The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Santaella, Lucia
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210
Resumo: After 1900, Peirce engaged himself in the development of his theory of signs, particularly in the theory of interpretants and even more specifically in the theory of the logical interpretants, since the latter represented the touchstone for linking pragmatism to the theory of signs. In 1907, he declared that the problem of what the “meaning” of an intellectual concept is could only be solved by the study of the interpretants, or the proper significate effects of signs. It was within this concept that Peirce developed his famous subdivision of interpretants in emotional, energetic and logical. Peirce stated in 1968 that the interpretant of a thought is another thought, and that this process, theoretically, is infinite. Many authors impressed with this assertion, and without bothering to follow the progress of this concept throughout Peirce’s works, favored that infinite semiosis, so often referred to. Umberto Eco, for instance, was one author who made extensive use of this notion of infinitude. The aim of this paper is to discuss the transformation that this concept of interpretant has undergone in Peircean works, particularly after 1907, when Peirce introduced his notion of the logical interpretant. This notion would come to change the idea – which unfortunately continues widespread – that semiosis is an abstract infinite process, unconnected with human action. Were it so, semiosis would bear no relation with pragmatism. When Peirce discovered the role of the logical interpretant in habit, and of the ultimate interpretant in the change of habit, he combined the processual nature of semiosis with pragmatism. From this synthesis derived the evolutionist character of his pragmatism.
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spelling The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist PragmatismO Papel da Mudança de Hábito no Pragmatismo Evolucionista de PeirceInterpretante lógicoSemioseHábitoPragmatismoLogical interpretantSemiosisHabitPragmatismAfter 1900, Peirce engaged himself in the development of his theory of signs, particularly in the theory of interpretants and even more specifically in the theory of the logical interpretants, since the latter represented the touchstone for linking pragmatism to the theory of signs. In 1907, he declared that the problem of what the “meaning” of an intellectual concept is could only be solved by the study of the interpretants, or the proper significate effects of signs. It was within this concept that Peirce developed his famous subdivision of interpretants in emotional, energetic and logical. Peirce stated in 1968 that the interpretant of a thought is another thought, and that this process, theoretically, is infinite. Many authors impressed with this assertion, and without bothering to follow the progress of this concept throughout Peirce’s works, favored that infinite semiosis, so often referred to. Umberto Eco, for instance, was one author who made extensive use of this notion of infinitude. The aim of this paper is to discuss the transformation that this concept of interpretant has undergone in Peircean works, particularly after 1907, when Peirce introduced his notion of the logical interpretant. This notion would come to change the idea – which unfortunately continues widespread – that semiosis is an abstract infinite process, unconnected with human action. Were it so, semiosis would bear no relation with pragmatism. When Peirce discovered the role of the logical interpretant in habit, and of the ultimate interpretant in the change of habit, he combined the processual nature of semiosis with pragmatism. From this synthesis derived the evolutionist character of his pragmatism.Depois de 1900, Peirce esteve empenhado no desenvolvimento de sua teoria dos signos, particularmente na teoria dos interpretantes, e, ainda mais especificamente, na teoria dos interpretantes lógicos, pois nestes estaria a pedra de toque para a unificação do pragmatismo com a teoria dos signos. Em 1907, ele declarou que o problema do significado de um conceito intelectual só poderia ser resolvido com o estudo dos interpretantes, ou efeitos propriamente significados dos signos. Foi nesse contexto que Peirce elaborou sua famosa subdivisão dos interpretantes em emocional, energético e lógico. Em 1968, Peirce havia afirmado que o interpretante de um pensamento é outro pensamento e que esse processo é teoricamente infinito. Muitos autores impressionados com essa afirmação, sem se darem ao trabalho de seguir o desenvolvimento desse conceito ao longo da obra de Peirce, concluíram pela tão citada semiose infinita. Umberto Eco, por exemplo, foi um dos autores a tirar partido dessa noção de infinitude. O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a transformação por que esse conceito de interpretante passou na obra peirceana, especialmente depois de 1907, quando Peirce introduziu sua noção de interpretante lógico. Essa noção mudaria a idéia – que infelizmente continua sendo tão propalada – de que a semiose é um processo infinito abstrato, sem conexão com o agir humano. Se assim fosse, a semiose não teria conexão com o pragmatismo. Quando descobriu o papel do interpretante lógico no hábito e do interpretante último na mudança de hábito, Peirce aliou a natureza processual da semiose com o pragmatismo. Dessa síntese resultou o caráter evolucionista do seu pragmatismo.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2004); 75-83Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 5 n. 1 (2004); 75-832316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210/9731Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSantaella, Lucia2024-07-01T13:09:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13210Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
O Papel da Mudança de Hábito no Pragmatismo Evolucionista de Peirce
title The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
spellingShingle The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
Santaella, Lucia
Interpretante lógico
Semiose
Hábito
Pragmatismo
Logical interpretant
Semiosis
Habit
Pragmatism
title_short The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
title_full The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
title_fullStr The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
title_full_unstemmed The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
title_sort The Role of Habit Changing in Peirce’s Evolutionist Pragmatism
author Santaella, Lucia
author_facet Santaella, Lucia
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Santaella, Lucia
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Interpretante lógico
Semiose
Hábito
Pragmatismo
Logical interpretant
Semiosis
Habit
Pragmatism
topic Interpretante lógico
Semiose
Hábito
Pragmatismo
Logical interpretant
Semiosis
Habit
Pragmatism
description After 1900, Peirce engaged himself in the development of his theory of signs, particularly in the theory of interpretants and even more specifically in the theory of the logical interpretants, since the latter represented the touchstone for linking pragmatism to the theory of signs. In 1907, he declared that the problem of what the “meaning” of an intellectual concept is could only be solved by the study of the interpretants, or the proper significate effects of signs. It was within this concept that Peirce developed his famous subdivision of interpretants in emotional, energetic and logical. Peirce stated in 1968 that the interpretant of a thought is another thought, and that this process, theoretically, is infinite. Many authors impressed with this assertion, and without bothering to follow the progress of this concept throughout Peirce’s works, favored that infinite semiosis, so often referred to. Umberto Eco, for instance, was one author who made extensive use of this notion of infinitude. The aim of this paper is to discuss the transformation that this concept of interpretant has undergone in Peircean works, particularly after 1907, when Peirce introduced his notion of the logical interpretant. This notion would come to change the idea – which unfortunately continues widespread – that semiosis is an abstract infinite process, unconnected with human action. Were it so, semiosis would bear no relation with pragmatism. When Peirce discovered the role of the logical interpretant in habit, and of the ultimate interpretant in the change of habit, he combined the processual nature of semiosis with pragmatism. From this synthesis derived the evolutionist character of his pragmatism.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-11
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13210/9731
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2004); 75-83
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 5 n. 1 (2004); 75-83
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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