Peirces account of assertion
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
Texto Completo: | http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-12092016-123010/ |
Resumo: | One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. |
id |
USP_9fedec4889bc93bc78e7942e163fbfaf |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:teses.usp.br:tde-12092016-123010 |
network_acronym_str |
USP |
network_name_str |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
repository_id_str |
2721 |
spelling |
Peirces account of assertionA visão de Peirce sobre a asserçãoAsserçãoAssertionC.S. PeirceC.S. PeirceDialogical semanticsPragmatismPragmatismoProposiçõesPropositionsSemântica dialógicaOne usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion.Costumamos fazer asserções quando proferimos sentenças indicativas como \"Está chovendo\". Mas, não toda proferição de uma sentença indicativa é uma asserção. Por exemplo, quando dissemos vou voltar amanhã, poderíamos estar fazendo uma promessa. O que é fazer uma asserção? C.S. Peirce argumentou que \"asseverar uma proposição é fazer-se responsável pela sua verdade\" (CP 5.543). O propósito do presente texto é interpretar a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção assim como examinar as razões que a suportam. Para cumprir esse propósito, primeiro reconstruo e examino o argumento que, em defesa da sua visão, Peirce propôs em (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), e (CP 5.546, 1908). A continuação aponto para três aspetos constitutivos dessa visão, a saber, a asserção como um ato que envolve certa responsabilidade, a proposição como o que é asseverado, e a responsabilidade pela verdade como a responsabilidade de dar razões. Tendo em consideração esses três aspetos, passo a defender as seguintes teses: (1) Peirce concebeu a responsabilidade envolvida na asserção como uma responsabilidade moral. (2) Peirce pensou que as proposições são types. (3) Peirce interpretou responsabilidade de dar razões de modo dialógico. Para finalizar, apresento duas objeções à visão de Peirce sobre a asserção e as réplicas respetivas. Concluo que a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção é uma contribuição valiosa ao debate filosófico sobre a asserção.Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USPCuter, Joao Vergilio GalleraniIglesias, Jaime Orlando Alfaro2016-05-12info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-12092016-123010/reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USPinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPLiberar o conteúdo para acesso público.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesseng2018-10-02T20:03:01Zoai:teses.usp.br:tde-12092016-123010Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://www.teses.usp.br/PUBhttp://www.teses.usp.br/cgi-bin/mtd2br.plvirginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.bropendoar:27212018-10-02T20:03:01Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Peirces account of assertion A visão de Peirce sobre a asserção |
title |
Peirces account of assertion |
spellingShingle |
Peirces account of assertion Iglesias, Jaime Orlando Alfaro Asserção Assertion C.S. Peirce C.S. Peirce Dialogical semantics Pragmatism Pragmatismo Proposições Propositions Semântica dialógica |
title_short |
Peirces account of assertion |
title_full |
Peirces account of assertion |
title_fullStr |
Peirces account of assertion |
title_full_unstemmed |
Peirces account of assertion |
title_sort |
Peirces account of assertion |
author |
Iglesias, Jaime Orlando Alfaro |
author_facet |
Iglesias, Jaime Orlando Alfaro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Cuter, Joao Vergilio Gallerani |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Iglesias, Jaime Orlando Alfaro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Asserção Assertion C.S. Peirce C.S. Peirce Dialogical semantics Pragmatism Pragmatismo Proposições Propositions Semântica dialógica |
topic |
Asserção Assertion C.S. Peirce C.S. Peirce Dialogical semantics Pragmatism Pragmatismo Proposições Propositions Semântica dialógica |
description |
One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like It is raining. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering I will be back tomorrow, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirces view of assertion and I evaluate Peirces reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirces case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirces view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of responsibility to give reasons. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirces view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirces account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-05-12 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-12092016-123010/ |
url |
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-12092016-123010/ |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público. |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP) instacron:USP |
instname_str |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
instacron_str |
USP |
institution |
USP |
reponame_str |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
collection |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
virginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.br |
_version_ |
1809090659567534080 |