Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Araújo, Arthur
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60854
Resumo: considering the debate in the modern and contemporary contexts of philosophy, I explore the pragmatic response to fact-value dualism. In this sense, considering that pragmatism regards mind and world as parts of an experiential continuum and humans as social beings, I draw attention to the “requiredness” of meaning and value in practices of living. Tracing a parallel between William James and Wolfgang Köhler regarding the notion of “interest”, as a form of requiredness, the central idea that I work out in this paper is that “interest” makes difference in some contexts of experience and then it leaves space for meaning and value in multiple levels of life. In terms of James’s pragmatism, as an alternative to the traditional dualities (fact-value, theory-practice, knowledge-reality, and so on), this pluralistic view supposes that each form of interest stands for condition and genesis of meaning and value in human practices.
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spelling Fact, value, meaning, pragmatismFato, valor, significação, pragmatismo considering the debate in the modern and contemporary contexts of philosophy, I explore the pragmatic response to fact-value dualism. In this sense, considering that pragmatism regards mind and world as parts of an experiential continuum and humans as social beings, I draw attention to the “requiredness” of meaning and value in practices of living. Tracing a parallel between William James and Wolfgang Köhler regarding the notion of “interest”, as a form of requiredness, the central idea that I work out in this paper is that “interest” makes difference in some contexts of experience and then it leaves space for meaning and value in multiple levels of life. In terms of James’s pragmatism, as an alternative to the traditional dualities (fact-value, theory-practice, knowledge-reality, and so on), this pluralistic view supposes that each form of interest stands for condition and genesis of meaning and value in human practices. considerando o debate nos contextos moderno e contemporâneo da filosofia, exploro a resposta pragmática ao dualismo fato-valor. Nesse sentido, levando em conta que o pragmatismo considera mente e mundo como partes de um continuum experiencial e os humanos como seres sociais, chamo a atenção para a “exigência” de significação e valor nas práticas de vida. Traçando um paralelo entre William James e Wolfgang Köhler relação à noção de “interesse”, como forma de exigência, a ideia central que desenvolvo neste artigo é que “interesse” faz diferença em alguns contextos de experiência e então abre espaço para significação e valor em múltiplos níveis da vida. Em termos do pragmatismo de James, como alternativa aos dualismos tradicionais (fato-valor, teoria- prática, conhecimento-realidade etc.), essa visão pluralista supõe que cada forma de interesse representa condição e gênese de sentido e valor nas práticas humanas. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2023-05-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/6085410.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e60854Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 24 No. 1 (2023): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e60854Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 24 n. 1 (2023): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e608542316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60854/42193Copyright (c) 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAraújo, Arthur 2023-02-12T13:48:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/60854Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2023-02-12T13:48:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
Fato, valor, significação, pragmatismo
title Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
spellingShingle Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
Araújo, Arthur
title_short Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
title_full Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
title_fullStr Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
title_full_unstemmed Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
title_sort Fact, value, meaning, pragmatism
author Araújo, Arthur
author_facet Araújo, Arthur
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Araújo, Arthur
description considering the debate in the modern and contemporary contexts of philosophy, I explore the pragmatic response to fact-value dualism. In this sense, considering that pragmatism regards mind and world as parts of an experiential continuum and humans as social beings, I draw attention to the “requiredness” of meaning and value in practices of living. Tracing a parallel between William James and Wolfgang Köhler regarding the notion of “interest”, as a form of requiredness, the central idea that I work out in this paper is that “interest” makes difference in some contexts of experience and then it leaves space for meaning and value in multiple levels of life. In terms of James’s pragmatism, as an alternative to the traditional dualities (fact-value, theory-practice, knowledge-reality, and so on), this pluralistic view supposes that each form of interest stands for condition and genesis of meaning and value in human practices.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-05-08
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60854
10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e60854
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60854
identifier_str_mv 10.23925/2316-5278.2023v24i1:e60854
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/60854/42193
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 24 No. 1 (2023): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e60854
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 24 n. 1 (2023): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e60854
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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