Área de Livre-Comércio das Américas: incentivos econômicos e políticos

• Autor(a) principal: Motta, Daniel Augusto
• Data de Publicação: 2002
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/1838
• topic: Political economy; Bargaining; Non-cooperative games; FTAA; ALCA; Economia política; Barganha; Jogos não cooperativos; Economia; Área de Livre Comércio das Américas (Organização)

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the political economy of Free Trade Area of America based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small economy, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups define the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg 'coalition-proof' equilibrium define the format of the free trade agreement in the second stage. Finally, I discuss a few modifications in the initial game structure in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power.