C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389 |
Resumo: | The question concerning the nature of time is intimately related to the traditional antithesis between the static a-temporal Parmenidean universe and the dynamic model of becoming. This is wonderfully illustrated in Peirce’s theory of the flux of time. In his rejection of the atomistic worldpicture, Peirce treated time in close relation to the physical processes. He thus propounded an extremely interesting theory which bears a kinship to contemporary theories of the arrow of time. However, what makes his approach extremely interesting is not only its air of modernity, but also its striking similarities with Aristotle (Physics, book IV, esp. chs. 10-14). My purpose, therefore, in this paper is to reconstruct Peirce’s theory of time in the light of Aristotle’s philosophy. My starting point will be Peirce’s analysis of continuity in relation to infinitesimals (6.109), through the use of which he could treat time as a “continuum par excellence, (6.86, 1898) which is not a static collection of discrete instants, (see MS 137, p. 4-5, 1904), but a collection of real possibilia (see NE, 360), thus making possible the understanding of the flow of time (6.11). I will then proceed to the examination of Peirce’s connection of time, as a real continuum, with the idea of the infinite. In this respect, I will focus on his rejection of actual infinity – in the Zenonean-atomistic-Cantorian sense – and his adoption of the Aristotelian idea of potential infinite (Physics, book III, chs. iv-viii). I will, thus, argue that what led Peirce to pass from a logico-mathematical analysis of continuity to an ontological theory was his appeal to potentiality in his treatment of continuity-infinity-time. This, I believe, was the result of the influence he had received from Aristotle, who was also deeply concerned with giving to change, motion and becoming their proper placein nature. Thus, both Peirce and Aristotle were able to built a dynamic theory of time, intimately related to the idea of potential infinity, which expresses a physical process progressively being actualized, so that it can never exist as a realized whole. |
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C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on TimeC.S. Peirce e Aristóteles sobre o TempoPeirceAristótelesTempoContinuidadeInfinitesimaisPeirceAristotleTimeContinuityInfinitesimals.The question concerning the nature of time is intimately related to the traditional antithesis between the static a-temporal Parmenidean universe and the dynamic model of becoming. This is wonderfully illustrated in Peirce’s theory of the flux of time. In his rejection of the atomistic worldpicture, Peirce treated time in close relation to the physical processes. He thus propounded an extremely interesting theory which bears a kinship to contemporary theories of the arrow of time. However, what makes his approach extremely interesting is not only its air of modernity, but also its striking similarities with Aristotle (Physics, book IV, esp. chs. 10-14). My purpose, therefore, in this paper is to reconstruct Peirce’s theory of time in the light of Aristotle’s philosophy. My starting point will be Peirce’s analysis of continuity in relation to infinitesimals (6.109), through the use of which he could treat time as a “continuum par excellence, (6.86, 1898) which is not a static collection of discrete instants, (see MS 137, p. 4-5, 1904), but a collection of real possibilia (see NE, 360), thus making possible the understanding of the flow of time (6.11). I will then proceed to the examination of Peirce’s connection of time, as a real continuum, with the idea of the infinite. In this respect, I will focus on his rejection of actual infinity – in the Zenonean-atomistic-Cantorian sense – and his adoption of the Aristotelian idea of potential infinite (Physics, book III, chs. iv-viii). I will, thus, argue that what led Peirce to pass from a logico-mathematical analysis of continuity to an ontological theory was his appeal to potentiality in his treatment of continuity-infinity-time. This, I believe, was the result of the influence he had received from Aristotle, who was also deeply concerned with giving to change, motion and becoming their proper placein nature. Thus, both Peirce and Aristotle were able to built a dynamic theory of time, intimately related to the idea of potential infinity, which expresses a physical process progressively being actualized, so that it can never exist as a realized whole.A questão concernente à natureza do tempo está intimamente relacionada à antítese tradicional entre o universo parmenidiano a-temporal estático e o modelo dinâmico do vir-a-ser. Isso está maravilhosamente ilustrado na teoria peirciana do fluxo do tempo. Nesta rejeição da visão de mundo atomista, Peirce tratou o tempo em relação íntima com os processos físicos. Ele então propôs uma teoria extremamente interessante que tem certo parentesco com teorias contemporâneas da flecha do tempo. Entretanto, o que torna essa abordagem extremamente interessante é não apenas seu ar demodernidade, mas suas notáveis semelhanças com Aristóteles (Física, livro IV, esp. caps. 10-14). Meu propósito, portanto, neste trabalho é