How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact?
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
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Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222 |
Resumo: | “Theory of Mind” (ToM) means the ability to attribute representational mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, and to explain/predict behaviors taking into account how these mental states commonly interact. “Moral Cognition” (CM), in a broad sense, refers to the way people make moral judgments, evaluating behaviors in the light of a system of norms. ToM and CM, skills that are part of human social cognition, although being distinct in computational terms (i.e. about their functional roles—domain of input processed and types of outputs produced) and neural embodiment, are processes that interact in various forms, with cognitive tasks that require them jointly. It is intended in this paper to analyze types of cognitive tasks in which ToM and CM interact (ToM taking as input an output of CM and CM taking as input an output of ToM), and in which ToM and CM are recruited separately. Due to the existence of clinical groups (e.g. individuals in the autism spectrum) having anomalous performance in certain cognitive tasks that recruit ToM and CM together (e.g. judging the behavior of an agent who, wanting to accomplish something good, caused an accidental injury to another person), it is necessary to investigate the exact role of each process in the production of these complex outputs to clarify the origin of the errors. Without taking into account experimental results that recruit ToM and CM alone it is not possible to determine whether the poor performance on a task that depends on the collective use of the two processes is the result of an impairment in ToM, CM or both. |
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How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact?Como a teoria da mente e a cognição moral interagem?Teoria da MenteCognição MoralMeta-representaçõesAutismoSíndrome de Down.Theory of MindMoral CognitionMeta-representationsAutismDown syndrome.“Theory of Mind” (ToM) means the ability to attribute representational mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, and to explain/predict behaviors taking into account how these mental states commonly interact. “Moral Cognition” (CM), in a broad sense, refers to the way people make moral judgments, evaluating behaviors in the light of a system of norms. ToM and CM, skills that are part of human social cognition, although being distinct in computational terms (i.e. about their functional roles—domain of input processed and types of outputs produced) and neural embodiment, are processes that interact in various forms, with cognitive tasks that require them jointly. It is intended in this paper to analyze types of cognitive tasks in which ToM and CM interact (ToM taking as input an output of CM and CM taking as input an output of ToM), and in which ToM and CM are recruited separately. Due to the existence of clinical groups (e.g. individuals in the autism spectrum) having anomalous performance in certain cognitive tasks that recruit ToM and CM together (e.g. judging the behavior of an agent who, wanting to accomplish something good, caused an accidental injury to another person), it is necessary to investigate the exact role of each process in the production of these complex outputs to clarify the origin of the errors. Without taking into account experimental results that recruit ToM and CM alone it is not possible to determine whether the poor performance on a task that depends on the collective use of the two processes is the result of an impairment in ToM, CM or both.Por “Teoria da Mente” (ToM) entende-se a capacidade de atribuir estados mentais representacionais a outras pessoas, tais como crenças e desejos, e de explicar/predizer comportamentos levando em consideração o modo como esses estados mentais comumente interagem. “Cognição Moral” (CM), num sentido abrangente, refere-se ao modo como pessoas fazem juízos morais, avaliando comportamentos à luz de um sistema de normas. ToM e CM, competências que integram a Cognição Social humana, apesar de se distinguirem em termos computacionais (i.e., quanto a seus papéis funcionais – domínio de inputs que processam e tipos de outputs que produzem) e de realização neural, são processos que interagem de várias formas, havendo tarefas cognitivas que as requerem conjuntamente. Pretende-se, neste trabalho, analisar tipos de tarefas cognitivas nas quais ToM e CM interagem (ToM tomando como input um output da CM e CM tomando como input um output da ToM), assim como nas quais ToM e CM são recrutadas isoladamente. Devido à existência de grupos clínicos (e.g. indivíduos pertencentes ao espectro autista) que apresentam desempenho anômalo em determinadas tarefas cognitivas que recrutam ToM e CM conjuntamente (e.g. julgar o comportamento de um agente que, querendo realizam algo bom, causou um dano acidental a outrem), faz-se necessário investigar o papel exato de cada processo na produção desses outputs mais complexos a fim de ser esclarecida a origem dos erros. Sem levar em conta os resultados conjuntos de experimentos que recrutam uma ToM e uma CM isoladamente, não se pode determinar se o mau desempenho em uma tarefa que dependa do uso coletivo dos dois processos é produto de uma deficiência em ToM, CM ou em ambas.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2016-12-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2016); 103-118Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 17 n. 1 (2016); 103-1182316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222/21694Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPerera, Ricardo AugustoStein, Sofia Inês Albornoz2017-02-04T19:25:58Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/30222Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2017-02-04T19:25:58Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? Como a teoria da mente e a cognição moral interagem? |
title |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
spellingShingle |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? Perera, Ricardo Augusto Teoria da Mente Cognição Moral Meta-representações Autismo Síndrome de Down. Theory of Mind Moral Cognition Meta-representations Autism Down syndrome. |
title_short |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
title_full |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
title_fullStr |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
title_full_unstemmed |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
title_sort |
How do theory of mind and moral cognition interact? |
author |
Perera, Ricardo Augusto |
author_facet |
Perera, Ricardo Augusto Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Perera, Ricardo Augusto Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Teoria da Mente Cognição Moral Meta-representações Autismo Síndrome de Down. Theory of Mind Moral Cognition Meta-representations Autism Down syndrome. |
topic |
Teoria da Mente Cognição Moral Meta-representações Autismo Síndrome de Down. Theory of Mind Moral Cognition Meta-representations Autism Down syndrome. |
description |
“Theory of Mind” (ToM) means the ability to attribute representational mental states to others, such as beliefs and desires, and to explain/predict behaviors taking into account how these mental states commonly interact. “Moral Cognition” (CM), in a broad sense, refers to the way people make moral judgments, evaluating behaviors in the light of a system of norms. ToM and CM, skills that are part of human social cognition, although being distinct in computational terms (i.e. about their functional roles—domain of input processed and types of outputs produced) and neural embodiment, are processes that interact in various forms, with cognitive tasks that require them jointly. It is intended in this paper to analyze types of cognitive tasks in which ToM and CM interact (ToM taking as input an output of CM and CM taking as input an output of ToM), and in which ToM and CM are recruited separately. Due to the existence of clinical groups (e.g. individuals in the autism spectrum) having anomalous performance in certain cognitive tasks that recruit ToM and CM together (e.g. judging the behavior of an agent who, wanting to accomplish something good, caused an accidental injury to another person), it is necessary to investigate the exact role of each process in the production of these complex outputs to clarify the origin of the errors. Without taking into account experimental results that recruit ToM and CM alone it is not possible to determine whether the poor performance on a task that depends on the collective use of the two processes is the result of an impairment in ToM, CM or both. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-12-27 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/30222/21694 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2016 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2016); 103-118 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 17 n. 1 (2016); 103-118 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387421733158912 |