Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Hovi, Jon
Data de Publicação: 2013
Outros Autores: Skodvin, Tora, Aakre, Stine
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96
Resumo: More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
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spelling Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibilityMore than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.Cogitatio Press2013-09-20info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96Politics and Governance; Vol 1, No 2 (2013): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 138-1502183-246310.17645/pag.i13reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/96https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/96/74Hovi, JonSkodvin, ToraAakre, Stineinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-12-28T15:15:23Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/96Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T00:56:38.554187Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
spellingShingle Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
Hovi, Jon
climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
title_short Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_full Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_fullStr Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_full_unstemmed Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_sort Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
author Hovi, Jon
author_facet Hovi, Jon
Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
author_role author
author2 Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Hovi, Jon
Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
topic climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
description More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-09-20
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url https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Politics and Governance; Vol 1, No 2 (2013): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 138-150
2183-2463
10.17645/pag.i13
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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