Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608 |
Resumo: | A thinker, confronted with the somewhat improbable task of making a right guess under stressful conditions involving a high risk to the thinker’s well being if the guess is wrong, is able to make the right guess more often than mere chance would dictate. In two cases c. 1907, Peirce asserts that mere chance does not suffice to explain a true guess. But the “vera causa of true guessing” involves a trick that the thinker must play on himself in order to dislodge the interference of his own ego in the guessing process. I shall analyze the phenomenon of the vera causa, as Peirce describes it in MSS 687 in terms of his notion of the triadicity of a true communication. |
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Peirce’s Vera Causa of GuessingA Vera Causa da Adivinhação segundo PeirceVera CausaAcasoAbduçãoInstintoAdivinhaçãoVera CausaChanceAbductionInstinctGuessingA thinker, confronted with the somewhat improbable task of making a right guess under stressful conditions involving a high risk to the thinker’s well being if the guess is wrong, is able to make the right guess more often than mere chance would dictate. In two cases c. 1907, Peirce asserts that mere chance does not suffice to explain a true guess. But the “vera causa of true guessing” involves a trick that the thinker must play on himself in order to dislodge the interference of his own ego in the guessing process. I shall analyze the phenomenon of the vera causa, as Peirce describes it in MSS 687 in terms of his notion of the triadicity of a true communication.Um pensador, confrontado com a tarefa de algum modo improvável de fazer uma adivinhação correta sob condições estressantes, envolvendo um alto risco para seu bem-estar caso esteja errado, é capaz de acertar com maior freqüência do que o mero acaso poderia determinar. Em dois casos, em torno de 1907, Peirce afirma que o mero acaso não é suficiente para explicar uma adivinhação verdadeira. Porém, a “vera causa da adivinhação correta” implica o pensador pregar uma peça em si mesmo, a fim de afastar a interferência do próprio ego no processo de adivinhação. Analiso o fenômeno de vera causa tal como Peirce o descreve em MSS 687-8, em termos de sua noção da triadicidade de uma comunicação verdadeiramente interpessoal.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 255-264Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 255-2642316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608/10120Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTurrisi, Patricia2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13608Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing A Vera Causa da Adivinhação segundo Peirce |
title |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
spellingShingle |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing Turrisi, Patricia Vera Causa Acaso Abdução Instinto Adivinhação Vera Causa Chance Abduction Instinct Guessing |
title_short |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
title_full |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
title_fullStr |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
title_full_unstemmed |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
title_sort |
Peirce’s Vera Causa of Guessing |
author |
Turrisi, Patricia |
author_facet |
Turrisi, Patricia |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Turrisi, Patricia |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Vera Causa Acaso Abdução Instinto Adivinhação Vera Causa Chance Abduction Instinct Guessing |
topic |
Vera Causa Acaso Abdução Instinto Adivinhação Vera Causa Chance Abduction Instinct Guessing |
description |
A thinker, confronted with the somewhat improbable task of making a right guess under stressful conditions involving a high risk to the thinker’s well being if the guess is wrong, is able to make the right guess more often than mere chance would dictate. In two cases c. 1907, Peirce asserts that mere chance does not suffice to explain a true guess. But the “vera causa of true guessing” involves a trick that the thinker must play on himself in order to dislodge the interference of his own ego in the guessing process. I shall analyze the phenomenon of the vera causa, as Peirce describes it in MSS 687 in terms of his notion of the triadicity of a true communication. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-02-08 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13608/10120 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 255-264 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 255-264 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
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1803387421288562688 |