Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Leclerc, André
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376
Resumo: In How to Make our Ideas Clear, Charles S. Peirce presents a principle that I shall call the Principle of the Determination of Meaning . Its wording could be as follows: The root of any distinction in thought or in the meaning of linguistic expressions is to be found in their sensitive effects, in our practices and activities. Peirce is one of the founders of the New Logic, but he didn’t follow the path chosen by the language philosophers of the logical trend (Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, etc.). These philosophers adopted a top-to-bottom perspective in semantics; in that perspective semantics must be developed in parallel with syntax, and the problems we face in semantics are relegated to pragmatics (the notorious “pragmatic waste basket”). Recently,many philosophers of language inverted that perspective: it is semantics that must answer to pragmatics, as Brandom says, and with him the Contextualists in the philosophy of language (Charles Travis, François Recanati, Anne Bezuidenhout, Julius Moravcsik, Hilary Putnam, etc.). Peirce might be presented as the fi rst philosopher to defend that “bottom-to-top” perspective in philosophical semantics. For many years Travis and Recanati multiplied examples illustrating Peirce’s Principle. My aim in this paper is to show, through the presentation of many examples, how the meaning or the content of our utterances (“What Is Said”) is determined in context and depends on our activities and practices. I will show how Mindreading and the structure of Plan that organizes our activities make a contribution in determining a specifi c meaning for the words used in context. I will also show how Recanati’s Principle of Availability echoes Peirce’s Principle. Recanati’s Principle says that the proposition actually and correctly understood in context is always the one which is directly and consciously accessible to the speaker-hearer.
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spelling Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of MeaningContextualismo, Pragmatismo e Determinação do SentidoContextualismDetermination of meaningPhilosophy of language.ContextualismoDeterminação do sentidoFilosofia da linguagemPragmatismo.In How to Make our Ideas Clear, Charles S. Peirce presents a principle that I shall call the Principle of the Determination of Meaning . Its wording could be as follows: The root of any distinction in thought or in the meaning of linguistic expressions is to be found in their sensitive effects, in our practices and activities. Peirce is one of the founders of the New Logic, but he didn’t follow the path chosen by the language philosophers of the logical trend (Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, etc.). These philosophers adopted a top-to-bottom perspective in semantics; in that perspective semantics must be developed in parallel with syntax, and the problems we face in semantics are relegated to pragmatics (the notorious “pragmatic waste basket”). Recently,many philosophers of language inverted that perspective: it is semantics that must answer to pragmatics, as Brandom says, and with him the Contextualists in the philosophy of language (Charles Travis, François Recanati, Anne Bezuidenhout, Julius Moravcsik, Hilary Putnam, etc.). Peirce might be presented as the fi rst philosopher to defend that “bottom-to-top” perspective in philosophical semantics. For many years Travis and Recanati multiplied examples illustrating Peirce’s Principle. My aim in this paper is to show, through the presentation of many examples, how the meaning or the content of our utterances (“What Is Said”) is determined in context and depends on our activities and practices. I will show how Mindreading and the structure of Plan that organizes our activities make a contribution in determining a specifi c meaning for the words used in context. I will also show how Recanati’s Principle of Availability echoes Peirce’s Principle. Recanati’s Principle says that the proposition actually and correctly understood in context is always the one which is directly and consciously accessible to the speaker-hearer.Em How to Make our Ideas Clear, o pai do Pragmatismo apresenta um princípio que chamarei de Princípio da Determinação do Sentido, que pode ser formulado assim: A raiz de qualquer distinção no pensamento e no sentido das expressões linguísticas se encontra nos seus efeitos sensíveis, em nossas práticas e atividades. Peirce é um dos fundadores da Nova Lógica,mas ele não seguiu o caminho dos fi lósofos da linguagem da corrente lógica (Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski etc.). Esses filósofos adotam uma perspectiva “top-bottom” em relação à semântica. A semântica deve ser desenvolvida paralelamente à sintaxe, e os problemas encontrados na semântica são relegados à pragmática (ao famoso “pragmatic waste basket”).Recentemente, os fi lósofos da