Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Sinclair, Robert
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418
Resumo: This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism.
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spelling Morton White’s Moral PragmatismO Pragmatismo Moral de Morton WhiteQuineWhiteÉticaEpistemologiaHolismoPragmatismo.QuineWhiteEthicsEpistemologyHolismPragmatism.This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism.Este ensaio examina o debate entre Quine e White a respeito do estatuto empírico dos juízos morais. A aceitação tardia de Quine da observação permeada pela teoria mostra que ele não tem razão em rejeitar a possibilidade das sentenças de observação moral ou em resistir à interpretação empírica e holística da teoria moral de Morton. Argumenta-se ainda que sentimentos de obrigação moral não podem fundamentar crenças morais do modo sugerido por White, mas que algumas afirmações podem ser testadas empiricamente e rejeitadas por terem as conexões relevantes para estimulação sensorial. Deste modo, a analogia metodológica que White sustenta entre ética e ciência pode ser mantida, assim como sua concepção totalmente empírica de pragmatismo ético.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2011); 143-155Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 1 (2011); 143-1552316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418/9945Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSinclair, Robert2024-07-01T13:09:33Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13418Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:33Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
O Pragmatismo Moral de Morton White
title Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
spellingShingle Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
Sinclair, Robert
Quine
White
Ética
Epistemologia
Holismo
Pragmatismo.
Quine
White
Ethics
Epistemology
Holism
Pragmatism.
title_short Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
title_full Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
title_fullStr Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
title_full_unstemmed Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
title_sort Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
author Sinclair, Robert
author_facet Sinclair, Robert
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Sinclair, Robert
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Quine
White
Ética
Epistemologia
Holismo
Pragmatismo.
Quine
White
Ethics
Epistemology
Holism
Pragmatism.
topic Quine
White
Ética
Epistemologia
Holismo
Pragmatismo.
Quine
White
Ethics
Epistemology
Holism
Pragmatism.
description This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418/9945
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2011); 143-155
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 1 (2011); 143-155
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387420846063616

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