Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro
Data de Publicação: 2024
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007
Resumo: In this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument.
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spelling Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophyEstrutura, sentido-ingrediente e estratégia assertórica: ouvindo Michael Dummett para interpretar a herança da filosofia de FregeAssertionIngredient-senseSenseStructureAsserçãoEstruturaSentidoSentido-ingredienteIn this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument.Neste artigo, revisitaremos uma motivação para considerar as vantagens de uma teoria sobre conteúdos estruturados sobre uma semântica de mundos possíveis. Argumentaremos que uma estrutura representa a organização estratégica do conteúdo de “p” sob condições nas quais afirmá-lo não implica consequências contraditórias. Estas são as condições vencedoras para a asserção de ‘p’. Quando ‘p’ é modalmente sensível – pode alterar os seus parâmetros de sucesso – o conhecimento da estrutura representará o ponto racional para asserções (sobre realidades não actualizadas) que são organizadas para maximizar o que pode ser deduzido de ‘p’. Nestes casos, a estrutura relevante conhecida é intensional. Argumentaremos que a Semântica do Mundo Possível actualista, que procura a conversão do conhecimento intensional numa representação de re de estados possíveis, paga o preço de ficar cega às divergências estruturais; e só consegue explicar muito mal estas divergências estruturais entre estados de informação não reais e correlacioná-las com a divergência entre estratégias vencedoras de afirmação. Nosso argumento começará expondo o legado de Frege; recorrer ao conceito de sentido-ingrediente de Dummett como alternativa ao conhecimento de segundo grau (grade-two) de Kripke; e passar brevemente por uma estratégia semântica de Stalnaker e Thomason para representar asserções modais. Além destes autores exploraremos a contribuição de Russell, Kaplan e Ecthemendy para o nosso argumento.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2024-06-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/6600710.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e660072316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007/45129Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVollet, Lucas Ribeiro2024-05-06T12:24:35Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/66007Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-05-06T12:24:35Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
Estrutura, sentido-ingrediente e estratégia assertórica: ouvindo Michael Dummett para interpretar a herança da filosofia de Frege
title Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
spellingShingle Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro
Assertion
Ingredient-sense
Sense
Structure
Asserção
Estrutura
Sentido
Sentido-ingrediente
title_short Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
title_full Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
title_fullStr Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
title_full_unstemmed Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
title_sort Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy: listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the heritage of Frege’s philosophy
author Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro
author_facet Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vollet, Lucas Ribeiro
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Assertion
Ingredient-sense
Sense
Structure
Asserção
Estrutura
Sentido
Sentido-ingrediente
topic Assertion
Ingredient-sense
Sense
Structure
Asserção
Estrutura
Sentido
Sentido-ingrediente
description In this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-06-13
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007
10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007
identifier_str_mv 10.23925/2316-5278.2024v25i1:e66007
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/66007/45129
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2024): Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia ; e66007
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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