Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570 |
Resumo: | The aim of my paper is already indicated in its subtitle (Peirce’s antifoundationalism and his defense of critical common-sensism). What I try to explain is what Peirce himself said: not only that all his philosophy has always seemed to him to grow “out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, but also that two doctrines – critical common sensism [CCS] and the scholastic doctrine of realism (“usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general. (...) the belief in this can hardly being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities”, CP 5.453) – were developed (by Peirce) before his formulation of pragmaticism (first enounced in the form of a maxim in 1878). Peirce’s realism and his pragmatism are not dissociated: “pragmatism could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there are real generals” (CP 5. 503, c.1905). Instead of presenting Peirce simply as anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: “Although pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of common sense” (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism “involves a complete rupture with nominalism” (CP 8.208). In Issues of Pragmaticism, Peirce defends his own doctrine of common sense (critical common-sensism) and specifies six errors which he finds in the Scotch doctrine of common sense. From the beginning to the end of his work, Peirce defended a realist and fallibilist pragmatism, but this, contrary to many contemporary “pragmatists”, did not impede him to refuse all accommodation with the “literary spirit” and to emphasize the legitimacy of the fundamental questions of philosophy. |
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Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-SensismOrigens do Pragmaticismo: O “Antifundacionalismo” de C. S. Peirce e a sua Defesa da Filosofia Crítica do Senso ComumPragmaticismRealismCritical common sensismMaxim of pragmaticismPragmaticismoRealismoDoutrina do senso comum críticoMáxima do pragmaticismoThe aim of my paper is already indicated in its subtitle (Peirce’s antifoundationalism and his defense of critical common-sensism). What I try to explain is what Peirce himself said: not only that all his philosophy has always seemed to him to grow “out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, but also that two doctrines – critical common sensism [CCS] and the scholastic doctrine of realism (“usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general. (...) the belief in this can hardly being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities”, CP 5.453) – were developed (by Peirce) before his formulation of pragmaticism (first enounced in the form of a maxim in 1878). Peirce’s realism and his pragmatism are not dissociated: “pragmatism could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there are real generals” (CP 5. 503, c.1905). Instead of presenting Peirce simply as anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: “Although pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of common sense” (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism “involves a complete rupture with nominalism” (CP 8.208). In Issues of Pragmaticism, Peirce defends his own doctrine of common sense (critical common-sensism) and specifies six errors which he finds in the Scotch doctrine of common sense. From the beginning to the end of his work, Peirce defended a realist and fallibilist pragmatism, but this, contrary to many contemporary “pragmatists”, did not impede him to refuse all accommodation with the “literary spirit” and to emphasize the legitimacy of the fundamental questions of philosophy.O subtítulo deste artigo, O “antifundacionalismo” de C. S. Peirce e a sua defesa da filosofia crítica do senso comum, já indica o seu objetivo. Tento explicitar o que foi dito por Peirce: não apenas que toda a sua filosofia parecia crescer “a partir de um contrito falibilismo, combinado com uma alta fé na realidade do conhecimento”, mas também que duas doutrinas – a doutrina do senso comum crítico e a doutrina escolástica do realismo – foram desenvolvidas ou elaboradas por ele antes da sua formulação do pragmaticismo. O realismo de Peirce é indissociável do seu pragmatismo: “O pragmaticismo jamais teria entrado numa cabeça que não estivesse já convencida de que há gerais reais” (CP 5.503, 1905). Não apresento aqui Peirce simplesmente como um anticartesiano, mas retomo o que ele próprio disse: “Embora o pragmaticismo não seja uma filosofia [...] ele se ajusta melhor à filosofia inglesa e, mais particularmente, à doutrina escocesa do senso comum” (CP 8.207, 1905), e insisto que o pragmaticismo está vinculado não apenas à filosofia escocesa mas “mais ou menos a toda a filosofia moderna” e pode ser caracterizado como uma “total ruptura com o nominalismo” (CP 8.208). Em Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], Peirce defende a sua doutrina do senso comum crítico e expõe os seis erros que ele encontrou na doutrina escocesa do senso comum. Do início ao fim de sua obra, Peirce defendeu um pragmatismo realista e falibilista, mas isso não o impediu, ao contrário de muitos “pragmatistas” contemporâneos, de recusar todo acomodamento com o “espírito literário” e de enfatizar a legitimidade das questões fundamentais da filosofia.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2018-06-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 49-76Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 49-762316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPporhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570/10080Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMagalhães, Theresa Calvet de2018-06-30T20:48:01Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13570Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2018-06-30T20:48:01Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism Origens do Pragmaticismo: O “Antifundacionalismo” de C. S. Peirce e a sua Defesa da Filosofia Crítica do Senso Comum |
title |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
spellingShingle |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de Pragmaticism Realism Critical common sensism Maxim of pragmaticism Pragmaticismo Realismo Doutrina do senso comum crítico Máxima do pragmaticismo |
title_short |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
title_full |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
title_fullStr |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
title_sort |
Origins of Pragmaticism: Peirce’s “Anti-foundationalism” and his Defense of Critical Common-Sensism |
author |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
author_facet |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Magalhães, Theresa Calvet de |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Pragmaticism Realism Critical common sensism Maxim of pragmaticism Pragmaticismo Realismo Doutrina do senso comum crítico Máxima do pragmaticismo |
topic |
Pragmaticism Realism Critical common sensism Maxim of pragmaticism Pragmaticismo Realismo Doutrina do senso comum crítico Máxima do pragmaticismo |
description |
The aim of my paper is already indicated in its subtitle (Peirce’s antifoundationalism and his defense of critical common-sensism). What I try to explain is what Peirce himself said: not only that all his philosophy has always seemed to him to grow “out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, but also that two doctrines – critical common sensism [CCS] and the scholastic doctrine of realism (“usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general. (...) the belief in this can hardly being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities”, CP 5.453) – were developed (by Peirce) before his formulation of pragmaticism (first enounced in the form of a maxim in 1878). Peirce’s realism and his pragmatism are not dissociated: “pragmatism could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there are real generals” (CP 5. 503, c.1905). Instead of presenting Peirce simply as anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: “Although pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of common sense” (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism “involves a complete rupture with nominalism” (CP 8.208). In Issues of Pragmaticism, Peirce defends his own doctrine of common sense (critical common-sensism) and specifies six errors which he finds in the Scotch doctrine of common sense. From the beginning to the end of his work, Peirce defended a realist and fallibilist pragmatism, but this, contrary to many contemporary “pragmatists”, did not impede him to refuse all accommodation with the “literary spirit” and to emphasize the legitimacy of the fundamental questions of philosophy. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-06-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13570/10080 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2006); 49-76 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 7 n. 1 (2006); 49-76 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387421256056832 |