Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530
Resumo: In his article published in the current issue of Cognitio, Professor Christopher Hookway addresses the question of Peirce’s proof of pragmaticism after 1903. It is essential to give a clear account of the details of Peirce’s proof, specially of his use of the then newly-discovered logic of Existential Graphs (EG). Hookway’s aim is to answer why Peirce did believe a proof of pragmaticism needed the Existential Graphs. I suggest that Peirce’s proof can still be maintained, since some modifications are made. My question is to twofold: first, given the logical theory of EGs at hand, can the proof itself be reconstructed with it, and, second, if so, how?
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spelling Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”Comentários sobre Hookway, “A Máxima Pragmática e a Prova do Pragmatismo (2): Depois de 1903”PeirceHookwayMáxima pragmáticaPragmaticismoGrafos existenciaisProvaPeirceHookwayPragmatic maximPragmaticismExistential graphsProofIn his article published in the current issue of Cognitio, Professor Christopher Hookway addresses the question of Peirce’s proof of pragmaticism after 1903. It is essential to give a clear account of the details of Peirce’s proof, specially of his use of the then newly-discovered logic of Existential Graphs (EG). Hookway’s aim is to answer why Peirce did believe a proof of pragmaticism needed the Existential Graphs. I suggest that Peirce’s proof can still be maintained, since some modifications are made. My question is to twofold: first, given the logical theory of EGs at hand, can the proof itself be reconstructed with it, and, second, if so, how?No seu artigo publicado no presente número da Cognitio, o professor Christopher Hookway aborda a questão da prova do pragmaticismo de Peirce depois de 1903. É fundamental oferecer uma interpretação clara dos detalhes da prova de Peirce, especialmente do uso que ele faz da então recémdescoberta lógica dos Grafos Existenciais. O objetivo de Hookway é responder por que Peirce acreditava que uma prova do pragmaticismo precisava dos Grafos Existenciais. Sugiro que a prova de Peirce ainda pode ser sustentada, desde que levemente modificada. Minha questão é dúplice: primeiro, dada a teoria disponível dos Grafos Existenciais, poderá a prova ser reconstruída com ela, e, segundo, se sim, como?Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 85-92Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 85-922316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530/10041Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPietarinen, Ahti-Veikko2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13530Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
Comentários sobre Hookway, “A Máxima Pragmática e a Prova do Pragmatismo (2): Depois de 1903”
title Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
spellingShingle Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
Peirce
Hookway
Máxima pragmática
Pragmaticismo
Grafos existenciais
Prova
Peirce
Hookway
Pragmatic maxim
Pragmaticism
Existential graphs
Proof
title_short Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
title_full Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
title_fullStr Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
title_full_unstemmed Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
title_sort Comments on Hookway, “The Pragmatic Maxim and the proof of pragmatism (2): after 1903”
author Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
author_facet Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Peirce
Hookway
Máxima pragmática
Pragmaticismo
Grafos existenciais
Prova
Peirce
Hookway
Pragmatic maxim
Pragmaticism
Existential graphs
Proof
topic Peirce
Hookway
Máxima pragmática
Pragmaticismo
Grafos existenciais
Prova
Peirce
Hookway
Pragmatic maxim
Pragmaticism
Existential graphs
Proof
description In his article published in the current issue of Cognitio, Professor Christopher Hookway addresses the question of Peirce’s proof of pragmaticism after 1903. It is essential to give a clear account of the details of Peirce’s proof, specially of his use of the then newly-discovered logic of Existential Graphs (EG). Hookway’s aim is to answer why Peirce did believe a proof of pragmaticism needed the Existential Graphs. I suggest that Peirce’s proof can still be maintained, since some modifications are made. My question is to twofold: first, given the logical theory of EGs at hand, can the proof itself be reconstructed with it, and, second, if so, how?
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13530/10041
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 85-92
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 85-92
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387420947775488

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