Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000100197 |
Resumo: | This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004. |
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Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin Americaeconomic sanctionshuman rightsLatin AmericaThis article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004.Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília2014-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000100197Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional v.57 n.1 2014reponame:Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online)instname:Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)instacron:IBRI10.1590/0034-7329201400111info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarneiro,Cristiane de Andrade Lucenaeng2015-09-23T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-73292014000100197Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/rbpihttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||editoria@ibri-rbpi.org1983-31210034-7329opendoar:2015-09-23T00:00Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) - Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
title |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
spellingShingle |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America Carneiro,Cristiane de Andrade Lucena economic sanctions human rights Latin America |
title_short |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
title_full |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
title_fullStr |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
title_full_unstemmed |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
title_sort |
Economic sanctions and human rights: an analysis of competing enforcement strategies in Latin America |
author |
Carneiro,Cristiane de Andrade Lucena |
author_facet |
Carneiro,Cristiane de Andrade Lucena |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carneiro,Cristiane de Andrade Lucena |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
economic sanctions human rights Latin America |
topic |
economic sanctions human rights Latin America |
description |
This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000100197 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292014000100197 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0034-7329201400111 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional v.57 n.1 2014 reponame:Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) instname:Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI) instacron:IBRI |
instname_str |
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI) |
instacron_str |
IBRI |
institution |
IBRI |
reponame_str |
Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) |
collection |
Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista brasileira de política internacional (Online) - Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||editoria@ibri-rbpi.org |
_version_ |
1754193626804518912 |