Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/54045 |
Resumo: | In her book Deviant Logic (1974), Susan Haack argued for a “pragmatist” conception of logic. This conception holds that, (i) logic is a theory on a par with other scientific theories, differing only from such theories by its degree of generality and (ii) the choice of a particular logic is to be made based on pragmatist principles, namely, economy, coherence, and simplicity. This view was contrasted, in this book, with an “absolutist” view of logic, according to which logical laws are necessary and immune to revision. Two decades later, however, Haack acknowledged, in the Introduction to an enlarged version of the same book, that she would not approach the question of the revisability of logic in the same way she did earlier. What was missing in her first book was a distinction between the question of the necessity of the laws of logic and the question of our fallibility in recognizing which are the true laws of logic and what structures are essential to representation. She also acknowledged that this change was mainly influenced by Peirce, with whose work she had “only the most superficial acquaintance twenty years ago”. In this context, this paper has two aims: (1) to show that, in Philosophy of Logics, we can find elements that reveal a tension between her early “pragmatic” views and her changing views on the nature of logic; (2) to present some hypotheses about the role Peirce may have had in this change. |
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Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logicA influência do Peirce nas reflexões de Haack sobre a natureza da lógicalogicpragmatismrevisability of logicPeirceHaackIn her book Deviant Logic (1974), Susan Haack argued for a “pragmatist” conception of logic. This conception holds that, (i) logic is a theory on a par with other scientific theories, differing only from such theories by its degree of generality and (ii) the choice of a particular logic is to be made based on pragmatist principles, namely, economy, coherence, and simplicity. This view was contrasted, in this book, with an “absolutist” view of logic, according to which logical laws are necessary and immune to revision. Two decades later, however, Haack acknowledged, in the Introduction to an enlarged version of the same book, that she would not approach the question of the revisability of logic in the same way she did earlier. What was missing in her first book was a distinction between the question of the necessity of the laws of logic and the question of our fallibility in recognizing which are the true laws of logic and what structures are essential to representation. She also acknowledged that this change was mainly influenced by Peirce, with whose work she had “only the most superficial acquaintance twenty years ago”. In this context, this paper has two aims: (1) to show that, in Philosophy of Logics, we can find elements that reveal a tension between her early “pragmatic” views and her changing views on the nature of logic; (2) to present some hypotheses about the role Peirce may have had in this change.Em seu livro Deviant Logic (1974), Susan Haack defendia um conceito “pragmatista” de lógica. Esta concepção sustenta que, (i) a lógica é uma teoria em pé de igualdade com outras teorias científicas, diferindo apenas de tais teorias por seu grau de generalidade e (ii) a escolha de uma lógica particular deve ser feita com base em princípios pragmáticos, a saber, economia, coerência e simplicidade. Esta visão foi contrastada, nesse livro, com uma visão “absolutista” da lógica, segundo a qual as leis lógicas são necessárias e imunes à revisão. Duas décadas depois, porém, Haack reconheceu, na Introdução de uma versão ampliada do mesmo livro, que não abordaria a questão da possibilidade de revisão da lógica da mesma forma que fizera anteriormente. O que faltava em seu primeiro livro era uma distinção entre a questão da necessidade das leis da lógica e a questão de nossa falibilidade no reconhecimento de quais são as verdadeiras leis da lógica e quais estruturas são essenciais para representação. Ela também reconheceu que essa mudança foi influenciada principalmente por Peirce, com cujo trabalho ela tinha “há vinte anos apenas o conhecimento mais superficial”. Neste contexto, este trabalho tem dois objetivos: (1) mostrar que, na Filosofia das Lógicas, podemos encontrar elementos que revelam uma tensão entre suas primeiras visões “pragmáticas” e suas visões em mudança sobre a natureza da lógica; (2) apresentar algumas hipóteses sobre o papel que Peirce pode ter tido nesta mudança.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2021-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/5404510.23925/2316-5278.2021v22i1:e54045Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 22 No. 1 (2021): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e54045Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (2021): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e540452316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/54045/38751Copyright (c) 2021 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNakano, Anderson Luis2021-12-31T22:19:17Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/54045Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2021-12-31T22:19:17Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic A influência do Peirce nas reflexões de Haack sobre a natureza da lógica |
title |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
spellingShingle |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic Nakano, Anderson Luis logic pragmatism revisability of logic Peirce Haack |
title_short |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
title_full |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
title_fullStr |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
title_sort |
Peirce’s influence on Haack's reflections on the nature of logic |
author |
Nakano, Anderson Luis |
author_facet |
Nakano, Anderson Luis |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Nakano, Anderson Luis |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
logic pragmatism revisability of logic Peirce Haack |
topic |
logic pragmatism revisability of logic Peirce Haack |
description |
In her book Deviant Logic (1974), Susan Haack argued for a “pragmatist” conception of logic. This conception holds that, (i) logic is a theory on a par with other scientific theories, differing only from such theories by its degree of generality and (ii) the choice of a particular logic is to be made based on pragmatist principles, namely, economy, coherence, and simplicity. This view was contrasted, in this book, with an “absolutist” view of logic, according to which logical laws are necessary and immune to revision. Two decades later, however, Haack acknowledged, in the Introduction to an enlarged version of the same book, that she would not approach the question of the revisability of logic in the same way she did earlier. What was missing in her first book was a distinction between the question of the necessity of the laws of logic and the question of our fallibility in recognizing which are the true laws of logic and what structures are essential to representation. She also acknowledged that this change was mainly influenced by Peirce, with whose work she had “only the most superficial acquaintance twenty years ago”. In this context, this paper has two aims: (1) to show that, in Philosophy of Logics, we can find elements that reveal a tension between her early “pragmatic” views and her changing views on the nature of logic; (2) to present some hypotheses about the role Peirce may have had in this change. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/54045 10.23925/2316-5278.2021v22i1:e54045 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/54045 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.23925/2316-5278.2021v22i1:e54045 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/54045/38751 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 22 No. 1 (2021): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e54045 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (2021): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; e54045 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387422344478720 |