Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/43715 |
Resumo: | There are mainly two paths to fiscal discipline within a federation or within a monetary union: either through markets or through hierarchy. By establishing the no-bailout clause, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure, it was thought that the Maastricht Treaty had chosen market mechanisms to achieve that objective. However, the financial crisis showed the severe shortcomings of the model, marking a shift towards surveillance. This article argues that such failure was not due to the market mechanism but by flawed institutional choices. By establishing a procedure for fiscal adjustment, Member States cast doubt on the credibility of the no-bail out clause and took matters into the political realm. As a result, the political process was at the forefront since inception. There are several ways to deliver a certain social goal. Accordingly, goal choice and institutional choice are inextricably linked because it is the institutional choice which connects goals with their legal or public policy results. Importantly, to choose the best avenue comparative institutional analysis needs to be conducted. After briefly considering the political process, this article purports that other processes should be fully explored. When addressing the financial crisis in multi-level governance, some alternatives have already been employed: state default and supranational bailout. Within the EMU, no State has defaulted on its debt obligations prior to receiving a bailout. However, there is room to explore an option that would be based on market mechanisms with judicial elements while reducing dependence on the political process in the long-term: allowing Member States to orderly default on their debts. The article discusses its main problems, constitutional admissibility and democratic necessity. |
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Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market processThere are mainly two paths to fiscal discipline within a federation or within a monetary union: either through markets or through hierarchy. By establishing the no-bailout clause, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure, it was thought that the Maastricht Treaty had chosen market mechanisms to achieve that objective. However, the financial crisis showed the severe shortcomings of the model, marking a shift towards surveillance. This article argues that such failure was not due to the market mechanism but by flawed institutional choices. By establishing a procedure for fiscal adjustment, Member States cast doubt on the credibility of the no-bail out clause and took matters into the political realm. As a result, the political process was at the forefront since inception. There are several ways to deliver a certain social goal. Accordingly, goal choice and institutional choice are inextricably linked because it is the institutional choice which connects goals with their legal or public policy results. Importantly, to choose the best avenue comparative institutional analysis needs to be conducted. After briefly considering the political process, this article purports that other processes should be fully explored. When addressing the financial crisis in multi-level governance, some alternatives have already been employed: state default and supranational bailout. Within the EMU, no State has defaulted on its debt obligations prior to receiving a bailout. However, there is room to explore an option that would be based on market mechanisms with judicial elements while reducing dependence on the political process in the long-term: allowing Member States to orderly default on their debts. The article discusses its main problems, constitutional admissibility and democratic necessity.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaMatos, Nuno Albuquerque2024-01-24T13:48:57Z2023-12-272023-12-27T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/43715eng2003-178510.36969/njel.v6i4.25917info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-02-06T01:37:23Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/43715Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:49.755304Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
title |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
spellingShingle |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process Matos, Nuno Albuquerque |
title_short |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
title_full |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
title_fullStr |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
title_full_unstemmed |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
title_sort |
Balancing the relationship between the Union and Member States through the market process |
author |
Matos, Nuno Albuquerque |
author_facet |
Matos, Nuno Albuquerque |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Matos, Nuno Albuquerque |
description |
There are mainly two paths to fiscal discipline within a federation or within a monetary union: either through markets or through hierarchy. By establishing the no-bailout clause, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure, it was thought that the Maastricht Treaty had chosen market mechanisms to achieve that objective. However, the financial crisis showed the severe shortcomings of the model, marking a shift towards surveillance. This article argues that such failure was not due to the market mechanism but by flawed institutional choices. By establishing a procedure for fiscal adjustment, Member States cast doubt on the credibility of the no-bail out clause and took matters into the political realm. As a result, the political process was at the forefront since inception. There are several ways to deliver a certain social goal. Accordingly, goal choice and institutional choice are inextricably linked because it is the institutional choice which connects goals with their legal or public policy results. Importantly, to choose the best avenue comparative institutional analysis needs to be conducted. After briefly considering the political process, this article purports that other processes should be fully explored. When addressing the financial crisis in multi-level governance, some alternatives have already been employed: state default and supranational bailout. Within the EMU, no State has defaulted on its debt obligations prior to receiving a bailout. However, there is room to explore an option that would be based on market mechanisms with judicial elements while reducing dependence on the political process in the long-term: allowing Member States to orderly default on their debts. The article discusses its main problems, constitutional admissibility and democratic necessity. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-12-27 2023-12-27T00:00:00Z 2024-01-24T13:48:57Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/43715 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/43715 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-1785 10.36969/njel.v6i4.25917 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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