Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2024 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007 |
Resumo: | In this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument. |
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Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophyEstrutura, sentido-ingrediente e estratégia assertórica: ouvindo Michael Dummett para interpretar a herança da filosofia de FregeAssertionIngredient-senseSenseStructureAsserçãoEstruturaSentidoSentido-ingredienteIn this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument.Neste artigo, revisitaremos uma motivação para considerar as vantagens de uma teoria sobre conteúdos estruturados sobre uma semântica de mundos possíveis. Argumentaremos que uma estrutura representa a organização estratégica do conteúdo de “p” sob condições nas quais afirmá-lo não implica consequências contraditórias. Estas são as condições vencedoras para a asserção de ‘p’. Quando ‘p’ é modalmente sensível – pode alterar os seus parâmetros de sucesso – o conhecimento da estrutura representará o ponto racional para asserções (sobre realidades não actualizadas) que são organizadas para maximizar o que pode ser deduzido de ‘p’. Nestes casos, a estrutura relevante conhecida é intensional. Argumentaremos que a Semântica do Mundo Possível actualista, que procura a conversão do conhecimento intensional numa representação de re de estados possíveis, paga o preço de ficar cega às divergências estruturais; e só consegue explicar muito mal estas divergências estruturais entre estados de informação não reais e correlacioná-las com a divergência entre estratégias vencedoras de afirmação. Nosso argumento começará expondo o legado de Frege; recorrer ao conceito de sentido-ingrediente de Dummett como alternativa ao conhecimento de segundo grau (grade-two) de Kripke; e passar brevemente por uma estratégia semântica de Stalnaker e Thomason para representar asserções modais. Além destes autores exploraremos a contribuição de Russell, Kaplan e Ecthemendy para o nosso argumento.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2024-06-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/6600710.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e660072316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007/45129Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVollet, Lucas Ribeiro2024-05-06T12:24:35Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66007Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-05-06T12:24:35Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy Estrutura, sentido-ingrediente e estratégia assertórica: ouvindo Michael Dummett para interpretar a herança da filosofia de Frege |
title |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
spellingShingle |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro Assertion Ingredient-sense Sense Structure Asserção Estrutura Sentido Sentido-ingrediente |
title_short |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
title_full |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
title_fullStr |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
title_full_unstemmed |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
title_sort |
Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy |
author |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
author_facet |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Assertion Ingredient-sense Sense Structure Asserção Estrutura Sentido Sentido-ingrediente |
topic |
Assertion Ingredient-sense Sense Structure Asserção Estrutura Sentido Sentido-ingrediente |
description |
In this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-06-13 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007 10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007/45129 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387422669537280 |