Petrobras’ Share Pricing: an analysis of the agency conflict in the Pasadena case

• Autor(a) principal: Leite, Antônio Fernando Ferreira
• Data de Publicação: 2016
• Outros Autores: Wilbert, Marcelo Driemeyer, Serrano, Andre Luiz Marques
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista Paranaense de Desenvolvimento (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://ipardes.emnuvens.com.br/revistaparanaense/article/view/824
• topic: Agency Theory. Event study. Corporate governance. Abnormal Return. Market Efficiency Hypothesis.; Teoría de la agencia. Estudio de eventos. Gobernanza corporativa. Rendimiento anormal. Hipótesis de eficiencia del mercado.; Teoria da agência. Estudo de eventos. Governança corporativa. Retorno anormal. Hipótese de eficiência do mercado.

This research’s objective is to ascertain to what extent the return of Petrobras’ shares, traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), was influenced by the disclosed information regarding the purchase of the refinery of Pasadena/US by Petrobras, an event with agency conflict characteristics. The empirical research had the Corporate Governance, the Agency Theory, and the Event Study as contributors. For such a purpose, the exercises of 2012/2014 were defined as a scope to raise relevant information published in the media about the purchase of said refinery. The methodological procedure used was the Event Study, from which it was possible to determine if there were Abnormal Cumulative Returns within the observed periods (Event Windows). Four windows were defined: one in 2012, the year in which the Pasadena case became relevant due to the possible overbilling and loss in the purchase of the refinery; another in 2013, a year in which the press did not paid too much attention to the case; and two windows in 2014, the year in which the subject was greatly explored and a Joint Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was established. The consolidated results related to the PETR3 and PETR4 shares in each event window presented Abnormal Cumulative Returns which, in turn, reflect the information asymmetry, with evidences of agency conflict in the relationship between the majority shareholder (Union) and the minority shareholders.