To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Degryse, Hans
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Karapetyan, Artashes, Karmakar, Sudipto
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/16039
Resumo: We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks' decisions to grant collateralized rather than uncollateralized loans.We exploit the 2011 EBA capital exercise, a quasi-natural experiment that required a number of banks to increase their regulatory capital but not others. This experiment makes secured lending more attractive vis-à- vis unsecured lending for the affected banks as secured loans require less regulatory capital. Using a loan-level dataset covering all corporate loans in Portugal, we identify a novel channel of tighter capital requirements: relative to the control group and after the shock, treated banks require loans more often to be collateralized but less so for relationship borrowers. We further find this impact is stronger for collateral that saves more on regulatory capital.
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spelling To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationshipsWe study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks' decisions to grant collateralized rather than uncollateralized loans.We exploit the 2011 EBA capital exercise, a quasi-natural experiment that required a number of banks to increase their regulatory capital but not others. This experiment makes secured lending more attractive vis-à- vis unsecured lending for the affected banks as secured loans require less regulatory capital. Using a loan-level dataset covering all corporate loans in Portugal, we identify a novel channel of tighter capital requirements: relative to the control group and after the shock, treated banks require loans more often to be collateralized but less so for relationship borrowers. We further find this impact is stronger for collateral that saves more on regulatory capital.ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and MathematicsRepositório da Universidade de LisboaDegryse, HansKarapetyan, ArtashesKarmakar, Sudipto2018-10-02T15:33:32Z2018-092018-09-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/16039engDegryse, Hans, Artashes Karapetyan e Sudipto Karmakar (2018). "To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 049 - 20182184-108Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:45:55Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/16039Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:32.691765Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
title To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
spellingShingle To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
Degryse, Hans
title_short To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
title_full To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
title_fullStr To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
title_full_unstemmed To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
title_sort To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships
author Degryse, Hans
author_facet Degryse, Hans
Karapetyan, Artashes
Karmakar, Sudipto
author_role author
author2 Karapetyan, Artashes
Karmakar, Sudipto
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Degryse, Hans
Karapetyan, Artashes
Karmakar, Sudipto
description We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks' decisions to grant collateralized rather than uncollateralized loans.We exploit the 2011 EBA capital exercise, a quasi-natural experiment that required a number of banks to increase their regulatory capital but not others. This experiment makes secured lending more attractive vis-à- vis unsecured lending for the affected banks as secured loans require less regulatory capital. Using a loan-level dataset covering all corporate loans in Portugal, we identify a novel channel of tighter capital requirements: relative to the control group and after the shock, treated banks require loans more often to be collateralized but less so for relationship borrowers. We further find this impact is stronger for collateral that saves more on regulatory capital.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-10-02T15:33:32Z
2018-09
2018-09-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/16039
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/16039
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Degryse, Hans, Artashes Karapetyan e Sudipto Karmakar (2018). "To ask or not to ask? Collateral versus screening in lending relationships". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 049 - 2018
2184-108X
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics
publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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