Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612 |
Resumo: | This work is the second part of my research on Mead's philosophy. While the heart of the first article (Viale, 2008 a) was a descriptive reconstruction of Mead's theses on moral philosophy, my current objective is to point out and criticize some shortcomings I have found in it. The core of my criticism is that a tension within Mead's moral philosophy exists and I try to show how this tension works. Particularly, I think there is a necessary but unrecognized tension between the Meadean conceptions of ethics as a method and of an ideal world. The lack of acknowledgment of this tension, caused mainly by Mead's shortcomings regarding his conception of ideal, entails a contradiction within Mead's practical philosophy: sometimes, Mead's methodological dictum seems to require a democratic background to work; sometimes,Mead conceives his methodological dictum working in any kind of normative background. To carry out this task I will present two lines of argument: that Mead’s conceptions of ethics as a method and ideal world imply different kinds of theoretical commitments; on the other hand, that Mead’s conception of ideal world cannot coherently arise from his conception of method as he argues. In order to develop my hypothesis, I have divided this article into four parts: first of all I present the theoretical background of the relationships between ethics as a method and the Meadean ideal world; in the second part I attempt to show why a necessary tension between ethics as a methodand the ideal world exists; in the third part I argue why Mead’s ideal world cannot coherently spring from his conception of method; finally, I present my conclusions. |
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Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral PhilosophyÉtica como Método e os Significados do Ideal (II): Uma Crítica da Filosofia Moral de MeadGeorge H. MeadMoral philosophyIdeal worldNormative aspect of ethicsTension between ethics as a method and idealGeorge H. MeadMoral philosophyIdeal worldNormative aspect of ethicsTension between ethics as a method and idealThis work is the second part of my research on Mead's philosophy. While the heart of the first article (Viale, 2008 a) was a descriptive reconstruction of Mead's theses on moral philosophy, my current objective is to point out and criticize some shortcomings I have found in it. The core of my criticism is that a tension within Mead's moral philosophy exists and I try to show how this tension works. Particularly, I think there is a necessary but unrecognized tension between the Meadean conceptions of ethics as a method and of an ideal world. The lack of acknowledgment of this tension, caused mainly by Mead's shortcomings regarding his conception of ideal, entails a contradiction within Mead's practical philosophy: sometimes, Mead's methodological dictum seems to require a democratic background to work; sometimes,Mead conceives his methodological dictum working in any kind of normative background. To carry out this task I will present two lines of argument: that Mead’s conceptions of ethics as a method and ideal world imply different kinds of theoretical commitments; on the other hand, that Mead’s conception of ideal world cannot coherently arise from his conception of method as he argues. In order to develop my hypothesis, I have divided this article into four parts: first of all I present the theoretical background of the relationships between ethics as a method and the Meadean ideal world; in the second part I attempt to show why a necessary tension between ethics as a methodand the ideal world exists; in the third part I argue why Mead’s ideal world cannot coherently spring from his conception of method; finally, I present my conclusions.This work is the second part of my research on Mead's philosophy. While the heart of the first article (Viale, 2008 a) was a descriptive reconstruction of Mead's theses on moral philosophy, my current objective is to point out and criticize some shortcomings I have found in it. The core of my criticism is that a tension within Mead's moral philosophy exists and I try to show how this tension works. Particularly, I think there is a necessary but unrecognized tension between the Meadean conceptions of ethics as a method and of an ideal world. The lack of acknowledgment of this tension, caused mainly by Mead's shortcomings regarding his conception of ideal, entails a contradiction within Mead's practical philosophy: sometimes, Mead's methodological dictum seems to require a democratic background to work; sometimes,Mead conceives his methodological dictum working in any kind of normative background. To carry out this task I will present two lines of argument: that Mead’s conceptions of ethics as a method and ideal world imply different kinds of theoretical commitments; on the other hand, that Mead’s conception of ideal world cannot coherently arise from his conception of method as he argues. In order to develop my hypothesis, I have divided this article into four parts: first of all I present the theoretical background of the relationships between ethics as a method and the Meadean ideal world; in the second part I attempt to show why a necessary tension between ethics as a methodand the ideal world exists; in the third part I argue why Mead’s ideal world cannot coherently spring from his conception of method; finally, I present my conclusions.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2012-09-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2011); 309-321Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2011); 309-3212316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612/9904Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessViale, Claudio2024-07-01T13:09:30Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/11612Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:30Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy Ética como Método e os Significados do Ideal (II): Uma Crítica da Filosofia Moral de Mead |
title |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
spellingShingle |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy Viale, Claudio George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal |
title_short |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
title_full |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
title_fullStr |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
title_full_unstemmed |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
title_sort |
Ethics as a Method and the Meanings of Ideal (II): A Criticism of Meads' Moral Philosophy |
author |
Viale, Claudio |
author_facet |
Viale, Claudio |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Viale, Claudio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal |
topic |
George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal George H. Mead Moral philosophy Ideal world Normative aspect of ethics Tension between ethics as a method and ideal |
description |
This work is the second part of my research on Mead's philosophy. While the heart of the first article (Viale, 2008 a) was a descriptive reconstruction of Mead's theses on moral philosophy, my current objective is to point out and criticize some shortcomings I have found in it. The core of my criticism is that a tension within Mead's moral philosophy exists and I try to show how this tension works. Particularly, I think there is a necessary but unrecognized tension between the Meadean conceptions of ethics as a method and of an ideal world. The lack of acknowledgment of this tension, caused mainly by Mead's shortcomings regarding his conception of ideal, entails a contradiction within Mead's practical philosophy: sometimes, Mead's methodological dictum seems to require a democratic background to work; sometimes,Mead conceives his methodological dictum working in any kind of normative background. To carry out this task I will present two lines of argument: that Mead’s conceptions of ethics as a method and ideal world imply different kinds of theoretical commitments; on the other hand, that Mead’s conception of ideal world cannot coherently arise from his conception of method as he argues. In order to develop my hypothesis, I have divided this article into four parts: first of all I present the theoretical background of the relationships between ethics as a method and the Meadean ideal world; in the second part I attempt to show why a necessary tension between ethics as a methodand the ideal world exists; in the third part I argue why Mead’s ideal world cannot coherently spring from his conception of method; finally, I present my conclusions. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-09-21 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11612/9904 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 12 No. 2 (2011); 309-321 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 12 n. 2 (2011); 309-321 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387420368961536 |