Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RS |
Texto Completo: | http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/8535 |
Resumo: | The scope of philosophical discussions about ethics, morality, politics, and justice is radically impacted by the ideas of John Rawls (1921-2002). In A Theory of Justice (1971), the American philosopher exposes his constructivist conception of justice as fairness, which is admittedly inspired and grounded in Kant's practical reason (1724-1804). Nevertheless, the Rawlsian intellectual itinerary undergoes profound changes, so that in Political Liberalism (1993) a strictly political conception of justice is presented. In effect, the principles of political liberalism are exposed as freestanding, with no link to Kantian moral presuppositions or even to any other philosophical doctrine. This would be a necessary condition for an overlapping consensus between the different conceptions of good existing in democratic societies. In this context, the present research questions the idea of freestanding of the political scope, seeking to highlight some moral assumptions not explicitly stated by Rawls. In the light of a semantic agreement that differentiates the scopes of application of ethics, politics, and moral, this discussion intends to demonstrate that there is a moral foundation in political liberalism, which, however, should not be understood in the ethical sense. This moral assumption would be in Kantian practical reason, for it is from this that Rawls sets out to structure and ground his conception of justice. Hence, the principles of Rawlsian political liberalism, in order to be effective when applied to the basic structure of society, must be analyzed through the moral elements of Kantian practical reason. Finally, this research seeks to show that such moral presupposition puts the idea of freestanding of the political scope in check, however, does not compromise the possibility of an overlapping consensus nor the establishment of the priority of the right over the good. That‘s because Kantian morality, unlike ethical conceptions of good, meets the criteria of objectivity and publicity required by the political scope. |
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Weber, Thadeuhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0933808527220029Orben, Douglas João2019-04-25T13:11:52Z2019-03-28http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/8535The scope of philosophical discussions about ethics, morality, politics, and justice is radically impacted by the ideas of John Rawls (1921-2002). In A Theory of Justice (1971), the American philosopher exposes his constructivist conception of justice as fairness, which is admittedly inspired and grounded in Kant's practical reason (1724-1804). Nevertheless, the Rawlsian intellectual itinerary undergoes profound changes, so that in Political Liberalism (1993) a strictly political conception of justice is presented. In effect, the principles of political liberalism are exposed as freestanding, with no link to Kantian moral presuppositions or even to any other philosophical doctrine. This would be a necessary condition for an overlapping consensus between the different conceptions of good existing in democratic societies. In this context, the present research questions the idea of freestanding of the political scope, seeking to highlight some moral assumptions not explicitly stated by Rawls. In the light of a semantic agreement that differentiates the scopes of application of ethics, politics, and moral, this discussion intends to demonstrate that there is a moral foundation in political liberalism, which, however, should not be understood in the ethical sense. This moral assumption would be in Kantian practical reason, for it is from this that Rawls sets out to structure and ground his conception of justice. Hence, the principles of Rawlsian political liberalism, in order to be effective when applied to the basic structure of society, must be analyzed through the moral elements of Kantian practical reason. Finally, this research seeks to show that such moral presupposition puts the idea of freestanding of the political scope in check, however, does not compromise the possibility of an overlapping consensus nor the establishment of the priority of the right over the good. That‘s because Kantian morality, unlike ethical conceptions of good, meets the criteria of objectivity and publicity required by the political scope.A esfera de discussões filosóficas acerca da ética, da moral, da política e da justiça é radicalmente impactada pelas ideias de John Rawls (1921-2002). Em A Theory of Justice (1971), o filósofo estadunidense apresenta a sua concepção construtivista de justiça como equidade, a qual é reconhecidamente inspirada e fundamentada na razão prática de Kant (1724-1804). Não obstante, o itinerário intelectual rawlsiano passa por mudanças profundas, de modo que, em Political Liberalism (1993), apresenta-se uma concepção estritamente política de justiça. Com efeito, os princípios do liberalismo político são expostos como autossustentáveis, sem nenhuma vinculação com pressupostos morais kantianos ou mesmo com qualquer outra doutrina filosófica. Essa seria, aliás, uma condição necessária para se levar a cabo um consenso sobreposto entre as diversas concepções de bem existentes em sociedades democráticas. Nesse contexto, a presente pesquisa questiona a ideia de autossustentabilidade do âmbito político, buscando evidenciar alguns pressupostos morais não explicitados por Rawls. À luz de um acordo semântico que diferencia os âmbitos de aplicação do ético, do político e do moral, pretende-se demostrar que há uma fundamentação moral no liberalismo político, a qual, todavia, não deve ser entendida no sentido ético. Esse pressuposto moral estaria na razão prática kantiana, pois é daí que Rawls parte para estruturar e fundamentar a sua concepção de justiça. Com isso, os princípios do liberalismo político rawlsiano, para que possam ser efetivos quando aplicados à estrutura básica da sociedade, devem ser analisados mediante os elementos morais da razão prática kantiana. Por fim, buscase evidenciar que esse pressuposto moral coloca em xeque a ideia de autossustentabilidade do âmbito político, entretanto, não compromete a possibilidade de um consenso sobreposto nem o estabelecimento da prioridade do justo sobre o bem. Isso porque a moralidade kantiana, diferente das concepções éticas de bem, atende aos critérios de objetividade e publicidade exigidos pelo âmbito político.Submitted by PPG Filosofia (filosofia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2019-04-09T18:45:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DOUGLAS JOÃO ORBEN - TESE - 09-04-2019.pdf: 2179592 