Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555 |
Resumo: | We consider Peirce’s remarks on judgment focusing on the relations and distinctions between judgment, proposition, belief and assertion. Despite the subtlety of Peirce’s distinctions, we finally argue for a broad conception of judgment. The main reason for that is the difficulty of assessing our responsibility in judging and asserting if judgment and assertion are considered in a narrow and separate sense. The argument goes as follows. Being an act of assent, claims Peirce, judgment is in contrast to assertion: to simply assent is not to assert, for the first is an internal act while the second is external. But such an internal conception of judgment, contrasted to the external dimension of assertion, is in our opinion too narrow a one to account for the social and normative aspects of judging and even asserting. We argue for a broader conception of judgment, with assertion as one of its parts and modeled on the process of legal judgment. In these terms, the idea of someone being responsible for the truth of his assertions would be specified. |
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Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and AssertionResponsável pela Verdade? Peirce sobre Juízo e AsserçãoJuízoAsserçãoJuízo legalResponsabilidadeVerdadeJudgmentAssertionLegal judgmentResponsibilityTruthWe consider Peirce’s remarks on judgment focusing on the relations and distinctions between judgment, proposition, belief and assertion. Despite the subtlety of Peirce’s distinctions, we finally argue for a broad conception of judgment. The main reason for that is the difficulty of assessing our responsibility in judging and asserting if judgment and assertion are considered in a narrow and separate sense. The argument goes as follows. Being an act of assent, claims Peirce, judgment is in contrast to assertion: to simply assent is not to assert, for the first is an internal act while the second is external. But such an internal conception of judgment, contrasted to the external dimension of assertion, is in our opinion too narrow a one to account for the social and normative aspects of judging and even asserting. We argue for a broader conception of judgment, with assertion as one of its parts and modeled on the process of legal judgment. In these terms, the idea of someone being responsible for the truth of his assertions would be specified.Consideramos as observações de Peirce sobre o juízo, enfocando as relações e distinções entre juízo, proposição, crença e asserção. A despeito da sutileza das distinções peirceanas, finalmente argumentamos em favor de uma concepção mais ampla de juízo. A principal razão para isso é a dificuldade de avaliar nossa responsabilidade ao julgar e emitir asserções, se juízo e asserção forem considerados num sentido estreito e separado. O argumento é o seguinte.Sendo um ato de assentimento, alega Peirce, juízo é diferente de asserção: simplesmente assentir não é asserir, pois o primeiro é um ato interno, ao passo que o segundo é um ato externo. Mas um tal conceito interno de juízo é, diferenciado da dimensão externa da asserção, em nossa opinião, deveras estreito para dar conta dos aspectos sociais e normativos de julgar e, até mesmo, de emitir asserções. Argumentamos em favor de uma concepção mais ampla de juízo, com a asserção como uma de suas partes, uma concepção modelada segundo o processo de juízo legal. Nesses termos, a idéia de alguém ser responsável pela verdade de suas asserções seria especificada.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2006); 317-336Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 2 (2006); 317-3362316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555/10073Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTuzet, Giovanni2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13555Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion Responsável pela Verdade? Peirce sobre Juízo e Asserção |
title |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
spellingShingle |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion Tuzet, Giovanni Juízo Asserção Juízo legal Responsabilidade Verdade Judgment Assertion Legal judgment Responsibility Truth |
title_short |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
title_full |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
title_fullStr |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
title_full_unstemmed |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
title_sort |
Responsible For Truth? Peirce on Judgment and Assertion |
author |
Tuzet, Giovanni |
author_facet |
Tuzet, Giovanni |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Tuzet, Giovanni |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Juízo Asserção Juízo legal Responsabilidade Verdade Judgment Assertion Legal judgment Responsibility Truth |
topic |
Juízo Asserção Juízo legal Responsabilidade Verdade Judgment Assertion Legal judgment Responsibility Truth |
description |
We consider Peirce’s remarks on judgment focusing on the relations and distinctions between judgment, proposition, belief and assertion. Despite the subtlety of Peirce’s distinctions, we finally argue for a broad conception of judgment. The main reason for that is the difficulty of assessing our responsibility in judging and asserting if judgment and assertion are considered in a narrow and separate sense. The argument goes as follows. Being an act of assent, claims Peirce, judgment is in contrast to assertion: to simply assent is not to assert, for the first is an internal act while the second is external. But such an internal conception of judgment, contrasted to the external dimension of assertion, is in our opinion too narrow a one to account for the social and normative aspects of judging and even asserting. We argue for a broader conception of judgment, with assertion as one of its parts and modeled on the process of legal judgment. In these terms, the idea of someone being responsible for the truth of his assertions would be specified. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-02-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13555/10073 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 2 (2006); 317-336 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 2 (2006); 317-336 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387421248716800 |