Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418 |
Resumo: | This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism. |
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Morton White’s Moral PragmatismO Pragmatismo Moral de Morton WhiteQuineWhiteÉticaEpistemologiaHolismoPragmatismo.QuineWhiteEthicsEpistemologyHolismPragmatism.This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism.Este ensaio examina o debate entre Quine e White a respeito do estatuto empírico dos juízos morais. A aceitação tardia de Quine da observação permeada pela teoria mostra que ele não tem razão em rejeitar a possibilidade das sentenças de observação moral ou em resistir à interpretação empírica e holística da teoria moral de Morton. Argumenta-se ainda que sentimentos de obrigação moral não podem fundamentar crenças morais do modo sugerido por White, mas que algumas afirmações podem ser testadas empiricamente e rejeitadas por terem as conexões relevantes para estimulação sensorial. Deste modo, a analogia metodológica que White sustenta entre ética e ciência pode ser mantida, assim como sua concepção totalmente empírica de pragmatismo ético.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2011); 143-155Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 1 (2011); 143-1552316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418/9945Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSinclair, Robert2024-07-01T13:09:33Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13418Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:33Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism O Pragmatismo Moral de Morton White |
title |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
spellingShingle |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism Sinclair, Robert Quine White Ética Epistemologia Holismo Pragmatismo. Quine White Ethics Epistemology Holism Pragmatism. |
title_short |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
title_full |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
title_fullStr |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
title_sort |
Morton White’s Moral Pragmatism |
author |
Sinclair, Robert |
author_facet |
Sinclair, Robert |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Sinclair, Robert |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Quine White Ética Epistemologia Holismo Pragmatismo. Quine White Ethics Epistemology Holism Pragmatism. |
topic |
Quine White Ética Epistemologia Holismo Pragmatismo. Quine White Ethics Epistemology Holism Pragmatism. |
description |
This essay examines the Quine-White debate concerning the empirical status of moral judgments. Quine’s later acceptance of the theory-ladenness of observation shows that he has no reason to reject the possibility of moral observation sentences or to resist White´s empirical, holistic rendering of moral theory. It is further argued that feelings of moral obligation cannot ground moral beliefs in the way suggested by White, but that some moral claims can be empirically tested and rejected through having the relevant links to sensory stimulation. In this way the methodological analogy White holds between ethics and science can be maintained as can his overall empirical conception of ethical pragmatism. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-24 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13418/9945 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 1 (2011); 143-155 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 1 (2011); 143-155 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387420846063616 |