What epistemologists talk about when they talk about reflection

• Autor(a) principal: Silva Filho, Waldomiro J.
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Outros Autores: Rolla, Giovanni
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/52140
• topic: Agenciamento; Individualismo epistêmico; Justificação epistêmica; Reflexão; Agency; Epistemic individualism; Epistemic justification; Reflection

In contemporary analytic philosophy, while some epistemologists claim that reflection—understood as a critical self-examination of belief—is a necessary condition for the attribution of valuable epistemic states, others reject this claim and maintain that philosophers tend to overestimate the value of reflection in their reports of epistemological phenomena. In this essay, we present a brief overview of this debate and outline the elements that constitute disagreement between epistemologists. Our diagnosis is that, despite radical disagreement, these positions converge, because they deal with reflection from an individualistic point of view, defining it as an agent’s private metacognitive performance of her own epistemic states. As well as being a reason for disagreement, this conception of reflection may be the reason that epistemologists misunderstand its place and value.