Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603 |
Resumo: | One of the most familiar themes of pragmatist philosophy is the idea that belief is a disposition to act or a habit of action. Peirce took it from Alexander Bain and made it one of the cornerstones of his pragmatism. Since then it has been associated to the core of doctrines of classical pragmatism. Within analytic philosophy, the thesis that belief is a disposition to act has been equally influential, and much discussed from Ramsey to contemporary functionalist philosophy of mind.In this paper I want to show that, although it is a common thread of many pragmatist or pragmatist-inspired doctrines, the belief-as-dispositionto-act theme is played on very different tunes by the various philosophical performers. A whole book could be devoted to the topic. I shall limit myself here to the views of Peirce, James, Ramsey, contemporary functionalists, and Isaac Levi. Depending on how they interpret this theme, the pragmatist philosophers can emphasise more or less the role of theory and practice in their respective account of thought, truth and inquiry. When they stress the former pragmatists are what I shall call theoriapragmatists, when they put the stress on the latter, I’ll call them the praxis pragmatists. I suggest that the first variety is much more appealing that the other, and I side with the theoreticist pragmatists. |
id |
PUC_SP-15_e8e191bd020a12749225ede38a7773e0 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13603 |
network_acronym_str |
PUC_SP-15 |
network_name_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist ThemeA Crença como uma Disposição para Agir: Variações acerca de um Tema PragmatistaBeliefHabitDisposition to actPragmatismAnalytic philosophyFunctionalismCrençaHábitoDisposição para agirPragmatismoFilosofia analíticaFuncionalismoOne of the most familiar themes of pragmatist philosophy is the idea that belief is a disposition to act or a habit of action. Peirce took it from Alexander Bain and made it one of the cornerstones of his pragmatism. Since then it has been associated to the core of doctrines of classical pragmatism. Within analytic philosophy, the thesis that belief is a disposition to act has been equally influential, and much discussed from Ramsey to contemporary functionalist philosophy of mind.In this paper I want to show that, although it is a common thread of many pragmatist or pragmatist-inspired doctrines, the belief-as-dispositionto-act theme is played on very different tunes by the various philosophical performers. A whole book could be devoted to the topic. I shall limit myself here to the views of Peirce, James, Ramsey, contemporary functionalists, and Isaac Levi. Depending on how they interpret this theme, the pragmatist philosophers can emphasise more or less the role of theory and practice in their respective account of thought, truth and inquiry. When they stress the former pragmatists are what I shall call theoriapragmatists, when they put the stress on the latter, I’ll call them the praxis pragmatists. I suggest that the first variety is much more appealing that the other, and I side with the theoreticist pragmatists.Um dos temas mais familiares da filosofia pragmatista é a idéia de que a crença é uma disposição para agir ou um hábito de ação. Peirce tomou-a de Alexander Bain e a transformou numa das pedras fundamentais do seu pragmatismo. Desde então, essa idéia tem sido associada ao cerne das doutrinas do pragmatismo clássico. Na filosofia analítica, a tese de que a crença é uma disposição para agir tem sido igualmente influente e muito discutida, desde Ramsey até a filosofia da mente funcionalista da contemporaneidade.Neste artigo, quero mostrar que, embora seja uma linha comum de muitas doutrinas pragmatistas, ou inspiradas no pragmatismo, o tema da crença-como-disposição-para-agir é tocado em tons muito diferentes pelos vários executores filosóficos. Todo um livro poderia ser dedicado ao tópico. Limitar-me-ei aqui às visões de Peirce, James, Ramsey, os funcionalistas contemporâneos e Isaac Levi. Dependendo de como eles interpretam esse tema, os filósofos pragmatistas podem enfatizar mais ou menos o papel da teoria e da prática em suas respectivas abordagens do pensamento, da verdade e da inquirição. Quando reforçam a primeira, os pragmatistas são o que chamo de pragmatistas teóricos; quando põe ênfase na segunda, chamo-os de pragmatistas da práxis. Sugiro que a primeira variedade é muito mais interessante do que a outra, e alinho-me aos pragmatistas teóricos.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 167-185Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 167-1852316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603/10111Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEngel, Pascal2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13603Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme A Crença como uma Disposição para Agir: Variações acerca de um Tema Pragmatista |
title |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
spellingShingle |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme Engel, Pascal Belief Habit Disposition to act Pragmatism Analytic philosophy Functionalism Crença Hábito Disposição para agir Pragmatismo Filosofia analítica Funcionalismo |
title_short |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
title_full |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
title_fullStr |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
title_full_unstemmed |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
title_sort |
Belief as a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme |
author |
Engel, Pascal |
author_facet |
Engel, Pascal |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Engel, Pascal |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Belief Habit Disposition to act Pragmatism Analytic philosophy Functionalism Crença Hábito Disposição para agir Pragmatismo Filosofia analítica Funcionalismo |
topic |
Belief Habit Disposition to act Pragmatism Analytic philosophy Functionalism Crença Hábito Disposição para agir Pragmatismo Filosofia analítica Funcionalismo |
description |
One of the most familiar themes of pragmatist philosophy is the idea that belief is a disposition to act or a habit of action. Peirce took it from Alexander Bain and made it one of the cornerstones of his pragmatism. Since then it has been associated to the core of doctrines of classical pragmatism. Within analytic philosophy, the thesis that belief is a disposition to act has been equally influential, and much discussed from Ramsey to contemporary functionalist philosophy of mind.In this paper I want to show that, although it is a common thread of many pragmatist or pragmatist-inspired doctrines, the belief-as-dispositionto-act theme is played on very different tunes by the various philosophical performers. A whole book could be devoted to the topic. I shall limit myself here to the views of Peirce, James, Ramsey, contemporary functionalists, and Isaac Levi. Depending on how they interpret this theme, the pragmatist philosophers can emphasise more or less the role of theory and practice in their respective account of thought, truth and inquiry. When they stress the former pragmatists are what I shall call theoriapragmatists, when they put the stress on the latter, I’ll call them the praxis pragmatists. I suggest that the first variety is much more appealing that the other, and I side with the theoreticist pragmatists. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-02-08 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13603/10111 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 167-185 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 167-185 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387421275979776 |