linguagem inverteram esta perspectiva: é a semântica que deve responder à pragmática, como afi rma Brandom, e, com ele, os contextualistas em fi losofi a da linguagem (Charles Travis, François Recanati, Anne Bezuidenhout, Julius Moravcsik, Putnam etc.). Peirce pode ser apresentado como o primeiro fi lósofo a defender essa perspectiva “bottom-top” na semântica fi losófi ca. Há anos que Travis e Recanati multiplicam os exemplos ilustrando o princípio de Peirce. Nosso objetivo é mostrar como o sentido ou conteúdo de nossas enunciações (“o que é dito”) é determinado em contexto e depende de nossas atividades e práticas, apresentando vários exemplos. Veremos como a leitura de mente (Mindreading) e a estrutura em planos de nossas atividades contribuem para fi xar o sentido das palavras. Mostraremos também como o Princípio de Acessibilidade de Recanati faz eco à ideia de Peirce. O princípio em questão diz que a proposição efetiva e corretamente compreendida em contexto é sempre aquela que é diretamente acessível à consciência do falante-ouvinte.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2010); 48-57Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 11 n. 1 (2010); 48-572316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376/9911Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLeclerc, André2024-07-01T13:09:33Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13376Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:33Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
Contextualismo, Pragmatismo e Determinação do Sentido
title Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
spellingShingle Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
Leclerc, André
Contextualism
Determination of meaning
Philosophy of language.
Contextualismo
Determinação do sentido
Filosofia da linguagem
Pragmatismo.
title_short Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
title_full Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
title_fullStr Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
title_full_unstemmed Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
title_sort Contextualism, Pragmatism and Determination of Meaning
author Leclerc, André
author_facet Leclerc, André
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Leclerc, André
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contextualism
Determination of meaning
Philosophy of language.
Contextualismo
Determinação do sentido
Filosofia da linguagem
Pragmatismo.
topic Contextualism
Determination of meaning
Philosophy of language.
Contextualismo
Determinação do sentido
Filosofia da linguagem
Pragmatismo.
description In How to Make our Ideas Clear, Charles S. Peirce presents a principle that I shall call the Principle of the Determination of Meaning . Its wording could be as follows: The root of any distinction in thought or in the meaning of linguistic expressions is to be found in their sensitive effects, in our practices and activities. Peirce is one of the founders of the New Logic, but he didn’t follow the path chosen by the language philosophers of the logical trend (Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, etc.). These philosophers adopted a top-to-bottom perspective in semantics; in that perspective semantics must be developed in parallel with syntax, and the problems we face in semantics are relegated to pragmatics (the notorious “pragmatic waste basket”). Recently,many philosophers of language inverted that perspective: it is semantics that must answer to pragmatics, as Brandom says, and with him the Contextualists in the philosophy of language (Charles Travis, François Recanati, Anne Bezuidenhout, Julius Moravcsik, Hilary Putnam, etc.). Peirce might be presented as the fi rst philosopher to defend that “bottom-to-top” perspective in philosophical semantics. For many years Travis and Recanati multiplied examples illustrating Peirce’s Principle. My aim in this paper is to show, through the presentation of many examples, how the meaning or the content of our utterances (“What Is Said”) is determined in context and depends on our activities and practices. I will show how Mindreading and the structure of Plan that organizes our activities make a contribution in determining a specifi c meaning for the words used in context. I will also show how Recanati’s Principle of Availability echoes Peirce’s Principle. Recanati’s Principle says that the proposition actually and correctly understood in context is always the one which is directly and consciously accessible to the speaker-hearer.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-22
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13376/9911
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2010); 48-57
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 11 n. 1 (2010); 48-57
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
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institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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