Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Wacławska, Kamila Angelika
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/11086
Resumo: In this work the discussion is focused on the empirical test of the presence of opportunistic cycles in municipal budgets of Poland and Spain. In the view of progressive decentralization of public sector, the research is extended by the examination of fiscal autonomy effect. Panel data analysis provides an evidence on electoral cycles in the categories of spending considered in the literature as invisible to the electorate. In particular, local incumbents seeking re-election signal higher competence through manipulation of spending policies associated with social support, environmental protection, public safety and administration. Further research indicates that electoral cycles in Spain are intensified by limited authority of councillors determined by transfers from the central government. The main findings suggest that distribution of fiscal power to sub-national governments may mitigate the effects of political budget cycles.
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spelling Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and SpainPublic spendingPolitical business cyclesFiscal decentralizationFiscal autonomyGastos públicosCiclos políticosDescentralização fiscalAutonomia fiscalIn this work the discussion is focused on the empirical test of the presence of opportunistic cycles in municipal budgets of Poland and Spain. In the view of progressive decentralization of public sector, the research is extended by the examination of fiscal autonomy effect. Panel data analysis provides an evidence on electoral cycles in the categories of spending considered in the literature as invisible to the electorate. In particular, local incumbents seeking re-election signal higher competence through manipulation of spending policies associated with social support, environmental protection, public safety and administration. Further research indicates that electoral cycles in Spain are intensified by limited authority of councillors determined by transfers from the central government. The main findings suggest that distribution of fiscal power to sub-national governments may mitigate the effects of political budget cycles.Neste trabalho a discussão centra-se no teste empírico à presença de ciclos oportunistas nos orçamentos municipais de Espanha e Polonia. Com base na progressiva descentralização do sector publico, a investigação estende-se também ao tratamento dos efeitos da autonomia fiscal. A analise de dados de painel fornece evidencias da existência de ciclos eleitorais nas categorias de gastos públicos consideradas na literatura como invisíveis ao eleitorado. Em particular, governos locais que procurem a reeleição apresentam uma maior evidência de manipulação de politicas de gastos públicos associados atividades como apoio social, proteção ambiental, segurança publica e administração. A investigação indica ainda que os ciclos eleitorais em Espanha são intensificados em concelhos com autonomia limitada e determinada por transferências vindas da administração central. Os principais resultados sugerem que a transferência de poder para os governos locais pode mitigar os efeitos dos ciclos políticos nos respetivos orçamentos.2016-03-15T15:02:07Z2015-01-01T00:00:00Z20152015-06info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfapplication/octet-streamhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/11086TID:201100819engWacławska, Kamila Angelikainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:46:33Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/11086Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:22:26.839403Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
title Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
spellingShingle Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
Wacławska, Kamila Angelika
Public spending
Political business cycles
Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal autonomy
Gastos públicos
Ciclos políticos
Descentralização fiscal
Autonomia fiscal
title_short Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
title_full Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
title_fullStr Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
title_full_unstemmed Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
title_sort Political business cycles in public goods expenditures in Poland and Spain
author Wacławska, Kamila Angelika
author_facet Wacławska, Kamila Angelika
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Wacławska, Kamila Angelika
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Public spending
Political business cycles
Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal autonomy
Gastos públicos
Ciclos políticos
Descentralização fiscal
Autonomia fiscal
topic Public spending
Political business cycles
Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal autonomy
Gastos públicos
Ciclos políticos
Descentralização fiscal
Autonomia fiscal
description In this work the discussion is focused on the empirical test of the presence of opportunistic cycles in municipal budgets of Poland and Spain. In the view of progressive decentralization of public sector, the research is extended by the examination of fiscal autonomy effect. Panel data analysis provides an evidence on electoral cycles in the categories of spending considered in the literature as invisible to the electorate. In particular, local incumbents seeking re-election signal higher competence through manipulation of spending policies associated with social support, environmental protection, public safety and administration. Further research indicates that electoral cycles in Spain are intensified by limited authority of councillors determined by transfers from the central government. The main findings suggest that distribution of fiscal power to sub-national governments may mitigate the effects of political budget cycles.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z
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