The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527 |
Resumo: | In “The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism” (Cognitio v.6, n.1), I tried to clarify the strategy Peirce employed in Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) to argue for (or “prove”) his pragmatism maxim. This proof was designed both to clarify the content of the maxim and to demonstrate its correctness. The current paper is a sequel to that one, and it considers Peirce’s attempts to argue for pragmatism in writings from after 1903. As in the earlier paper, I am concerned with identifying the strategies he employed for defending the doctrine rather than the details of his execution of his strategies. And an important issue concerns why he did not rest content with the 1903 argument and, apparently, looked for a different sort of approach. Was this because he thought that the earlier argument failed to establish its conclusion? Or was it because he thought that the earlier approach did not provide a fully perspicuous “explanation” of why the maxim was correct? |
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The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903A Máxima Pragmática e a Prova do Pragmatismo (2): Depois de 1903PeirceMáxima pragmáticaProvaConseqüenciaConseqüências práticasPeircePragmatist maximProofConsequencePractical bearingsIn “The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism” (Cognitio v.6, n.1), I tried to clarify the strategy Peirce employed in Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) to argue for (or “prove”) his pragmatism maxim. This proof was designed both to clarify the content of the maxim and to demonstrate its correctness. The current paper is a sequel to that one, and it considers Peirce’s attempts to argue for pragmatism in writings from after 1903. As in the earlier paper, I am concerned with identifying the strategies he employed for defending the doctrine rather than the details of his execution of his strategies. And an important issue concerns why he did not rest content with the 1903 argument and, apparently, looked for a different sort of approach. Was this because he thought that the earlier argument failed to establish its conclusion? Or was it because he thought that the earlier approach did not provide a fully perspicuous “explanation” of why the maxim was correct?Em “The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism” (Cognitio v.6, n.1), eu tentei esclarecer a estratégia utilizada por Peirce nas Conferências sobre Pragmatismo (1903) para argumentar em prol de (ou “provar”) sua máxima pragmática. Essa prova visava tanto esclarecer o conteúdo da máxima quanto demonstrar sua correção. Este trabalho é uma continuação daquele e debruça-se sobre a tentativa de Peirce de argumentar em prol do pragmatismo nos escritos de depois de 1903. Como no trabalho anterior, estou mais preocupado em identificar as estratégias que ele utilizou para defender a doutrina do que nos detalhes de sua execução dessas estratégias. E um assunto importante concerne ao porquê de ele não se satisfazer com o argumento de 1903 e, aparentemente, buscar um tipo diferente de abordagem. Terá sido porque achava que o argumento anterior havia fracassado em estabelecer sua conclusão? Ou porque achava que a abordagem anterior não fornecia uma “explicação” plenamente perspícua do porquê de a máxima estar correta?Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 57-72Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 57-722316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527/10037Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHookway, Christopher2024-07-01T13:09:34Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13527Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:34Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 A Máxima Pragmática e a Prova do Pragmatismo (2): Depois de 1903 |
title |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
spellingShingle |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 Hookway, Christopher Peirce Máxima pragmática Prova Conseqüencia Conseqüências práticas Peirce Pragmatist maxim Proof Consequence Practical bearings |
title_short |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
title_full |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
title_fullStr |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
title_sort |
The Pragmatic Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism (2): After 1903 |
author |
Hookway, Christopher |
author_facet |
Hookway, Christopher |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Hookway, Christopher |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Peirce Máxima pragmática Prova Conseqüencia Conseqüências práticas Peirce Pragmatist maxim Proof Consequence Practical bearings |
topic |
Peirce Máxima pragmática Prova Conseqüencia Conseqüências práticas Peirce Pragmatist maxim Proof Consequence Practical bearings |
description |
In “The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism” (Cognitio v.6, n.1), I tried to clarify the strategy Peirce employed in Lectures on Pragmatism (1903) to argue for (or “prove”) his pragmatism maxim. This proof was designed both to clarify the content of the maxim and to demonstrate its correctness. The current paper is a sequel to that one, and it considers Peirce’s attempts to argue for pragmatism in writings from after 1903. As in the earlier paper, I am concerned with identifying the strategies he employed for defending the doctrine rather than the details of his execution of his strategies. And an important issue concerns why he did not rest content with the 1903 argument and, apparently, looked for a different sort of approach. Was this because he thought that the earlier argument failed to establish its conclusion? Or was it because he thought that the earlier approach did not provide a fully perspicuous “explanation” of why the maxim was correct? |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13527/10037 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 57-72 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 57-72 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387420943581184 |