Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Nese, Gjermund
Data de Publicação: 2007
Outros Autores: Straume, Odd Rune
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6827
Resumo: We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.
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spelling Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopolySuccessive oligopolyStrategic trade policyIndustry concentrationSocial SciencesWe study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council, through the PETROPOL research programme, is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has been greatly improved by the suggestions of two anonymous referees. We also thank Hisashi Hokari and Frode Meland for valuable comments and suggestions.SpringerUniversidade do MinhoNese, GjermundStraume, Odd Rune2007-032007-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/6827eng"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade". ISSN 1566-1679. 7:1 (Mar. 2007) 31-52.1566-167910.1007/s10842-006-0001-7http://www.springer.com/west/home/economics/journals?SGWID=4-40532-70-35634534-0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:22:39Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/6827Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:16:10.507482Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
title Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
spellingShingle Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
Nese, Gjermund
Successive oligopoly
Strategic trade policy
Industry concentration
Social Sciences
title_short Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
title_full Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
title_fullStr Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
title_full_unstemmed Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
title_sort Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly
author Nese, Gjermund
author_facet Nese, Gjermund
Straume, Odd Rune
author_role author
author2 Straume, Odd Rune
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Nese, Gjermund
Straume, Odd Rune
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Successive oligopoly
Strategic trade policy
Industry concentration
Social Sciences
topic Successive oligopoly
Strategic trade policy
Industry concentration
Social Sciences
description We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-03
2007-03-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6827
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6827
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade". ISSN 1566-1679. 7:1 (Mar. 2007) 31-52.
1566-1679
10.1007/s10842-006-0001-7
http://www.springer.com/west/home/economics/journals?SGWID=4-40532-70-35634534-0
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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