Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gonçalves, Ricardo
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Ray, Indrajit
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42402
Resumo: We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.
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spelling Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auctionDiscrete bidsJapanese-English auctionsPartitionsPooling equilibriumSeller's revenueSeparating equilibriumWallet gameWe consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaGonçalves, RicardoRay, Indrajit2023-09-15T16:59:17Z2023-07-292023-07-29T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42402eng1434-474210.1007/s10058-023-00337-785175116668001039119600001info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-07T01:33:07Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/42402Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T20:29:36.498607Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
title Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
spellingShingle Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
Gonçalves, Ricardo
Discrete bids
Japanese-English auctions
Partitions
Pooling equilibrium
Seller's revenue
Separating equilibrium
Wallet game
title_short Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
title_full Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
title_fullStr Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
title_full_unstemmed Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
title_sort Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
author Gonçalves, Ricardo
author_facet Gonçalves, Ricardo
Ray, Indrajit
author_role author
author2 Ray, Indrajit
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gonçalves, Ricardo
Ray, Indrajit
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Discrete bids
Japanese-English auctions
Partitions
Pooling equilibrium
Seller's revenue
Separating equilibrium
Wallet game
topic Discrete bids
Japanese-English auctions
Partitions
Pooling equilibrium
Seller's revenue
Separating equilibrium
Wallet game
description We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-09-15T16:59:17Z
2023-07-29
2023-07-29T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42402
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/42402
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 1434-4742
10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7
85175116668
001039119600001
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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