College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pais, Filipa
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25819
Resumo: Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings.We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.
id RCAP_62750ec0185a4de2ab4d3183bb8fe00f
oai_identifier_str oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25819
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling College admissions and the role of information: An experimental studyCollege Admission ProblemsSchool ChoiceEfficiencyGame Theoretic ModelingThree well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings.We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.John Wiley & SonsRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, Filipa2022-10-28T13:09:55Z20112011-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25819engPais, Joana; Ágnes Pintér and Róbert F. Veszteg.(2011). "College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study". International Economic Review, Vol. 52, Nº 3: pp. 713-737.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:55:20Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25819Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:09:34.390884Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
title College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
spellingShingle College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
Pais, Filipa
College Admission Problems
School Choice
Efficiency
Game Theoretic Modeling
title_short College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
title_full College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
title_fullStr College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
title_full_unstemmed College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
title_sort College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
author Pais, Filipa
author_facet Pais, Filipa
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pais, Filipa
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv College Admission Problems
School Choice
Efficiency
Game Theoretic Modeling
topic College Admission Problems
School Choice
Efficiency
Game Theoretic Modeling
description Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings.We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2011-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-10-28T13:09:55Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25819
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25819
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pais, Joana; Ágnes Pintér and Róbert F. Veszteg.(2011). "College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study". International Economic Review, Vol. 52, Nº 3: pp. 713-737.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley & Sons
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799131190588866560

Registros relacionados