reconstruir a teoria do tempo de Peirce à luz da filosofia de Aristóteles. Meu ponto de partida será a análise de continuidade em relação aos infinitesimais (6.109), por meio da qual ele pode tratar o tempo como um “continuum par excellence” (6.86, 1898), que não é uma coleção estática de instantes discretos (ver MS 137, p. 4- 5, 1904), mas uma coleção de possibilia reais (ver NE, 360), tornando assimpossível a compreensão do fluxo do tempo (6.11). Então prosseguirei com o exame da conexão do tempo de Peirce, como um continuum real, com a idéia de infinito. A este respeito, focalizarei a sua rejeição da infinidade verdadeira – no sentido zenoneano-atomístico-cantoriano – e sua adoção da idéia aristotélica de potencial infinito (Física, livro III, caps. iv-viii). Argüirei, portanto, que o que levou Peirce a passar da análise lógico-matemática de continuidade para uma teoria ontológica foi seu apelo à potencialidade no seu tratamento de continuidade-infinidade-tempo. Isto, creio, foi o resultado da influência que ele recebera de Aristóteles, que estava também profundamente preocupado em dar à mudança, movimento e vir-a-ser, seu lugar apropriado na natureza. Assim, tanto Peirce quanto Aristóteles puderam construir uma teoria dinâmica do tempo, intimamente relacionada à idéia de infinidade potencial, que expressa um processo físico sendo progressivamente atualizado,de tal modo que ele jamais poderá existir como um todo imaginado.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2008); 261-280Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 2 (2008); 261-2802316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389/9925Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra2024-07-01T13:09:33Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13389Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:33Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time C.S. Peirce e Aristóteles sobre o Tempo |
title |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
spellingShingle |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra Peirce Aristóteles Tempo Continuidade Infinitesimais Peirce Aristotle Time Continuity Infinitesimals. |
title_short |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
title_full |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
title_fullStr |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
title_full_unstemmed |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
title_sort |
C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time |
author |
Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra |
author_facet |
Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Peirce Aristóteles Tempo Continuidade Infinitesimais Peirce Aristotle Time Continuity Infinitesimals. |
topic |
Peirce Aristóteles Tempo Continuidade Infinitesimais Peirce Aristotle Time Continuity Infinitesimals. |
description |
The question concerning the nature of time is intimately related to the traditional antithesis between the static a-temporal Parmenidean universe and the dynamic model of becoming. This is wonderfully illustrated in Peirce’s theory of the flux of time. In his rejection of the atomistic worldpicture, Peirce treated time in close relation to the physical processes. He thus propounded an extremely interesting theory which bears a kinship to contemporary theories of the arrow of time. However, what makes his approach extremely interesting is not only its air of modernity, but also its striking similarities with Aristotle (Physics, book IV, esp. chs. 10-14). My purpose, therefore, in this paper is to reconstruct Peirce’s theory of time in the light of Aristotle’s philosophy. My starting point will be Peirce’s analysis of continuity in relation to infinitesimals (6.109), through the use of which he could treat time as a “continuum par excellence, (6.86, 1898) which is not a static collection of discrete instants, (see MS 137, p. 4-5, 1904), but a collection of real possibilia (see NE, 360), thus making possible the understanding of the flow of time (6.11). I will then proceed to the examination of Peirce’s connection of time, as a real continuum, with the idea of the infinite. In this respect, I will focus on his rejection of actual infinity – in the Zenonean-atomistic-Cantorian sense – and his adoption of the Aristotelian idea of potential infinite (Physics, book III, chs. iv-viii). I will, thus, argue that what led Peirce to pass from a logico-mathematical analysis of continuity to an ontological theory was his appeal to potentiality in his treatment of continuity-infinity-time. This, I believe, was the result of the influence he had received from Aristotle, who was also deeply concerned with giving to change, motion and becoming their proper placein nature. Thus, both Peirce and Aristotle were able to built a dynamic theory of time, intimately related to the idea of potential infinity, which expresses a physical process progressively being actualized, so that it can never exist as a realized whole. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13389/9925 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2008); 261-280 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 2 (2008); 261-280 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387420822994944 |