The pragmatism of the late Foucault
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764 |
Resumo: | Foucault underlined, throughout his whole intellectual activity, the question of truth as an effect of power-knowledge. There are not properly truths as substances, but effects of truths as incorporeal practices of discourse, that change slowly, but inevitably, the limits of our knowledge. We can say then that he has always been a pragmatist, unbeknown to him. However, it was during the last two courses delivered at the Collége de France, recently published with the title of The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, that he recognized explicitly his pragmatic vein. I will show two specific points of his philosophical testament (as we can consider the two courses). Commenting Plato’s Seventh Letter, he said the philosophy coincides with “its practices” (pragmata). Philosophy is an ergon, a work, a labor, a practical and “real” activity, that must undergo the test of praxis (and of politics). Secondly, commenting Platos’ Lachetes and the Cynical attitude, he referred to the Greek Parrhesia, the will to speak freely. It has evidently a pragmatist imprint: the philosopher who serves to find the truth must manifest in his way of life a congruence, a tuning between bios and logos, gestures and meanings, between the body, with its bearings and manners, and the truth conveyed. The real correspondence is not between words and facts, but between words and actions. It is not, therefore, sufficient a truth be expressed by words: it must be acted. It must transform into habits, take form in a corporeal life, in an existence, in a praxis: this is the teaching not only of the pragmatist school, but also of the hermeneutical one starting from Nietzsche to the last Foucault. Philosophy must return to be a form of life, and to witness in practice its ideas. |
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The pragmatism of the late FoucaultO pragmatismo do Foucault tardioFoucault. Parrhesia. Platão. Sétima Carta. Cínicos.Foucault. Parrhesia. Plato. Seventh Letter. Cynics.Foucault underlined, throughout his whole intellectual activity, the question of truth as an effect of power-knowledge. There are not properly truths as substances, but effects of truths as incorporeal practices of discourse, that change slowly, but inevitably, the limits of our knowledge. We can say then that he has always been a pragmatist, unbeknown to him. However, it was during the last two courses delivered at the Collége de France, recently published with the title of The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, that he recognized explicitly his pragmatic vein. I will show two specific points of his philosophical testament (as we can consider the two courses). Commenting Plato’s Seventh Letter, he said the philosophy coincides with “its practices” (pragmata). Philosophy is an ergon, a work, a labor, a practical and “real” activity, that must undergo the test of praxis (and of politics). Secondly, commenting Platos’ Lachetes and the Cynical attitude, he referred to the Greek Parrhesia, the will to speak freely. It has evidently a pragmatist imprint: the philosopher who serves to find the truth must manifest in his way of life a congruence, a tuning between bios and logos, gestures and meanings, between the body, with its bearings and manners, and the truth conveyed. The real correspondence is not between words and facts, but between words and actions. It is not, therefore, sufficient a truth be expressed by words: it must be acted. It must transform into habits, take form in a corporeal life, in an existence, in a praxis: this is the teaching not only of the pragmatist school, but also of the hermeneutical one starting from Nietzsche to the last Foucault. Philosophy must return to be a form of life, and to witness in practice its ideas.Foucault destacou, por toda sua atividade intelectual, a questão da verdade como um efeito do poder do saber. Não há propriamente verdades como substâncias, mas sim efeitos de verdades como práticas incorpóreas do discurso, que mudam de forma lenta, mas inevitável, os limites do nosso conhecimento. Podemos dizer, então, que ele sempre foi um pragmatista, sem ter consciência disso. Todavia, foi durante os dois últimos cursos ministrados no Collége de France, publicados recentemente sob os títulos de O Governo de Si e dos Outros e A Coragem da Verdade, que ele reconheceu explicitamente sua veia pragmática. Apresentarei dois pontos específicos de seu testamento filosófico (como podemos considerar os dois cursos). Comentando sobre A Sétima Carta de Platão, ele disse que a filosofia coincide com “suas práticas” (pragmata). A filosofia é um ergon, uma criação, um trabalho, uma atividade prática e “real” que deve submeter-se ao teste da práxis (e da política). Em segundo lugar, comentando Lachetes e as atitudes Cínicas de Platão, ele se referiu à Parrhesia grega, a vontade de falar livremente. Possui evidentemente uma marca pragmatista: o filósofo que se dedica à busca da verdade deve manifestar, em seu modo de vida, uma congruência, uma afinação entre bios e logos, gestos e significados, entre o corpo, com seu porte e modos e a verdade transmitida. A correspondência real não está entre palavras e fatos, mas sim entre palavras e ações. Não é, portanto, suficiente que uma verdade seja expressa por palavras: precisa ser exercida. Deve se transformar em hábitos, assumir forma em uma vida corpórea, em uma existência, em uma práxis: este é o ensinamento não só da escola pragmatista, como também da hermenêutica, a partir de Nietzsche até o Foucault tardio. A filosofia deve voltar a ser uma forma de vida, e testemunhar na prática suas ideias.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2016-05-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 16 No. 2 (2015): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; 259-272Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 16 n. 2 (2015): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; 259-2722316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764/19634Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFabbrichesi, Rossella2024-07-01T13:09:39Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/27764Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:39Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault O pragmatismo do Foucault tardio |
title |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
spellingShingle |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault Fabbrichesi, Rossella Foucault. Parrhesia. Platão. Sétima Carta. Cínicos. Foucault. Parrhesia. Plato. Seventh Letter. Cynics. |
title_short |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
title_full |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
title_fullStr |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
title_full_unstemmed |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
title_sort |
The pragmatism of the late Foucault |
author |
Fabbrichesi, Rossella |
author_facet |
Fabbrichesi, Rossella |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Fabbrichesi, Rossella |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Foucault. Parrhesia. Platão. Sétima Carta. Cínicos. Foucault. Parrhesia. Plato. Seventh Letter. Cynics. |
topic |
Foucault. Parrhesia. Platão. Sétima Carta. Cínicos. Foucault. Parrhesia. Plato. Seventh Letter. Cynics. |
description |
Foucault underlined, throughout his whole intellectual activity, the question of truth as an effect of power-knowledge. There are not properly truths as substances, but effects of truths as incorporeal practices of discourse, that change slowly, but inevitably, the limits of our knowledge. We can say then that he has always been a pragmatist, unbeknown to him. However, it was during the last two courses delivered at the Collége de France, recently published with the title of The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, that he recognized explicitly his pragmatic vein. I will show two specific points of his philosophical testament (as we can consider the two courses). Commenting Plato’s Seventh Letter, he said the philosophy coincides with “its practices” (pragmata). Philosophy is an ergon, a work, a labor, a practical and “real” activity, that must undergo the test of praxis (and of politics). Secondly, commenting Platos’ Lachetes and the Cynical attitude, he referred to the Greek Parrhesia, the will to speak freely. It has evidently a pragmatist imprint: the philosopher who serves to find the truth must manifest in his way of life a congruence, a tuning between bios and logos, gestures and meanings, between the body, with its bearings and manners, and the truth conveyed. The real correspondence is not between words and facts, but between words and actions. It is not, therefore, sufficient a truth be expressed by words: it must be acted. It must transform into habits, take form in a corporeal life, in an existence, in a praxis: this is the teaching not only of the pragmatist school, but also of the hermeneutical one starting from Nietzsche to the last Foucault. Philosophy must return to be a form of life, and to witness in practice its ideas. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-05-08 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/27764/19634 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 16 No. 2 (2015): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; 259-272 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 16 n. 2 (2015): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; 259-272 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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