Majoritarian vs. Median Legislator: party trajectories in multiparty presidential systems

• Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Carlos
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Artigo de conferência
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/29219
• topic: Coalition government; Multiparty presidential regime; Median legislator; Coalition management; Ciência política; Brasil - Política e governo; Governos de coalizão; Partidos políticos - Brasil

In multiparty presidential settings, political parties have two pathways to follow: a protagonist role, by offering competitive candidates for the chief executive, or playing the supporting median legislator game, by trying to be the pivot partner in the governing coalition. The paper provides a theoretical framework to understand different tracks political parties follow. Based on an illustrative expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of “supporting median legislative parties”. It is possible to identify a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and the occurrence of parties holding characteristics of median legislative parties. Econometric exercises reveal that larger parties switch trajectories less frequently. Also, whereas left wing parties change paths more often and consistently offer candidates for the presidency, right wing parties prefer to follow a coalitional supporting role in congress. Finally, having played a majoritarian game in previous elections increases the chances of launching presidential candidates in subsequent elections.