Organizational design and incentive provision
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2004 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/71 |
Resumo: | We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts. |
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Costa, Cristiano MachadoEscolas::EPGEFGVFerreira, Daniel Bernardo SoaresCosta, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa daMoreira, Humberto Luiz Ataíde2008-05-13T13:16:11Z2008-05-13T13:16:11Z2004-06-302004-06-30COSTA, Cristiano Machado. Organizational design and incentive provision. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2004.https://hdl.handle.net/10438/71We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.engOrganizational design and incentive provisioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisEconomiaInvestimentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINALPDFapplication/pdf405094https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/a532fb21-89ea-425c-960a-9d9b2163ebb5/download02d7abfa691a8d69c5022e083e4e3a83MD51TEXT1847.pdf.txt1847.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain5816https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/22fc55ec-623b-4993-a8ef-6ba04f814e2e/download6d038549e7237dac2ae4bf9c70bf3ee6MD52PDF.txtPDF.txtExtracted texttext/plain135790https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/37874443-49a0-4f67-82c3-14b89412f29e/downloaddf7af1da807fcb9b6405bc5a9cd0025eMD54THUMBNAIL1847.pdf.jpg1847.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1592https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/d515c002-4a48-4ae7-b67e-625a976d7ac3/download2619d05ef5bcf02f9e52c4a30223a48fMD53PDF.jpgPDF.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2840https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/231c8e1f-f7ae-41a3-8919-b10e226a027d/download5bab1c15f98f100c2882df8bf2dce708MD5510438/712024-07-08 18:51:36.801open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/71https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742024-07-08T18:51:36Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
title |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
spellingShingle |
Organizational design and incentive provision Costa, Cristiano Machado Economia Investimentos |
title_short |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
title_full |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
title_fullStr |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
title_full_unstemmed |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
title_sort |
Organizational design and incentive provision |
author |
Costa, Cristiano Machado |
author_facet |
Costa, Cristiano Machado |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Costa, Cristiano Machado |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataíde |
contributor_str_mv |
Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataíde |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Investimentos |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Investimentos |
description |
We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts. |
publishDate |
2004 |
dc.date.submitted.none.fl_str_mv |
2004-06-30 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2004-06-30 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T13:16:11Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T13:16:11Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
COSTA, Cristiano Machado. Organizational design and incentive provision. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2004. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/71 |
identifier_str_mv |
COSTA, Cristiano Machado. Organizational design and incentive provision. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2004. |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/71 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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