Textos para Discussão;196 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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