Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Paulo Trigo
Data de Publicação: 2006
Outros Autores: Silva, Nuno, Silva, João Andrade e
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/26446
Resumo: Traditional gift-exchange experiments were designed with corner equilibria so that evidence of positive reciprocity could not be disentangled from one-sided errors. Our first treatment replicates the traditional design and finds that effort is an increasing function of wage for mid-range wage offers, but this relationship is not significant for high and low offers. The second treatment has an interior equilibrium, asymmetric marginal costs of reciprocity (positive and negative) and lower efficiency gains. There is evidence of a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, there is still significant reciprocal behavior (positive and negative).
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spelling Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor marketTrustReciprocityGift-Exchange GamesIncomplete ContractsLabor RelationsTraditional gift-exchange experiments were designed with corner equilibria so that evidence of positive reciprocity could not be disentangled from one-sided errors. Our first treatment replicates the traditional design and finds that effort is an increasing function of wage for mid-range wage offers, but this relationship is not significant for high and low offers. The second treatment has an interior equilibrium, asymmetric marginal costs of reciprocity (positive and negative) and lower efficiency gains. There is evidence of a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, there is still significant reciprocal behavior (positive and negative).ElsevierRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPereira, Paulo TrigoSilva, NunoSilva, João Andrade e2022-12-14T09:08:00Z20062006-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/26446engPereira, Paulo Trigo; Nuno Silva and João Andrade e Silva .(2006). “Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Vol. 59, No. 3 : pp. 406–422. (search PDF at sciencedirect.com in 2020)0167-268110.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.015info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:55:54Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/26446Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:10:05.824043Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
title Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
spellingShingle Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
Pereira, Paulo Trigo
Trust
Reciprocity
Gift-Exchange Games
Incomplete Contracts
Labor Relations
title_short Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
title_full Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
title_fullStr Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
title_full_unstemmed Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
title_sort Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market
author Pereira, Paulo Trigo
author_facet Pereira, Paulo Trigo
Silva, Nuno
Silva, João Andrade e
author_role author
author2 Silva, Nuno
Silva, João Andrade e
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pereira, Paulo Trigo
Silva, Nuno
Silva, João Andrade e
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Trust
Reciprocity
Gift-Exchange Games
Incomplete Contracts
Labor Relations
topic Trust
Reciprocity
Gift-Exchange Games
Incomplete Contracts
Labor Relations
description Traditional gift-exchange experiments were designed with corner equilibria so that evidence of positive reciprocity could not be disentangled from one-sided errors. Our first treatment replicates the traditional design and finds that effort is an increasing function of wage for mid-range wage offers, but this relationship is not significant for high and low offers. The second treatment has an interior equilibrium, asymmetric marginal costs of reciprocity (positive and negative) and lower efficiency gains. There is evidence of a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, there is still significant reciprocal behavior (positive and negative).
publishDate 2006
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2006
2006-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-12-14T09:08:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/26446
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/26446
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pereira, Paulo Trigo; Nuno Silva and João Andrade e Silva .(2006). “Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Vol. 59, No. 3 : pp. 406–422. (search PDF at sciencedirect.com in 2020)
0167-2681
10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.015
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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