Contextualism as representationalism?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31572 |
Resumo: | This paper addresses a critique made a few years ago by Avner Baz of the work of current contextualists in the philosophy of language. Baz’s critique focuses on the idea that contextualists (especially Charles Travis) have misread the attack made by J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein on the so-called “prevailing conception of meaning”. Despite their insistence on the contextual factors determining the content of a statement, Baz contends that the contextualists still explain our utterances in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences they express and, by emphasizing the referential dimension of words, they end up advocating a conception of meaning as a theoretical entity responsible for pointing out the objects of our discourse. Therefore, to Baz, they hold a representationalist view still closely connected to the traditional conception of meaning. Describing the foundation of Baz’s view, I argue in this paper that the connection he advocates between reference and a theory of meaning as representation is precisely the target of contextualists like Charles Travis. Their work is presented here as an attempt to explain the reference of words and the truth-conditions of a sentence after a radical negation of the notion of meaning as representation has been made. In that sense, contrary to what Baz affirms, they are closely connected to the spirit of the pioneers of Ordinary Language Philosophy. |
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Contextualism as representationalism?Contextualismo como representacionismo?ContextualismTruth-conditionsMeaningRepresentationOrdinary language philosophyContextualismoCondições de verdadeSignificadoRepresentaçãoFilosofia da linguagem comumThis paper addresses a critique made a few years ago by Avner Baz of the work of current contextualists in the philosophy of language. Baz’s critique focuses on the idea that contextualists (especially Charles Travis) have misread the attack made by J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein on the so-called “prevailing conception of meaning”. Despite their insistence on the contextual factors determining the content of a statement, Baz contends that the contextualists still explain our utterances in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences they express and, by emphasizing the referential dimension of words, they end up advocating a conception of meaning as a theoretical entity responsible for pointing out the objects of our discourse. Therefore, to Baz, they hold a representationalist view still closely connected to the traditional conception of meaning. Describing the foundation of Baz’s view, I argue in this paper that the connection he advocates between reference and a theory of meaning as representation is precisely the target of contextualists like Charles Travis. Their work is presented here as an attempt to explain the reference of words and the truth-conditions of a sentence after a radical negation of the notion of meaning as representation has been made. In that sense, contrary to what Baz affirms, they are closely connected to the spirit of the pioneers of Ordinary Language Philosophy.Este artigo aborda uma crítica feita alguns anos atrás por Avner Baz sobre o trabalho de contextualistas atuais na filosofia da linguagem. A crítica de Baz enfoca a ideia de que os contextualistas (especialmente Charles Travis) interpretaram mal o ataque feito por J. L. Austin e Wittgenstein à chamada “concepção vigente de significado”. Apesar da insistência deles sobre os fatores contextuais que determinam o contexto de uma declaração, Baz argumenta que os contextualistas ainda explicam nossos enunciados em termos das condições de verdade das sentenças que expressam e, ao enfatizarem a dimensão referencial das palavras, acabam por defender uma concepção de significado como uma entidade teórica, responsável por assinalar os objetos do nosso discurso. Portanto, para Baz, eles mantêm uma visão representacionista ainda intimamente ligada à concepção tradicional de concepção de significado. Descrevendo as bases da visão de Baz, sustento neste artigo que a ligação que ele assevera entre referência e uma teoria de significado como representação, é precisamente o objetivo de contextualistas como Charles Travis. O trabalho deles é apresentado aqui como uma tentativa de explicar a referência de palavras e as condições de verdade de uma sentença após a ocorrência de uma negação radical da noção de significado como representação. Nesse sentido, contrariamente ao que Baz afirma, estão intimamente ligados ao espírito dos pioneiros da filosofia da linguagem comum.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2017-07-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/3157210.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p89-98Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 89-98Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 89-982316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31572/23144Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarchesan, Eduardo Caliendo2017-08-17T16:51:45Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/31572Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2017-08-17T16:51:45Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Contextualism as representationalism? Contextualismo como representacionismo? |
title |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
spellingShingle |
Contextualism as representationalism? Marchesan, Eduardo Caliendo Contextualism Truth-conditions Meaning Representation Ordinary language philosophy Contextualismo Condições de verdade Significado Representação Filosofia da linguagem comum |
title_short |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
title_full |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
title_fullStr |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
title_sort |
Contextualism as representationalism? |
author |
Marchesan, Eduardo Caliendo |
author_facet |
Marchesan, Eduardo Caliendo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Marchesan, Eduardo Caliendo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Contextualism Truth-conditions Meaning Representation Ordinary language philosophy Contextualismo Condições de verdade Significado Representação Filosofia da linguagem comum |
topic |
Contextualism Truth-conditions Meaning Representation Ordinary language philosophy Contextualismo Condições de verdade Significado Representação Filosofia da linguagem comum |
description |
This paper addresses a critique made a few years ago by Avner Baz of the work of current contextualists in the philosophy of language. Baz’s critique focuses on the idea that contextualists (especially Charles Travis) have misread the attack made by J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein on the so-called “prevailing conception of meaning”. Despite their insistence on the contextual factors determining the content of a statement, Baz contends that the contextualists still explain our utterances in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences they express and, by emphasizing the referential dimension of words, they end up advocating a conception of meaning as a theoretical entity responsible for pointing out the objects of our discourse. Therefore, to Baz, they hold a representationalist view still closely connected to the traditional conception of meaning. Describing the foundation of Baz’s view, I argue in this paper that the connection he advocates between reference and a theory of meaning as representation is precisely the target of contextualists like Charles Travis. Their work is presented here as an attempt to explain the reference of words and the truth-conditions of a sentence after a radical negation of the notion of meaning as representation has been made. In that sense, contrary to what Baz affirms, they are closely connected to the spirit of the pioneers of Ordinary Language Philosophy. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31572 10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p89-98 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31572 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p89-98 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31572/23144 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 89-98 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 89-98 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387421764616192 |