bytes, checksum: 48cb16725c7a5fc53222a5f72dd854c0 (MD5)Approved for entry into archive by Sheila Dias (sheila.dias@pucrs.br) on 2019-04-25T13:07:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DOUGLAS JOÃO ORBEN - TESE - 09-04-2019.pdf: 2179592 bytes, checksum: 48cb16725c7a5fc53222a5f72dd854c0 (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2019-04-25T13:11:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DOUGLAS JOÃO ORBEN - TESE - 09-04-2019.pdf: 2179592 bytes, checksum: 48cb16725c7a5fc53222a5f72dd854c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-03-28Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPESapplication/pdfhttp://tede2.pucrs.br:80/tede2/retrieve/174696/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.jpghttps://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/retrieve/187266/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.jpgporPontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do SulPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaPUCRSBrasilEscola de HumanidadesKantRawlsÉticaPolíticaJustiçaCIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIADa razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo políticoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisTrabalho será publicado como artigo ou livro48 meses25/04/2023-1441514414422910841500500500600-6557531471218110192-6723520209401670533590462550136975366info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RSinstname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)instacron:PUC_RSORIGINALTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdfTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdfapplication/pdf2179592https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/5/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf48cb16725c7a5fc53222a5f72dd854c0MD55THUMBNAILTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.jpgTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.jpgimage/jpeg4087https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/4/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.jpg3dae660720ecdf4238ff1931d4edc647MD54TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.jpgTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.jpgimage/jpeg5459https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/7/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.jpg03482c7d6afeac6072483181d520711dMD57TEXTTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.txtTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.txttext/plain1822https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/3/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_CONFIDENCIAL.pdf.txtf659e6d57a13e6a7df145bfa50c51aeeMD53TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.txtTES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.txttext/plain799672https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/6/TES_DOUGLAS_JOAO_ORBEN_COMPLETO.pdf.txtedf53f5c1ebced36f5b739f145727aa4MD56LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-8590https://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/bitstream/tede/8535/1/license.txt220e11f2d3ba5354f917c7035aadef24MD51tede/85352023-04-28 12:00:19.353oai:tede2.pucrs.br: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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/PRIhttps://tede2.pucrs.br/oai/requestbiblioteca.central@pucrs.br||opendoar:2023-04-28T15:00:19Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_RS - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS)false |
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
title |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
spellingShingle |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político Orben, Douglas João Kant Rawls Ética Política Justiça CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
title_full |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
title_fullStr |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
title_full_unstemmed |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
title_sort |
Da razão prática kantiana à teoria da justiça rawlsiana : os pressupostos morais do liberalismo político |
author |
Orben, Douglas João |
author_facet |
Orben, Douglas João |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Weber, Thadeu |
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/0933808527220029 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Orben, Douglas João |
contributor_str_mv |
Weber, Thadeu |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Kant Rawls Ética Política Justiça |
topic |
Kant Rawls Ética Política Justiça CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
The scope of philosophical discussions about ethics, morality, politics, and justice is radically impacted by the ideas of John Rawls (1921-2002). In A Theory of Justice (1971), the American philosopher exposes his constructivist conception of justice as fairness, which is admittedly inspired and grounded in Kant's practical reason (1724-1804). Nevertheless, the Rawlsian intellectual itinerary undergoes profound changes, so that in Political Liberalism (1993) a strictly political conception of justice is presented. In effect, the principles of political liberalism are exposed as freestanding, with no link to Kantian moral presuppositions or even to any other philosophical doctrine. This would be a necessary condition for an overlapping consensus between the different conceptions of good existing in democratic societies. In this context, the present research questions the idea of freestanding of the political scope, seeking to highlight some moral assumptions not explicitly stated by Rawls. In the light of a semantic agreement that differentiates the scopes of application of ethics, politics, and moral, this discussion intends to demonstrate that there is a moral foundation in political liberalism, which, however, should not be understood in the ethical sense. This moral assumption would be in Kantian practical reason, for it is from this that Rawls sets out to structure and ground his conception of justice. Hence, the principles of Rawlsian political liberalism, in order to be effective when applied to the basic structure of society, must be analyzed through the moral elements of Kantian practical reason. Finally, this research seeks to show that such moral presupposition puts the idea of freestanding of the political scope in check, however, does not compromise the possibility of an overlapping consensus nor the establishment of the priority of the right over the good. That‘s because Kantian morality, unlike ethical conceptions of good, meets the criteria of objectivity and publicity required by the political scope. |
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