School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2631 |
Resumo: | We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in three different informational set¬tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug-gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is as suc¬cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un¬der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the others' payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—, the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others. |
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School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanismsSchool ChoiceAdmission of StudentsEconomic and Social SettingsInformationWe present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in three different informational set¬tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug-gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is as suc¬cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un¬der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the others' payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—, the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under grant SFRH/BD/5308/2001 and from the spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under research grant BEC2002-02130. And financial support under the grant Beca de Postgrado para la Formación de Profesorado Universitario from the spanish Min¬isterio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte (Ref.: AP2001-0923).ISEG – Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, JoanaPintér, Agnes2010-12-09T11:58:22Z20062006-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2631engPais, Joana e Agnes Pintér. 2006. "School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 14-2006/DE/UECE0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:33:49Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/2631Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:50:36.393777Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
spellingShingle |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms Pais, Joana School Choice Admission of Students Economic and Social Settings Information |
title_short |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_full |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_fullStr |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_full_unstemmed |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
title_sort |
School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms |
author |
Pais, Joana |
author_facet |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Agnes |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pintér, Agnes |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Agnes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
School Choice Admission of Students Economic and Social Settings Information |
topic |
School Choice Admission of Students Economic and Social Settings Information |
description |
We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in three different informational set¬tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug-gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is as suc¬cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un¬der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the others' payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—, the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z 2010-12-09T11:58:22Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2631 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2631 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana e Agnes Pintér. 2006. "School choice and information: an experimental study on matching mechanisms". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 14-2006/DE/UECE 0874-4548 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG – Departamento de Economia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG – Departamento de Economia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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