Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Motta,Daniel Augusto
Data de Publicação: 2007
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Economia Política
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000200003
Resumo: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.
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spelling Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiationFTAApolitical economybargainingnon-cooperative gamesThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.Centro de Economia Política2007-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000200003Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.2 2007reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/S0101-31572007000200003info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMotta,Daniel Augustoeng2007-09-17T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31572007000200003Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2007-09-17T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
title Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
spellingShingle Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
Motta,Daniel Augusto
FTAA
political economy
bargaining
non-cooperative games
title_short Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
title_full Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
title_fullStr Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
title_full_unstemmed Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
title_sort Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
author Motta,Daniel Augusto
author_facet Motta,Daniel Augusto
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Motta,Daniel Augusto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv FTAA
political economy
bargaining
non-cooperative games
topic FTAA
political economy
bargaining
non-cooperative games
description The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000200003
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000200003
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0101-31572007000200003
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.2 2007
reponame:Revista de Economia Política
instname:EDITORA 34
instacron:EDITORA_34
instname_str EDITORA 34
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reponame_str Revista de Economia Política
collection Revista de Economia Política
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br
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