Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Borges, Caio de Souza
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11815
Resumo: Banking crises can have a distributive effect within a society. The public interest in a well-functioning banking system requires that effective resolution regimes are framed in order to avoid the disorderly failure of such financial intermediaries and the eruption of systemic risk. The Brazilian Central Bank is mandated with the task of ensuring financial stability, and to discharge its duties the authority is entitled to use several instruments of bank restructuring and resolution. To avoid the spread of systemic risk, legal rules confer upon the Central Bank broad discretionary powers in the choice of methods for bank resolution. However, the crescent globalization of finance constrains the available options of the authority, especially in the case of failure of global financial conglomerates, where coordination and cooperation with foreign authorities may be required for an effective resolution. Since the outset of the global financial crisis, in 2007-2008, international financial regulators have undertaken several initiatives aimed at creating a coordinated international framework for crisis management, as demonstrated by the attempts to harmonize between domestic resolution regimes. The historic of banking crises in Brazil explains how the financial safety net became relatively robust in the country even before the global financial crisis and explains the resilient performance of the domestic system during the worst stages of the crisis. Since a systemic banking crisis did not strike the Brazilian financial system, it is relatively isolated from recent trends that are reshaping the institutional landscape of many national financial systems, such as the reorganization of the architecture of financial supervision. However, the challenges imposed by financial globalization and local factors are motivating reforms and subtle changes in the governance of the Brazilian safety net. Through the reconstitution of the acts taken by the Central Bank during three different crises in Brazil, this study aims to analyze, under a critical fashion, the evolution of the safety net of the Brazilian banking system and the design of legal mechanisms of accountability for the financial authority which apply to its supervisory and crisis management functions.
id FGV_4c3dee7515383788e35830d3622b2398
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/11815
network_acronym_str FGV
network_name_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
repository_id_str 3974
spelling Borges, Caio de SouzaEscolas::DIREITO SPBadin, Michelle Ratton SanchezDuran, Camila VillardYazbek, OtavioNasser, Salem Hikmat2014-06-05T14:23:25Z2014-06-05T14:23:25Z2014-04-28BORGES, Caio de Souza. Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias. Dissertação (Mestrado em Direito) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2014.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11815Banking crises can have a distributive effect within a society. The public interest in a well-functioning banking system requires that effective resolution regimes are framed in order to avoid the disorderly failure of such financial intermediaries and the eruption of systemic risk. The Brazilian Central Bank is mandated with the task of ensuring financial stability, and to discharge its duties the authority is entitled to use several instruments of bank restructuring and resolution. To avoid the spread of systemic risk, legal rules confer upon the Central Bank broad discretionary powers in the choice of methods for bank resolution. However, the crescent globalization of finance constrains the available options of the authority, especially in the case of failure of global financial conglomerates, where coordination and cooperation with foreign authorities may be required for an effective resolution. Since the outset of the global financial crisis, in 2007-2008, international financial regulators have undertaken several initiatives aimed at creating a coordinated international framework for crisis management, as demonstrated by the attempts to harmonize between domestic resolution regimes. The historic of banking crises in Brazil explains how the financial safety net became relatively robust in the country even before the global financial crisis and explains the resilient performance of the domestic system during the worst stages of the crisis. Since a systemic banking crisis did not strike the Brazilian financial system, it is relatively isolated from recent trends that are reshaping the institutional landscape of many national financial systems, such as the reorganization of the architecture of financial supervision. However, the challenges imposed by financial globalization and local factors are motivating reforms and subtle changes in the governance of the Brazilian safety net. Through the reconstitution of the acts taken by the Central Bank during three different crises in Brazil, this study aims to analyze, under a critical fashion, the evolution of the safety net of the Brazilian banking system and the design of legal mechanisms of accountability for the financial authority which apply to its supervisory and crisis management functions.Crises bancárias podem implicar uma alta redistribuição de recursos em uma sociedade. O interesse público em manter os bancos em funcionamento demanda o desenho de regimes eficazes de resolução, pois a falência desordenada desses intermediários pode ser uma fonte de risco sistêmico. O Banco Central, autoridade responsável por zelar pela higidez do sistema financeiro, pode se valer de diversos instrumentos para reestruturar ou liquidar um banco em dificuldade financeira. De modo a prevenir a propagação do risco sistêmico, as regras jurídicas conferem ao Banco Central uma ampla margem de discricionariedade no julgamento de quais bancos merecem receber assistência financeira e na escolha dos métodos de resolução bancária. O caráter globalizado das finanças exige uma maior coordenação entre autoridades domésticas na resolução de bancos que operam em múltiplas jurisdições. Algumas iniciativas de órgãos internacionais no período pós-crise de 2007-2008 têm buscado instituir, em nível global, um marco normativo para gerenciamento de crises bancárias, através da harmonização de regimes domésticos de resolução. O histórico de crises do sistema financeiro brasileiro levou ao desenvolvimento de uma rede de proteção bancária em momentos anteriores à crise financeira global de 2007-2008. Assim, o sistema financeiro brasileiro apresentou bom funcionamento mesmo nas fases mais agudas. Não tendo experimentado uma crise sistêmica no período recente, o Brasil não está passando por reformas profundas na estrutura institucional do seu sistema financeiro, a exemplo de países como Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. No entanto, desafios impostos pela crescente globalização das finanças e peculiaridades locais motivam reformas e mudanças discretas nos padrões de governança da rede de proteção brasileira. Através da reconstituição da atuação do Banco Central em três momentos de crise no Brasil, o presente trabalho busca analisar criticamente a rede de proteção bancária brasileira e os mecanismos jurídicos de accountability da autoridade financeira