Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism”
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523 |
Resumo: | The classical pragmatists shared the confidence in the emancipating possibilities of scientific methods and results, although this attitude was maintained in different ways. One of their most important purposes was to show that scientific activity suggests the overcoming of a series of dichotomies – subject/object, mind/nature, theory/practice – that go through both idealist and empiricist traditional philosophies. G.H. Mead’s utilization of biological knowledge and experimental psychology in the course of his philosophical research represents an attempt to achieve this purpose by means of an account of human consciousness as a specific phenomenon of biological life and, at the same time, through the development of a social psychology, conceived as an empirical analysis of the relationship between the structures of social life and the dynamics of subjectivity.My intention is to outline the main arguments Mead offers in support of an epistemological realism centred on the idea of the social nature of cognitive activities. The formulation of the concept of individual experience in terms of functional, organic aspects of the development of sciences, and the outlook of these latter as a “constructive” process of socially valid objective meanings will be considered as the parameters of a philosophical perspective that aims at neutralizing the risk of scepticism implicit in the opposition of subject and physical world, which characterize traditional forms of realism, as well as the idealistic residues of theories that emphasise the logical aspect of scientific research. Taking into consideration a group of texts spanning the whole of Mead’s work, I will focus on the congruence of this project with a naturalistic theory of mind and language through which he tries to restructure a number of basic philosophical notions, such as those of universality, symbolic meaning, truth and objectivity, in view of a conception of knowledge processes definable as “social realism.” |
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Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism”Indivíduo e Socialidade na Ciência: O “Realismo Social” de G.H. MeadG.H. MeadRealismSocialityIndividual ExperienceNaturalismG.H. MeadRealismoSocialidadeExperiência individualNaturalismoThe classical pragmatists shared the confidence in the emancipating possibilities of scientific methods and results, although this attitude was maintained in different ways. One of their most important purposes was to show that scientific activity suggests the overcoming of a series of dichotomies – subject/object, mind/nature, theory/practice – that go through both idealist and empiricist traditional philosophies. G.H. Mead’s utilization of biological knowledge and experimental psychology in the course of his philosophical research represents an attempt to achieve this purpose by means of an account of human consciousness as a specific phenomenon of biological life and, at the same time, through the development of a social psychology, conceived as an empirical analysis of the relationship between the structures of social life and the dynamics of subjectivity.My intention is to outline the main arguments Mead offers in support of an epistemological realism centred on the idea of the social nature of cognitive activities. The formulation of the concept of individual experience in terms of functional, organic aspects of the development of sciences, and the outlook of these latter as a “constructive” process of socially valid objective meanings will be considered as the parameters of a philosophical perspective that aims at neutralizing the risk of scepticism implicit in the opposition of subject and physical world, which characterize traditional forms of realism, as well as the idealistic residues of theories that emphasise the logical aspect of scientific research. Taking into consideration a group of texts spanning the whole of Mead’s work, I will focus on the congruence of this project with a naturalistic theory of mind and language through which he tries to restructure a number of basic philosophical notions, such as those of universality, symbolic meaning, truth and objectivity, in view of a conception of knowledge processes definable as “social realism.”Os pragmatistas clássicos compartilhavam da confiança nas possibilidades emancipadoras dos métodos e resultados científicos, embora de modo diferente. Um de seus propósitos mais importantes era mostrar que a atividade científica sugere a superação de uma série de dicotomias – sujeito/objeto, mente/natureza, teoria/prática – que perpassam as tradicionais filosofias tanto idealistas quanto empiristas. A utilização do conhecimento biológico e da psicologia experimental por parte de G.H. Mead, no decurso de sua pesquisa filosófica, representa uma tentativa de alcançar esse propósito por meio de uma explicação da consciência humana como um fenômeno específico da vida biológica e, ao mesmo tempo, por meio do desenvolvimento de uma psicologia social, concebida como uma análise empírica do relacionamento entre as estruturas da vida social e a dinâmica da subjetividade. Minha intenção é esboçar os principais argumentos que Mead avança na sustentação de um realismo epistemológico centrado na idéia de uma natureza social das atividades cognitivas. A formulação de um conceito de experiência individual em termos de aspectos funcionais, orgânicos do desenvolvimento das ciências, e a perspectiva destes últimos como um processo “construtivo” de significados objetivos socialmente válidos serão considerados como os parâmetros de uma visão filosófica que visa à neutralização do risco do ceticismo implícito na oposição sujeito e mundo físico, que caracteriza as formas tradicionais de realismo, assim como os resíduos idealistas de teorias que enfatizam o aspecto lógico da pesquisa científica. Levando em consideração um grupo de textos cobrindo toda a obra de Mead, eu focalizarei a congruência desse projeto com uma teoria naturalista da mente e da linguagem por meio da qual ele tenta reestruturar uma série de noções filosóficas básicas, tais como de universalidade, significado simbólico, verdade e objetividade, à luz de uma concepção de processos de conhecimento definíveis como “realismo social”.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 27-40Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 27-402316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523/10034Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCalcaterra, Rosa2024-07-01T13:09:34Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13523Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:34Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” Indivíduo e Socialidade na Ciência: O “Realismo Social” de G.H. Mead |
title |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
spellingShingle |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” Calcaterra, Rosa G.H. Mead Realism Sociality Individual Experience Naturalism G.H. Mead Realismo Socialidade Experiência individual Naturalismo |
title_short |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
title_full |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
title_fullStr |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
title_full_unstemmed |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
title_sort |
Individual and Sociality in Science: G.H. Mead’s “Social Realism” |
author |
Calcaterra, Rosa |
author_facet |
Calcaterra, Rosa |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Calcaterra, Rosa |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
G.H. Mead Realism Sociality Individual Experience Naturalism G.H. Mead Realismo Socialidade Experiência individual Naturalismo |
topic |
G.H. Mead Realism Sociality Individual Experience Naturalism G.H. Mead Realismo Socialidade Experiência individual Naturalismo |
description |
The classical pragmatists shared the confidence in the emancipating possibilities of scientific methods and results, although this attitude was maintained in different ways. One of their most important purposes was to show that scientific activity suggests the overcoming of a series of dichotomies – subject/object, mind/nature, theory/practice – that go through both idealist and empiricist traditional philosophies. G.H. Mead’s utilization of biological knowledge and experimental psychology in the course of his philosophical research represents an attempt to achieve this purpose by means of an account of human consciousness as a specific phenomenon of biological life and, at the same time, through the development of a social psychology, conceived as an empirical analysis of the relationship between the structures of social life and the dynamics of subjectivity.My intention is to outline the main arguments Mead offers in support of an epistemological realism centred on the idea of the social nature of cognitive activities. The formulation of the concept of individual experience in terms of functional, organic aspects of the development of sciences, and the outlook of these latter as a “constructive” process of socially valid objective meanings will be considered as the parameters of a philosophical perspective that aims at neutralizing the risk of scepticism implicit in the opposition of subject and physical world, which characterize traditional forms of realism, as well as the idealistic residues of theories that emphasise the logical aspect of scientific research. Taking into consideration a group of texts spanning the whole of Mead’s work, I will focus on the congruence of this project with a naturalistic theory of mind and language through which he tries to restructure a number of basic philosophical notions, such as those of universality, symbolic meaning, truth and objectivity, in view of a conception of knowledge processes definable as “social realism.” |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13523/10034 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 9 No. 1 (2008); 27-40 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 9 n. 1 (2008); 27-40 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387420939386880 |