O juízo da pronúncia e seus dilemas probatórios : a (im)possibilidade de coexistência entre indícios suficientes de autoria, presunção de inocência e in dubio pro societate

• Autor(a) principal: Stein, Ana Carolina Filippon
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RS
• Texto Completo: http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/7990
• topic: Direito Processual Penal; Presunção de Inocência; In dubio pro Societate; Indícios; Prova; Decisão de Pronúncia; CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO

The present work is grounded on Penal System and Violence area, in the line of research on Contemporary Criminal Justice Systems of the Postgraduate Program in Criminal Sciences of PUCRS, and aims at analyzing the probative issue concerning the judge’s decision to pursue, when it allows sufficient evidence to justify, in overcoming the dubio pro reo, by the dubio pro societate. It is assumed a constitutional view of Brazilian criminal procedure of the principles studied, by the filter of the presumption of innocence guarantee in criminal proceedings. The problem under discussion is the principle of presumption of innocence and its scope of observance within Brazilian criminal proceedings, as well as the adage of the in dubio pro societate, in order to allow a deeper evidentiary dilemma contained in the judge’s decision to pursue, that is, whether sufficient evidence has the force to overcome the presumption of innocence in face of a pro-societal judgment, or not, in a criminal justice system, which is claimed to be democratic. We also worked on the specific differences between indication and evidence, as well as on differences between investigative acts and evidence acts, with the purpose of fostering a separation between these precepts and demarcating their moments of action within criminal prosecution. Finally, we presented and analyzed documentary research data, identifying vices in speeches of judge’s decision to pursue, which affirm a certain argument from authority contained in such documents, and which may end up influencing the jurors’ beliefs. We concluded that there is no democratic criminal procedure without the actual observance of the principle of presumption of innocence, which must be imposed at decisive moments, surpassing any other technical principles colliding with it.