no exercício da supervisão e administração de crises bancárias.porAccountabilityGovernança global do sistema financeiroRisco sistêmicoResolução bancáriaLegitimidadeDireitoBanco Central do BrasilCrise financeiraBancos - FalênciaDireito bancário - BrasilResponsabilidade (Direito)Bancos - Brasil - RegulamentaçãoBanco Central e a administração de crises bancáriasinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINALDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdfDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdfapplication/pdf1435286https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/16c90944-1e7e-4e91-882a-ef0dc039fb65/download7b4a1a2d4e62468cdafb9e09a3e79610MD53LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-84707https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/633da80b-5cb3-42f0-a517-4998c7df94fa/downloaddfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1MD54TEXTDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdf.txtDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain103503https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/2b16f3ee-1a50-46b2-a98f-2d19b05144b6/download175d56408161d2091f2d6f90767c7dd7MD59THUMBNAILDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdf.jpgDissertacao.Caio.Borges.Bacen.Crises.Bancarias.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2363https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/3a9560ce-de1c-4a6e-ae3f-4f70c44e80f0/download63a3266fc6306665e47a90e00afcbe1eMD51010438/118152023-11-07 22:24:30.194open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/11815https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-07T22:24:30Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)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
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
title Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
spellingShingle Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
Borges, Caio de Souza
Accountability
Governança global do sistema financeiro
Risco sistêmico
Resolução bancária
Legitimidade
Direito
Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Bancos - Falência
Direito bancário - Brasil
Responsabilidade (Direito)
Bancos - Brasil - Regulamentação
title_short Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
title_full Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
title_fullStr Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
title_full_unstemmed Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
title_sort Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias
author Borges, Caio de Souza
author_facet Borges, Caio de Souza
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::DIREITO SP
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Badin, Michelle Ratton Sanchez
Duran, Camila Villard
Yazbek, Otavio
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Borges, Caio de Souza
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Nasser, Salem Hikmat
contributor_str_mv Nasser, Salem Hikmat
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Accountability
topic Accountability
Governança global do sistema financeiro
Risco sistêmico
Resolução bancária
Legitimidade
Direito
Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Bancos - Falência
Direito bancário - Brasil
Responsabilidade (Direito)
Bancos - Brasil - Regulamentação
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Governança global do sistema financeiro
Risco sistêmico
Resolução bancária
Legitimidade
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Direito
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Bancos - Falência
Direito bancário - Brasil
Responsabilidade (Direito)
Bancos - Brasil - Regulamentação
description Banking crises can have a distributive effect within a society. The public interest in a well-functioning banking system requires that effective resolution regimes are framed in order to avoid the disorderly failure of such financial intermediaries and the eruption of systemic risk. The Brazilian Central Bank is mandated with the task of ensuring financial stability, and to discharge its duties the authority is entitled to use several instruments of bank restructuring and resolution. To avoid the spread of systemic risk, legal rules confer upon the Central Bank broad discretionary powers in the choice of methods for bank resolution. However, the crescent globalization of finance constrains the available options of the authority, especially in the case of failure of global financial conglomerates, where coordination and cooperation with foreign authorities may be required for an effective resolution. Since the outset of the global financial crisis, in 2007-2008, international financial regulators have undertaken several initiatives aimed at creating a coordinated international framework for crisis management, as demonstrated by the attempts to harmonize between domestic resolution regimes. The historic of banking crises in Brazil explains how the financial safety net became relatively robust in the country even before the global financial crisis and explains the resilient performance of the domestic system during the worst stages of the crisis. Since a systemic banking crisis did not strike the Brazilian financial system, it is relatively isolated from recent trends that are reshaping the institutional landscape of many national financial systems, such as the reorganization of the architecture of financial supervision. However, the challenges imposed by financial globalization and local factors are motivating reforms and subtle changes in the governance of the Brazilian safety net. Through the reconstitution of the acts taken by the Central Bank during three different crises in Brazil, this study aims to analyze, under a critical fashion, the evolution of the safety net of the Brazilian banking system and the design of legal mechanisms of accountability for the financial authority which apply to its supervisory and crisis management functions.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2014-06-05T14:23:25Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2014-06-05T14:23:25Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2014-04-28
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv BORGES, Caio de Souza. Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias. Dissertação (Mestrado em Direito) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2014.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11815
identifier_str_mv BORGES, Caio de Souza. Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias. Dissertação (Mestrado em Direito) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2014.
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11815
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/16c90944-1e7e-4e91-882a-ef0dc039fb65/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/633da80b-5cb3-42f0-a517-4998c7df94fa/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/2b16f3ee-1a50-46b2-a98f-2d19b05144b6/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/3a9560ce-de1c-4a6e-ae3f-4f70c44e80f0/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 7b4a1a2d4e62468cdafb9e09a3e79610
dfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1
175d56408161d2091f2d6f90767c7dd7
63a3266fc6306665e47a90e00afcbe1e
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1810023832220598272